In re Reed

• Citation: 207 La. 1011,22 So.2d 552
• Decision Date: 30 April 1945
• Docket Number: 37041.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: In re REED.

22 So.2d 552

207 La. 1011

In re REED.

No. 37041.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

April 30, 1945

Charles A. McCoy, of Lake Charles, Hollingsworth B Barret, of Shreveport Frank Wm. Hart, of New Orleans, Guy V Rich, of Bogalusa, Carroll Buck, of Amite, and Benjamin Y Wolf, of New Orleans, for Supreme Court Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances.

J. L. Warren Woodville and Walter B. Hamlin, both of New Orleans, for Alphonse H. Reed, exceptor.

HAMITER Justice.

Invoking the original jurisdiction of this court, the Louisiana State Bar Association, through the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, filed a petition charging generally that Alphonse H. Reed, a resident of New Orleans and a member of the Bar of Louisiana, has 'demeaned himself in a manner inconsistent and at variance with the oath subscribed by him as an attorney-at-law, and has disregarded the ethics, duties and obligations as a lawyer which he assumed as a member of the Bar by reason whereof he should be disbarred from the further practice of his profession in the State of Louisiana.'

Specifically, the Committee charged:

'That the said Alphonse H. Reed, unlawfully and in collusion with principals and J. Claude Meraux, former Judge of the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court for St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, had illegal divorces rendered in eight cases where neither plaintiffs nor defendants were residents of St. Bernard Parish in which acts of collusion are shown, as shown by the pleadings and notes of evidence in said cases, wherein there was no jurisdiction either of the parties or of the subject matter of said suits, as will appear from the cases hereinafter cited.

'That in many such cases where the alleged cause was adultery, services were accepted and citations waived by the defendants, such acceptances of service by the defendants at times being made and noted on the petitions several days before filing; that in other cases the defendants signed and made affidavits to the answers and collusively admitted allegations of adultery, and in many such cases the affidavits to the answers were made before the filing of said suits. In many cases the notices of trial were prepared by the attorneys for the plaintiffs and service thereof accepted by the defendant and filed as a prelude to a quick rendition of judgment by the said Judge of said Court, in collusion with said defendant herein and the said parties thereto.'

Respondent excepted to the petition as disclosing no cause of action. The exception was considered by us on a previous hearing and overruled. In Re Reed, 203 La. 1008, 14 So.2d 818.

After respondent had answered, denying the charges urged by the Committee, Honorable Oliver P. Carriere, an attorney-at-law of the New Orleans Bar, was appointed Commissioner to receive the evidence in the matter and to report to the court his findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In due course, following his holding of a hearing on the charges, the Commissioner presented his written report. He found to be groundless the accusation that collusion existed between respondent Reed and the former Judge J. Claude Meraux, no proof to sustain it having been offered. Also, he concluded that the allegation relative to a lack of the district court's jurisdiction in the divorce suits was without merit, he observing that 'the records of the various cases filed in this disbarment proceeding show that in all eight cases the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.' Furthermore, it was the finding of the Commissioner that the evidence does not disclose collusion in the divorce cases, between Reed and the parties to the suits, for the purpose of quick rendition of judgments.

But the Commissioner entertained the belief, based on the evidence adduced, that the method employed by respondent in obtaining the divorces was improper in certain respects and constituted professional misconduct. For this reason he recommended that Reed be suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month.

Both the Committee and the respondent filed exceptions to the Commissioner's report, and on them the matter is now presented.

The Committee complains first of the Commissioner's ruling in sustaining an objection to a question propounded by it to the witness, Judge Meraux. This witness had testified that in his court, on confirmation of a default in any divorce case, he did not read or examine the petition and the return on the citation, but that he relied entirely on the explanation of their contents as given by the attorney. Then he was asked: 'Would you have acted in the manner you did [granting judgments in the eight divorce cases] if you had examined that record?' When respondent's counsel objected to the question, the Commissioner ruled:

'The objection is sustained. His answer now as to what he would have done if he had read the record is immaterial, as he would not know what he would have done at that time anyhow, at this moment. The record speaks for itself.'

The Committee contends, under its first complaint, that the Commissioner had no right to exclude the testimony; that it should have been received for consideration by this court which alone has the authority of determining whether or not it was competent evidence. The rules of this court are silent with reference to the power of the Commissioner to exclude evidence. In that capacity, however, he is a representative of the court, possessing delegated authority to receive all evidence directly touching upon the issues to be decided in the proceeding. Therefore, if evidence is offered that is manifestly inadmissible, such as that which is wholly irrelevant or rank hearsay or pure conjecture, the Commissioner, in our opinion, should not permit it to encumber the record; if, on the other hand, its inadmissibility does not clearly appear, he should admit it. The query directed to the witness, Judge Meraux, called for an answer based purely on conjecture, and we think that the Commissioner correctly sustained the objection.

Next, the Committee excepts to the finding of the Commissioner that there was no collusion, for the purpose of quick rendition of the divorce judgments, between Reed, the parties to the suits, and Judge Meraux. It insists that such finding is in conflict with certain observations of this court in Perez v. Meraux, 201 La. 498, 9 So.2d 662, 677, and In Re Reed, supra. The observation in the first named case was:

'Moreover, the evidence in the record unmistakably shows that the court over which the defendant judge presided was used in obtaining illegal judgments of divorce and annulment of marriages where, in a large number of instances, collusion and fraud were employed. We are not impressed with the protestations of the judge that he had no knowledge of these facts--in other words, his claim that advantage was taken of him by the attorneys and litigants in these cases--for it is difficult for us to understand just how the judge could sit and hear such a large number of cases in which so many irregularities are patent on the face of the record and the notes of evidence so scant, without at least having his suspicions aroused as to what was going on. Particularly is this true when as many as three of these cases were heard by him in a single day. Then, too, the striking similarity in the method employed in the handling of these cases by the four principal attorneys who are involved should, in our opinion, have placed him on his guard.'

In the other proceeding to which reference is made (the Reed matter decided on the exception of no cause of action), we said [203 La. 1008, 14 So.2d 820]:

'It is needless to discuss in detail the other divorce suits referred to by the Committee. It suffices to...