In re Robinson
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-PR-846 |
| Citation | 280 A.3d 194 |
| Parties | IN RE Pearl ROBINSON; Bruce E. Gardner, Appellant. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Bruce Gardner, pro se.
Before Glickman and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Thompson, Senior Judge.*
Appellant Bruce E. Gardner is a court-appointed guardian and conservator. Mr. Gardner asked the trial court to approve compensation for work performed on behalf of his ward, Ms. Pearl Robinson. The trial court granted that request in part and denied it in part. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Mr. Gardner sought approximately $45,000 in compensation, claiming an hourly rate of $300. The trial court awarded Mr. Gardner approximately $33,000. The trial court generally accepted Mr. Gardner's hourly rate of $300, but reduced the rate to $90 for certain non-legal tasks and $25 for less complex non-legal tasks. The trial court also disallowed some claimed hours and expenses.
Mr. Gardner challenges the trial court's reduction of his hourly rate. We agree that a remand is necessary on this issue.
Mr. Gardner argues that the trial court was required to compensate him at an hourly rate of $300 for all of the claimed hours, because Mr. Gardner had a valid and enforceable contract with Ms. Robinson to be compensated at that rate. We disagree.
According to Mr. Gardner, the contract was made in November 2014, just days before Ms. Robinson was found to be incapacitated. At that time, Mr. Gardner had not yet been appointed guardian/conservator and instead was a court-appointed attorney representing Ms. Robinson in connection with the petition to appoint a guardian/conservator. Ms. Robinson initially opposed the petition, but she withdrew her opposition and requested the appointment of Mr. Gardner.
We have previously expressed doubts about the validity of the claimed contract between Mr. Gardner and Ms. Robinson. In re Robinson , 216 A.3d 887, 890 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam) (). The trial court in this case also expressed grave concerns about Mr. Gardner's conduct in connection with the alleged contract. Specifically, the trial court noted that Mr. Gardner had not advised the trial court at the time of the appointment that he had negotiated a contract for compensation with Ms. Robinson, whom the court had just found to be incapacitated. Such a disclosure "would have raised red flags about a possible conflict of interest." In the trial court's view, such a disclosure would also have made it highly unlikely that Mr. Gardner would have been appointed. The trial court was "profoundly disturbed" by the ethical questions created by the alleged agreement.
Mr. Gardner does not directly address the ethical concerns raised by the trial court. He does contend, however, that the agreement was valid as a matter of contract law. We need not address that issue, because we agree with the trial court that Mr. Gardner's compensation from the funds of Ms. Robinson's estate is governed by statute rather than by Mr. Gardner's alleged contract with Ms. Robinson. See D.C. Code § 21-2060(a) (); In re Robinson , 216 A.3d at 889 (); Super. Ct. Prob. R. 308(a) (), superseded by Super. Ct. Prob. R. 322(a) () (effective Aug. 22, 2022).
We are not persuaded by Mr. Gardner's reliance on In re Estate of Grealis , 902 A.2d 821 (D.C. 2006). That case held "that when attorney's fees are not paid from the estate of a protected individual (or from the court's Guardianship Fund) but rather from private funds, no statutory basis exists for requiring court approval." Id. at 822. Mr. Gardner is seeking compensation from Ms. Robinson's estate, so this case is governed by § 21-2060(a), not by In re Estate of Grealis .
Mr. Gardner argues in passing that the trial court was required by principles of claim preclusion and issue preclusion to deem his $300 hourly rate reasonable, because that rate had previously been deemed reasonable in connection with earlier compensation applications in this case. We disagree.
In an earlier appeal, Mr. Gardner made a similar argument: that the "law of the case" doctrine precluded the trial court from finding an hourly rate unreasonable if the hourly rate had been approved in connection with earlier requests for compensation. In re Robinson , 216 A.3d at 890. We disagreed, explaining that trial courts are not required to find an hourly rate "reasonable simply because that rate had been approved, without analysis, in an earlier compensation request decided by a different judge and relating to a different time period." Id. For similar reasons, we disagree with Mr. Gardner's invocation of principles of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Mr. Gardner provides no authority supporting the idea that such principles should prevent a trial court from making an independent determination as to the reasonableness of the hourly rate claimed in a given compensation application. Moreover, we see no reason to preclude such an independent determination. On the other hand, prior rulings approving an hourly rate are certainly relevant to the determination whether that hourly rate is reasonable.
Mr. Gardner challenges the trial court's decision to reduce Mr. Gardner's hourly rate to $90 for most non-legal tasks (such as writing checks) and $25 for less complex non-legal tasks (such as shopping for Ms. Robinson). The trial court gave two reasons for its ruling. First, the trial court noted that $90 is the maximum hourly rate awarded to court-appointed guardians who are paid from public funds when a ward's estate lacks adequate funds to pay compensation. In re Goodwin , 275 A.3d 283, 287-88 (D.C. 2022). We have recently held, however, that "the fact that $90 is the hourly rate paid to guardians when an estate's assets are depleted does not mean that should be viewed as the reasonable rate for all non-legal guardianship services." In re Robinson , 216 A.3d at 892.
Second, the trial court considered information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics about the hourly wage paid to employees for various non-legal tasks that Mr. Gardner had performed. We do not doubt that such information is potentially relevant. As we have explained, the trial court may have the authority to reduce Mr. Gardner's hourly rate for non-legal tasks, either "because that...
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