In re Rinker

• Decision Date: 16 November 1955
• Citation: 180 Pa.Super. 143,117 A.2d 780
• Parties: In re Terry RINKER, Harry L. Rinker and Nancy Marie Rinker, Dependent and Neglected Minors. Appeal of Charlotte Bumgardner RINKER.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

117 A.2d 780

180 Pa.Super. 143

In re Terry RINKER, Harry L. Rinker and Nancy Marie Rinker, Dependent and Neglected Minors. Appeal of Charlotte Bumgardner RINKER.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

November 16, 1955

Proceeding upon child welfare worker's petition to have children declared neglected. The Court of Quarter sessions Huntingdon County, Swirles L. Himes, President Judge, sitting as Juvenile Court, dated June 22, 1955, awarded custody of the children to Huntingdon County Child Welfare Services, and Mother appealed. The Superior Court, No. 283, October Term 1955, Woodside, J., held that evidence was not sufficient to sustain trial court's finding that children were neglected and that mother neglected to provide proper care necessary for morals and well-being of children or to sustain order committing children to care and custody of welfare agency.

Record returned to court below for action consistent with opinion.

Richard W. Linton, Huntingdon, for appellant.

R. Merle Heffner, Dist. Atty., Huntingdon, for appellee.

Before RHODES, P. J., and HIRT, ROSS, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE and ERVIN, JJ.

WOODSIDE, Judge.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Huntingdon County Sitting as a Juvenile Court in which it declared the appellant's three children neglected, and directed them committed to the care and custody of the Huntingdon County Child Welfare Services.

The mother, who has taken this appeal, questions the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the action of the court.

A petition to have the children declared ‘ neglected’ was filed in the Juvenile Court by a child welfare worker. The court ordered that the case be heard January 19, 1955 at which time the testimony of a number of witnesses was taken. After the hearing the learned Judge ‘ determined’ that the best interests of the children required their care, guidance and control and committed them to the care and custody of the Welfare Services.

As provided in section 15 of the Juvenile Court Law of June 2, 1933, P.L. 1433, 11 P.S. § 257, upon petition of the mother the court granted a review and rehearing. At the rehearing the court admitted the testimony taken at the previous hearing and heard additional witnesses.

There was no error in this procedure. Weintraub's Appeal, 1950, 166 Pa.Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823.

The procedure provided by the above section of the Juvenile Court Law for a rehearing is unusual, but its purpose is evident. To avoid the atmosphere and the formality of a courtroom the legislature established a separate court and procedure to deal with children. The informality of the procedure has much to do with its value, and this informality is generally followed by juvenile court judges and is encouraged both by the legislature and the appellate courts. This informality, however makes it impossible to present to an appellsate court a record that can be intelligently reviewed.

In order to provide a proper record for review when appeals are taken the legislature provided for the ‘ review and rehearing’ which the lower court must grant when requested within 21 days of the final order and which requires that the testimony be taken down and transcribed by an official court stenographer. The final order from which an appeal may be taken to this Court is based upon the record made at the rehearing.

In the instant case the mother was present at the first hearing; she was represented by counsel who examined and cross-examined witnesses; an official court stenographer took down and transcribed the testimony. Under these circumstances it was proper to admit the transcript of this testimony into evidence at the rehearing. as a part of the record of the rehearing. Weintraub Appeal, supra. Both the petitioner, who was represented by the District Attorney, and the mother of the alleged neglected children had a right to offer additional testimony at the rehearing. Both did.

On the basis of the evidence thus submitted the court made certain findings of fact upon which it based its final order of June 22, 1955. The court found that the children were neglected, and that the mother neglected to provide the proper care necessary for the morals and well being of the children and it ordered them committed to the care and custody of the welfare agency. We are of the opinion that the evidence did not warrant this action.

Section 1 of the Juvenile Court Law, supra, 11 P.S. § 243, provides, inter alia, as follows:

‘ (5) the words ‘ neglected child’ include:

‘ (b) A child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her parent, guardian, custodian or legal representative;

‘ (c) A child whose parent, guardian, custodian or legal representative neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care, or other care necessary for his or her health, morals or well-being’ .

The family is an institution which preceded governments. Its sanctity was universally recognized before judges or statutes or constitutions or welfare organizations were known to man. The right of a child to a mother and a mother to a child are rights created by natural law. They are rights attributable to the nature of mankind rather than to the enactments of law.

It is a serious matter for the long arm of the state to reach into a home and snatch a child from its mother. It is a power which a government dedicated to freedom for the individual should exercise with extreme care, and only where the evidence clearly establishes its necessity. Yet, of course, there are cases where such authority must be exercised for the protection and welfare of children.

Under our system of government children are not the property of the state to be reared only where and under such conditions as officials deem best. On the other hand the state is interested in establishing a minimum standard of care for a child's physical, intellectual and moral well being. But this minimum standard must be viewed in the light of experience. Although there are many very good homes, there is no such thing as a ‘ perfect home.’

A child cannot be declared ‘ neglected’ merely because his condition might be improved by changing his parents. The welfare of many children might be served by taking them from their homes and placing them in what the officials may consider a better home. But the Juvenile Court Law was not intended to provide a procedure to take the children of the poor and give them to the rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and give them to the educated, nor to take the children of the crude and give them to the cultured, nor to take the children of the weak and sickly and give them to the strong and healthy.

The power of the juvenile court is not to adjudicate what is for the best interests of a child, but to adjudicate whether or not the child is neglected. In re Rose Child Dependency Case, 1947, 161 Pa.Super. 204, 208, 54 A.2d 297.

Much of what we have said above was contained in the opinion of President Judge Himes of the lower court, some in almost the same language. Where we differ with the court below is not so much on the principles involved but in their application to the evidence.

The fact that the state is supporting the children does not take away from the mother any rights which she would have to the custody of the children were she supporting them from her own resources.

In habeas corpus cases involving the custody of children the contest is between two people usually parents or relatives. It seldom involves people who have not been at some time in a parental relationship to the child. In these cases the government acts as an arbiter between the parties and determines with whom the child's interests will best be served.

An action to have a child declared neglected is a contest between the state and the parent or person having custody of the child. The state becomes both arbiter and party. In order that justice may be done, it is necessary that juvenile court judges exercise their power with caution, for the restraint that it upon them is limited largely to self restraint.

It is because of this distinction between habeas corpus and neglected cases that the Supreme Court may have pronounced the apparently inconsistent rules of Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 1953, 374 Pa. 172, 97 A.2d 350; and Ciammaichella's Appeal, 1952, 369 Pa. 278, 85 A.2d 406.

In the Eastridge case the Supreme Court held that an appellate court is not free to nullify the fact-finding function of the hearing judge in a habeas corpus case, and that in such case the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony can best be determined by the judge before whom they appear.

In the Ciammaichella's Appeal the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court should not limit its review in a neglected case but should exercise its independent judgment after consideration of the entire record. ‘ Obviously,’ it was there said, ‘ its [the Superior Court's] scope extends to the fullest review consistent with equitable principles.’ 369 Pa. at page 281, 85 A.2d at page 408.

We perceive that as one of these cases was a habeas corpus and the other a neglected case, the rule relating to the scope of review in the Ciammaichella's Appeal was not reversed by the Eastridge case. But even if we were to limit our review in this case to the scope imposed upon us by the Eastridge case we would reach the same conclusion.

An examination of the record in this case shows that the evidence of the Commonwealth is not seriously disputed. The determination of this matter depends upon the inferences to be drawn from the evidence rather than the credibility of the witnesses.

The children in...