In re Robinson, 88-K-1092
Decision Date | 06 March 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 88-K-1092,Bankruptcy No. 88 B 3315 E.,88-K-1092 |
Citation | 114 BR 716 |
Parties | In re Edward Earl ROBINSON and Karen Soderholm Robinson, Debtors. Edward Earl ROBINSON and Karen Soderholm Robinson, Appellants, v. Charlotte M. ROBINSON, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Milnor H. Senior, III, Denver, Colo., for Edward E. Robinson, Karen S. Robinson, debtors/appellants.
Jorge E. Castillo, Denver, Colo., for Charlotte Robinson, appellee.
This bankruptcy appeal raises an issue for which there is a split of authority among the judges of the Bankruptcy Court in this District. The issue is whether § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code can be used to avoid a judicial lien on the debtor's homestead exemption. In this case, Judge Matheson followed the position of Judge Brumbaugh as articulated in In re Fry, 83 B.R. 778 (Bankr.D.Colo.1988). Under Fry, the debtor may not avoid a judicial lien on his homestead exemption because under Colorado law, a judicial lien does not automatically attach to real property, and therefore the homestead exemption is not "impaired" as required by the terms of § 522(f). The opposing view, first expressed by Judge Brooks in In re Hermansen, 84 B.R. 729 (Bankr.D.Colo.1988), followed by Judge Clark, and urged by the debtor in this case is that a debtor may avoid a judicial lien on his homestead exemption. The Hermansen line of cases acknowledges that the lien does not attach, but reasons that the homestead exemption is "impaired" in other ways. This view was recently adopted by Judge Weinshienk in Dudun v. Rosenthal (In re Duden), 102 B.R. 797 (D.Colo.1989). The Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue.
While it is obvious that reasonable minds differ on the issue, I find Judge Brook's position that the judgment lien is avoidable is the persuasive one. Therefore, Judge Matheson's ruling denying the debtors' § 522(f) motion is reversed.
The facts in this case are stipulated. On March 18, 1988, the debtors, Earl and Karen Robinson (the "Robinsons"), filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Robinsons claimed their interest in their home as exempt from the bankruptcy estate under the Colorado Homestead Exemption, Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 38-41-201, 202 (1982). At the time of their filing, the home was worth $101,000. It was subject to a first deed of trust to Pioneer Savings Trust for $49,200 and a second deed of trust to Bank Western Federal Savings Bank for $49,683. Thus, the Robinsons had approximately $2,200 of equity in their home.
Charlotte Robinson ("Mrs. Robinson"), Mr. Robinson's ex-wife, is a creditor of the estate. She was listed on the Robinson's Statement of Liabilities as having a secured interest in a business owned by the debtors and another unsecured interest. After filing for bankruptcy, the Robinsons also learned that Mrs. Robinson had filed a judgment lien against the Robinson's residence in the amount of $57,936, plus interests and costs. The judgment arose out of Mr. Robinson's failure to pay a portion of a property settlement to Mrs. Robinson awarded in their divorce action.
On May 3, 1988, the Robinson's filed a motion to avoid the judgment lien of Mrs. Robinson under § 522(f)(1). Mrs. Robinson opposed this motion. After a hearing in which the bankruptcy court heard oral argument on the stipulated facts, the court concluded that Mrs. Robinson's lien was not avoidable. The court noted the split between bankruptcy judges in the district on the issue, but found that Judge Brumbaugh's position in Fry was the better one. See R. Vol. II at 15-17. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the Robinson's motion to avoid the judgment lien, finding that it did not impair the debtor's homestead exemption because a judgment lien does not automatically attach to real property in Colorado. The Robinsons now appeal. Review of this purely legal issue is de novo. First Bank v. Mullet (In re Mullet), 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir.1987).
A. Judgement Lien Avoidance Under Colorado and Federal Bankruptcy Law.
Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to treat certain classes of property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate and therefore exempt from recovery by creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). This section allows a debtor to elect between the exemptions provided by state law and those defined in § 522(d), the federal exemptions. However, § 522(b) authorizes each state to "opt out" of the federal scheme and to replace it entirely with a state law program of exemptions. Like many states, Colorado has elected to "opt out" of the federal program. Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-54-107 (1987); see generally In re Parrish, 19 B.R. 331, 334-35 (Bankr.D.Colo.1982) ( Colorado's exemptions constitutional).
Formal declaration of the homestead exemption is governed by Colo.Rev.Stat. § 38-41-202. The homestead exemption applies only to the debtor's equity in his home, up to the $20,000 statutory limitation. In this case, the Robinson's equity in their home was approximately $2,200. Since this amount is lower than the statutory limit, the Robinson's entire equity interest is protected by the homestead exemption. There is no dispute that the Robinsons effectively claimed the homestead exemption.
The Bankruptcy Code grants a debtor certain additional protection for its exempted property. Section 522(f)(1) of the Code provides:
11 U.S.C. § 544(f)(1). Thus, § 522(f)(1) authorizes a debtor to avoid any judicial lien on property to the extent the lien "impairs" the debtor's exemption. The intent of this section was to preserve the debtor's "fresh start." See In re Aikens, 87 B.R. 350, 354 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). The Code does not define the term "impairs."
At one time there seemed to be some question whether a debtor could use the lien avoidance provisions of § 522(f) if his exemptions were created under state law and not federal law. That question has now been conclusively resolved: state law controls what property is exempt but federal law determines the availability of the lien avoidance provision. Heape v. Citadel Bank of Independence (In re Heape), 886 F.2d 280, 282 (10th Cir.1989) (lien avoidance under § 522(f)(2)); Aetna Finance Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 336-38 (10th Cir.1989) (same); see Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1988) ( ). Thus, under the above cases, a debtor with state-created exemptions is entitled to the protection of § 522(f).
Nevertheless, Mrs. Robinson argues, relying on Fry and its progeny, that the § 522(f) does not apply in this case because her lien does not "impair" the Robinsons' homestead exemption. The rationale for this view is dependant on the particular nuances of Colorado state law with respect to the homestead exemption and the attachment of judicial liens. As explained in Fry:
83 B.R. at 779-80. Courts in the Sixth Circuit have espoused a similar view based on Ohio law. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dixon (In re Dixon), 885 F.2d 327, 329-330 (6th Cir.1989) ( ); National Deposit Guarantee Corp. v. Peck (In re Peck), 55 B.R. 752, 754-55 (N.D.Ohio 1985) (...
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