In re Reorganization of Pittsburgh Rys. Co.

Decision Date30 April 1940
Docket Number7283.,No. 7271,7271
Citation111 F.2d 932
PartiesIn re REORGANIZATION OF PITTSBURGH RYS. CO. et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Wm. Alvah Stewart, Jr., City Sol., Richard B. Tucker, Jr., and Leon Wald, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for City of Pittsburgh, appellant.

A. E. Kountz and Lewis M. Alpern, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Tort Creditors' Committee, Appellant.

J. Henry O'Neill, J. Garfield Houston, and Blaxter, O'Neill & Houston, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for W. D. George, Thomas M. Benner, and Thomas Fitzgerald, trustees.

Philip A. Fleger and W. A. Seifert, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Philadelphia Co. and certain underliers.

Lee C. Beatty and Richard W. Ahlers, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Citizens Traction Co., Penn Street Ry. Co., and Suburban Rapid Transit St. Ry. Co.

Hill Burgwin, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Allegheny Traction Co. and Millvale Etna & Sharpsburg St. Ry. Co.

John M. Reed, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Samuel H. Putnam.

Before MARIS, CLARK, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

These are appeals from an order of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania directing the trustees of Pittsburgh Railways Company, a debtor in reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq., and of Pittsburgh Motor Coach Company, a subsidiary, to pay as an administration expense taxes assessed against fifty-five underlying companies whose properties under leases and operating agreements form part of the Pittsburgh Railways System. A schedule of the taxes involved in this appeal is set out below.1

None of the taxes listed in the schedule was assessed against the debtor or its subsidiary and none bears any relation to the properties leased by the underliers to the debtor. Each is a tax upon the income of the underliers or upon their capital stock or securities. In other words, although they are taxes due and owing by the underliers to the state and federal governments, they are not taxes due and owing by the debtor. The sole obligation of the debtor with respect to these taxes arose under the leases and operating agreements with the underliers which provided that the debtor should pay all taxes assessed against the underliers. The obligation of the debtor to pay the taxes was an additional consideration for its use of the underliers' property, and, therefore, as to it a rental obligation rather than a tax liability.2

The appellees argue that since the properties of the underlying companies are in the possession of the trustees of the debtor and are being used and operated by them with properties of the debtor as a unified system the taxes of the underlying companies are, in effect, taxes of the unified system and are, therefore, operating and administrative expenses of the trustees.3 The district court adopted this view.

We are asked to ignore the legal relationships existing between the Philadelphia Company,4 the debtor and the underliers5 and their separate corporate identities and treat them all as one unified transportation system. For all practical purposes, the appellees argue, the separate identity of the underlying corporations has been lost. We are not impressed with the equity of this plea. Under other circumstances the appellee, the Philadelphia Company, has not sought to ignore its corporate identity but has taken refuge behind it to escape liability upon an underlier's bond,6 as has also the debtor7 and an underlier.8 The appellees, the Philadelphia Company and the underliers, appear not too sincere in their contention that the corporate form is merely fiction when it is observed that the underliers have refrained from themselves filing petitions for reorganization, with the result that the only corporations in the system which are in process of reorganization are the debtor and its subsidiary. The Trustees are not trustees for the Philadelphia Company nor for any of the underliers. Neither the past history of the system nor the present state of the reorganization proceedings would, we think, justify our ignoring the existence of the separate legal entities which compose that system.

A number of the taxes here involved became due prior to the filing of the petition for reorganization on May 10, 1938. These are the federal income taxes for 1937 and federal income taxes for 1937 withheld at source, due March 15, 19389 and the Pennsylvania net income taxes for 1937, due April 15, 1938.10 Even though the taxpayer was given the option to pay these taxes in installments the taxes were actually due on the dates mentioned, which were the dates fixed by law for filing the tax returns. The failure of the debtor to pay these taxes was a breach of the leases and operating agreements and the amounts then due became simple contract claims against the debtor, due when the debtor's petition was filed.11 As to these claims the underliers must take their position with all other general creditors.

A different question is presented by the taxes for 1938 since they became due while the trustees were actually administering the debtor's estate and making use of the properties of the underliers in such administration.

The trustees have no obligation to pay the rentals due under the leases, as such, unless and until they affirm the leases and operating contracts. They have a reasonable time within which to affirm or disaffirm. During the interim their sole obligation is to pay the lessors a reasonable amount for the use and occupation of the properties actually in use.12 This rule, which was originally laid down in railroad receiverships in equity, applies to the reorganization of a street railway under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C.A. § 207.13 If an interim payment is made it is ordinarily held that it should not be in an amount in excess of the net earnings derived from the operation of the lessor's properties.14

It may be, as argued by the appellees, that in this case it is impossible fairly to allocate the net earnings of the system to the various leased lines. In that case it may be necessary for the court to fix an allowance for use and occupation upon the basis of the fair value of the property actually used by the trustees. This we need not now determine for the court must first determine the property which is being used, the extent of its use and the net earnings being derived from it or its value.15 Until that is done any order made by the court would have no factual basis and would, therefore, be arbitrary and possibly confiscatory.

It is urged that unless the taxes are paid immediately irreparable harm may result, since the taxing authorities may distrain. If and when this situation arises and the district court deems such a distraint undesirable and likely to hinder the reorganization, it may utilize the powers conferred upon it and enjoin all the proceedings to enforce the lien of any distraint made upon any property in which the debtor has an interest.16 However, the record before us does not justify a conclusion that the taxing authorities intend to distrain without leave of court. The court may properly withhold such leave pending determination of such vital questions to the reorganization as whether the trustees plan to affirm or disaffirm the leases, which of the underliers are to become part of the new transportation unit and whether the debtor's counterclaims against the underliers to which reference is made in the master's report...

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9 cases
  • Sprinkle v. Davis
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 4 Mayo 1940
  • In re Mr. Gatti's, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Texas
    • 2 Marzo 1994
    ...rent. Braniff, 783 F.2d at 1286. See also Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 656, 61 S.Ct. 538, 85 L.Ed. 651 (1941) affirming 111 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir.1940); Crook v. Zorn, 100 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.1939), cert. denied 307 U.S. 630, 59 S.Ct. 833, 83 L.Ed. 1513 (1939); Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F.2d ......
  • In re Pittsburgh Rys. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 7 Mayo 1946
    ...the Supreme Court in Philadelphia Company v. Dipple, 1941, 312 U.S. 168, 61 S.Ct. 538, 85 L.Ed. 651, affirming In re Reorganization of Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 3 Cir., 111 F.2d 932. There the effort was to compel the trustees, in the same reorganization to pay the taxes of the underlying compan......
  • In re Los Angeles Land and Investments, Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii
    • 21 Febrero 1968
    ...classification since an unsecured indebtedness or liability is the common denominator of all." See also In re Reorganization of Pittsburgh Rys. Co., C.A. 3rd (1940), 111 F.2d 932. The general unsecured creditor classification recommended by the trustee in his petition, which he believes to ......
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