IN RE REINSTATEMENT OF KADRIE

Decision Date09 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. C5-90-383.,C5-90-383.
Citation602 N.W.2d 868
PartiesIn re Petition for REINSTATEMENT to the Practice of Law OF Richard J. KADRIE, Petitioner.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Jerry Straus, Minneapolis, for petitioner.

Edward J. Cleary, Director, Betty M. Shaw, Senior Assistant Director, St. Paul, for Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This appeal comes to us on the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board panel's January 14, 1999 recommendation to deny Richard J. Kadrie's petition for reinstatement. On June 6, 1990, petitioner Kadrie was indefinitely suspended for forging a cashier's check, misappropriating client funds and falsely stating that he held the funds in trust for a client. See In re Kadrie, 456 N.W.2d 717, 718-19 (Minn. 1990). The indefinite suspension order did not allow petitioner to petition for reinstatement for a minimum of five years. See id. at 719. Prior to his suspension, petitioner had been placed on probation for failing to maintain books and records for client trust funds and law office funds; for falsely certifying that he maintained such books and records; for failing to provide an accountant's report to the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility in a timely manner; for failing to produce books and records upon request by the director; and for failing to cooperate with the supervising attorney appointed by the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB). See id. at 718.

Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Kadrie filed a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. The director performed an investigation and submitted a report to a three-member LPRB panel. The panel held a hearing on February 26, 1997, and heard testimony from petitioner and a consulting psychologist, Dr. Paul Reitman. The panel concluded that petitioner had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he had "undergone such a moral change as now to render him a fit person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited." In re Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn.1984) (Swanson I). The panel then issued its findings of fact and conclusions, and recommended against reinstatement. Oral arguments were scheduled in this court, but before they could be held a new complaint was filed against petitioner with the director. The proceedings were remanded to the panel. The director investigated the complaint and submitted a supplemental report to the panel.

A second panel hearing was held on October 9, 1998. The panel found that the new complaint had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the panel concluded that petitioner's failure to satisfy a civil judgment entered against him in 1991 for six years evidenced that he did not understand the wrongfulness of his conduct and had not undergone a moral change. Further, the panel concluded that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he possessed the skills and knowledge needed to practice law competently, and again recommended that his petition for reinstatement be denied.

We conclude that neither of the panel's conclusions are supported by the record. Accordingly, we reject the panel's recommendation that petitioner's application for reinstatement be denied and reinstate petitioner subject to the conditions set forth below.

I.

In reinstatement cases this court conducts an independent review of the entire record before making its determination. See In re Maki, 536 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Minn.1995)

. While the panel's recommendation is duly considered, it is not binding. The responsibility for determining whether a petitioner will be reinstated rests with this court. See, e.g., In re Williams, 433 N.W.2d 104, 104 (Minn.1988) (reinstating petitioner where the panel recommended denial).

The standard for determining whether a disbarred or suspended attorney should be reinstated focuses on whether the attorney has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he has undergone a moral change. See In re Wegner, 417 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Minn.1987)

. This moral change must be such that if the petitioner were reinstated, "clients could submit their most intimate and important affairs to him with complete confidence in both his competence and fidelity." In re Herman, 293 Minn. 472, 476, 197 N.W.2d 241, 244 (1972). Evidence of a moral change "must come not only from an observed record of appropriate conduct, but from the petitioner's own state of mind and his values." In re Swanson, 405 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Minn.1987)

(Swanson II).

However, evidence of moral change is not our only consideration. Other factors bearing on whether a petitioner should be reinstated are: (1) petitioner's recognition of the wrongfulness of his conduct, see Swanson II, 405 N.W.2d at 893

; (2) the length of time since the misconduct and disbarment or suspension, see In re Hanson, 454 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Minn.1990); (3) the seriousness of the original misconduct, see In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.1979); (4) the existence of physical or mental illness or pressures that are susceptible to correction, see Wegner, 417 N.W.2d at 98-99; In re Ossanna, 288 Minn. 541, 542, 180 N.W.2d 260, 261 (1970); and (5) petitioner's intellectual competency to practice law, see In re Strand, 259 Minn. 379, 381, 107 N.W.2d 518, 519 (1961).

The panel's conclusion that petitioner has not demonstrated moral change by clear and convincing evidence is supported primarily by its finding that petitioner

has not acted to rectify the harm caused by his misconduct, nor to atone for the moral failure it represented. Until the initial hearing in this matter, he resisted payment of damages awarded to his former client. After the initial hearing, he satisfied the * * * judgment, but the circumstances do not indicate a desire to rectify or atone for harm he caused.

The damages in question arose out of a 1991 counterclaim against petitioner by a former client. Petitioner sued the client for attorney fees stemming from petitioner's representation of the client in a real estate transaction. The client brought a counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation and negligence. The former client was also the complainant in an earlier action which led to petitioner's suspension. While petitioner's claim was dismissed due to his misconduct, the former client was awarded damages of $33,200.95 in her counterclaim. Though the judgment was rendered in 1991, petitioner did not satisfy it until 1997. The panel's conclusions indicate that petitioner's delay in satisfying the judgment evinced that he had not recognized the wrongfulness of his actions, and thus had not demonstrated clear and convincing evidence of moral change. The record shows, however, that petitioner satisfied the judgment as soon as he was financially able to do so. An affidavit submitted by petitioner's employer with attached W-2 payroll records demonstrates that petitioner could not have satisfied the judgment until 1997, when he received a large bonus. Contrary to the panel's findings, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that when able the petitioner acted to rectify the harm he caused his former client.

Likewise, the record shows that petitioner has recognized the wrongfulness of his actions. Petitioner repeatedly expressed remorse for his misdeeds at both panel hearings. While the panel found in the first hearing that petitioner "testified that he recognizes his misconduct was a serious mistake, for which he is remorseful," it still concluded that he "exhibits a limited understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct. His remorse appears to be focused on the consequences to himself rather than on the harm it caused to his clients and to the integrity of the legal profession." While this court defers to the credibility assessments of lower courts and tribunals, in this case the panel's assessment seems to be rooted in its concern about the judgment that remained unsatisfied for six years. As stated above, the six-year delay was due more to petitioner's financial situation than to a lack of remorse. In fact, the record contains unrefuted evidence of petitioner's expressions of remorse,1 as well as Dr. Reitman's corroborating testimony that petitioner repeatedly expressed regret for his actions in their sessions together. The record shows that petitioner has demonstrated clear and convincing evidence of his recognition of and repentance for the wrongfulness of his actions.

The length of time since petitioner's misdeeds and suspension also weighs in favor of his reinstatement. While our indefinite suspension order allowed petitioner to apply for reinstatement after five years, see Kadrie, 456 N.W.2d at 719, more than nine years have passed since his suspension. It should be noted that a five-year suspension exceeds in duration most discipline this court has ordered in cases concerning conduct of comparable gravity. For example, in In re Mack, 476 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 1991), this court considered reinstatement of an attorney who had, among other things, misappropriated client funds, knowingly filed false interrogatory answers, and filed false tax returns. See id. at 893. The attorney was suspended indefinitely without eligibility for reinstatement for at least 21 months. See id. at 894. Similarly, in In re Porter, 472 N.W.2d 654 (Minn.1991), an attorney who falsified will documents, swore falsely under oath and misappropriated client funds was suspended indefinitely without eligibility for reinstatement for at least six months. See id. at 655. We do not claim that petitioner's suspension was too lengthy, only that it was not, in light of this court's precedent, too short.

As to the factor concerning the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct, the panel found at both hearings that the misconduct was serious, as it "involved dishonesty and deceit, betrayal of a client, disregard of professional...

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