In re Roberson

• Decision Date: 29 September 2016
• Citation: 142 A.D.3d 1259,37 N.Y.S.3d 797,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 06278
• Parties: In the Matter of the Claim of Jennifer ROBERSON, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

142 A.D.3d 1259
37 N.Y.S.3d 797
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 06278

In the Matter of the Claim of Jennifer ROBERSON, Appellant.

Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Sept. 29, 2016.

37 N.Y.S.3d 798

Jennifer Roberson, Jamaica, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Mary Hughes of counsel), for respondent.

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Devine, Clark and Mulvey, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.P.

142 A.D.3d 1259

Appeals from two decisions of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 1, 2014, which ruled, among other things, that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

37 N.Y.S.3d 799

In November 2012, claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits and began receiving those benefits as well as federally funded emergency unemployment compensation (see Pub. L. 110–252, tit. IV, § 4001 et seq., 122 U.S. Stat. 2323). Thereafter, the Department of Labor issued initial determinations that found claimant ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed during the time that she received benefits and disqualified her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she had left that employment without good cause. The determinations

142 A.D.3d 1260

charged her with a recoverable overpayment of the different benefits that she received and also imposed a forfeiture and civil penalties for her willful misrepresentations pursuant to Labor Law § 594. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge sustained the Department's initial determinations. Ultimately, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed, finding that claimant was not totally unemployed while receiving benefits, that she had voluntarily left that employment without good cause and that the recoverable overpayments and penalties imposed were appropriate. Claimant now appeals.

We affirm. Initially, “Labor Law § 591(1) limits eligibility for benefits to those claimants who are ‘totally unemployed’ ” (Matter of Connerton [Thousand Is. Cent. Sch. Dist.—Commissioner of Labor], 132 A.D.3d 1210, 1210–1211, 19 N.Y.S.3d 613 [2015], quoting Matter of Alm [Commissioner of Labor], 302 A.D.2d 777, 778, 754 N.Y.S.2d 779 [2003] ), which is defined as “the total lack of any employment on any day” (Labor Law § 522 ; see Matter of Brown [Erie 2 Chautauqua–Cattaraugus Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs.—Commissioner of Labor], 133 A.D.3d 1146, 1146, 20 N.Y.S.3d 232 [2015] ; Matter of Smith [Commissioner of Labor], 8 A.D.3d 744, 745, 777 N.Y.S.2d 771 [2004] ). “[W]hether a claimant is totally unemployed for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits is a factual question for the Board and its determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Robinson [Commissioner of Labor], 125 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 3 N.Y.S.3d 177 [2015], lv. dismissed 26 N.Y.3d 953, 17 N.Y.S.3d 70, 38 N.E.3d 815 [2015] ; see Matter of Nebel [Commissioner of Labor], 108 A.D.3d 1007, 1008, 970 N.Y.S.2d 128 [2013] ). The record evidence adduced at the hearing, including claimant's own testimony, establishes...