In re Robinson

Citation2019 VT 8
Decision Date22 February 2019
Docket NumberNo. 2018-112,2018-112
PartiesIn re Glenn Robinson, Esq. (Office of Disciplinary Counsel)
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

Original Jurisdiction

Professional Responsibility Board

Sheila Ware, Chair

Sarah Katz, Disciplinary Counsel, Burlington, for Petitioner-Appellant.

P. Scott McGee of Hershenson, Carter, Scott & McGee, P.C., Norwich, for Respondent-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Pearson, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

¶ 1. PER CURIAM. A hearing panel of the Professional Responsibility Board concluded that respondent, Glenn Robinson, Esq., violated several of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct—Rules 1.7, 4.3, 8.4(d), and 8.4(g)—based on his relationships with two former clients. The panel imposed a sanction suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years and placed several conditions on respondent's ability to resume practice. This Court ordered review of the hearing panel's decision, pursuant to Administrative Order 9, designating the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as appellant. A.O. 9 § 11(E). Disciplinary counsel argues that the panel erred in applying the presumptive standards for attorney discipline and asks this Court to modify the panel's sanction and disbar respondent. While accepting the recommended sanction, respondent argues that several of the panel's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, the panel incorrectly determined respondent acted knowingly in violating Rule 1.7, and the panel erred in concluding that respondent violated Rules 4.3, 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) and applying the standards for attorney discipline. We adopt the hearing panel's conclusions that respondent violated Rules 1.7, 4.3, and 8.4(g) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct; reverse the panel's conclusion that respondent violated Rule 8.4(d); and conclude that respondent's actions warrant disbarment.

I. Hearing Panel's Findings of Fact

¶ 2. The relevant facts as found by the hearing panel are as follows. Respondent was admitted to the Vermont bar and has practiced as a licensed attorney in Vermont since 1999. In 2005, respondent began business as a solo practitioner in Newport, Vermont. Most of respondent's practice related to family, criminal, and probate law. During the time period at issue, from December 2010 until approximately April 2013, respondent provided legal services for several female clients relevant to this appeal—C.M., P.B., and A.P. Respondent later employed and engaged in sexual behavior with these former clients. The hearing panel concluded that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct based on his interactions with two of these individuals, C.M. and P.B. The hearing panel found no violations with related to respondent's conduct with A.P. On appeal, we address whether the panel correctly concluded that respondent's conduct with C.M. and P.B. violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and, if so, what sanctions are appropriate. We do not consider the allegations with respect to A.P.

A. Respondent's Conduct with C.M.

¶ 3. Respondent represented C.M. in her divorce proceedings from December 2010 until June 2012. At the time, C.M. was a thirty-nine-year-old mother of five children who hadrecently separated from her husband of sixteen years. She had left the family farm and was living in a trailer in Newport Center, Vermont. Respondent engaged in a sexual relationship with C.M. from February 2011 until June 2012, while he was representing her in the divorce action.

¶ 4. Prior to entering the sexual relationship with C.M., respondent discussed with C.M. whether he could ethically enter a sexual relationship with her while representing her in the divorce action, and he told her he believed he could do so. However, respondent did not request or receive a signed written waiver from C.M. acknowledging that she was aware of the risks of engaging in a sexual relationship with respondent while he represented her or authorizing him to do so. Respondent also took steps not to be seen with C.M. in the area of the state where he practiced.

¶ 5. During the pendency of the divorce action, C.M. was under considerable financial strain; she struggled to make her monthly car and rent payments. C.M. paid respondent an initial "retainer" of approximately $2000 by cashing in a retirement account, but she stopped making monthly payments to respondent at some point over the course of his representation of her in the divorce proceedings. To alleviate C.M.'s financial burden, respondent made several offers to C.M. that she could stay with him at his condominium and hired C.M. as an employee of a tanning salon business that he owned.

¶ 6. Respondent ended the relationship with C.M. very shortly after the final merits hearing in her divorce proceedings in June 2012. They had sexual relations on one occasion during the week following the divorce settlement and one final time in the fall of 2012. The panel found that C.M.:

believes—rightly or wrongly—that [r]espondent failed to devote sufficient time to representing her interests in the divorce proceedings; that he did not take sufficient actions to protect and advance her financial interests in the proceeding; that he misled herinto agreeing to the final settlement; and that he abandoned her after convincing her to agree to a settlement in the divorce proceeding.1

The panel further noted that C.M. "felt that she was being abandoned by [r]espondent both personally and in connection with her expectations as to receiving ongoing support from [r]espondent on divorce-related issues going forward."

B. Respondent's Conduct with P.B.

¶ 7. In December 2011, P.B. contacted respondent's office seeking legal advice. Respondent assisted her in connection with several matters, including a pending criminal proceeding in which respondent helped P.B. obtain temporary relief from the conditions of release imposed at her arraignment. He did not charge P.B. for his legal services. In January 2012, respondent contacted P.B. and offered her a job as an administrative assistant at his law firm. At the time, P.B. was twenty-nine years old, living with her parents, and aspiring to gain admission to a training program to work as a border-patrol agent. Because P.B. did not have a college degree, she needed to demonstrate law-related employment for a minimum of one year to qualify for admission to the training program—employment with respondent appealed to her to satisfy that requirement, and she had an incentive to remain employed with respondent for at least one year. P.B. had no experience or training as an administrative assistant.

¶ 8. P.B. suffers from mental-health issues. In 2005, P.B. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Over the courseof her treatment for these disorders, P.B. utilized a variety of coping mechanisms in response to exacerbation of her PTSD, which included, at times, self-harm via cutting behaviors, avoidance of social engagements, agoraphobia, withdrawal, and counterphobia—engaging in behavior that makes the individual feel threatened.

¶ 9. P.B. began working for respondent in January 2012 and received her last paycheck in January 2013. Over the course of her employment, P.B. experienced various difficulties relating to respondent. Relevant to the panel's analysis and the issues on appeal are incidents where respondent tossed paperclips at P.B.'s cleavage, masturbated in her presence, and requested that she sign a contract in September 2012 indicating their relationship was "mutually welcome" and waiving any future claims against respondent. The panel's findings regarding these events are as follows.

¶ 10. The panel found that respondent encouraged a "relaxed atmosphere" at the office and often engaged in verbal banter, teasing, and flirtatious conduct with P.B. In April or May 2012, respondent's common practice of "joking" with P.B. escalated when he—on more than one occasion—threw paperclips at her in a manner that intentionally "targeted her breasts and cleavage" so that the paperclips would slip down her shirt and between her breasts. The panel found that, at various times throughout April and July 2012, P.B. told her psychiatrist "that her boss was making unwanted advances towards her or otherwise causing her stress." The psychiatrist noted that P.B.'s PTSD symptoms "surfaced" and were "being exacerbated" due to the "unwanted sexual advances from [respondent]."

¶ 11. The panel made further findings that, in late July 2012, while respondent and P.B. were together in the law office, an incident occurred during which, at respondent's request, P.B. unbuttoned her shirt, exposed her bra, and lowered her bra strap while respondent proceeded tomasturbate to ejaculation in his pants. Respondent asked her to pull on his tie while he masturbated; P.B. did so. That evening, after the incident, P.B. went home and "broke down" in front of her mother while explaining what had happened with respondent. On August 7, 2012, P.B. sent an email to respondent stating that she felt disrespected and planned to stop coming to work due to respondent's actions. Respondent replied that he never intended to make P.B. uncomfortable and that he would be happy to speak with her about her concerns. Following this exchange, P.B. and respondent revisited signing a contract to outline the boundaries of their personal and professional relationships—an issue that had been developing for several months.

¶ 12. The panel made the following findings...

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11 cases
  • Wool v. Office of Prof'l Regulation
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • 12 Junio 2020
    ...to maintain public confidence in the bar, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in misconduct. Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Robinson, 2019 VT 8, ¶ 73, 209 Vt. 557, 209 A.3d 570 ). We observed that the process does not provide "a means of redress for one claiming to have been personally wrong......
  • In re Bowen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • 12 Febrero 2021
    ...Although we carefully consider the Board's recommendation on the issue of sanctions, we "treat it as just that—a recommendation." In re Robinson, 2019 VT 8, ¶ 27, 209 Vt. 557, 209 A.3d 570 (per curiam). Because we bear ultimate responsibility for the discipline of Vermont attorneys, should ......
  • In re Wysolmerski
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • 26 Junio 2020
    ...The panel's legal conclusions, which include its violation determinations and sanction recommendations, are reviewed de novo. In re Robinson, 2019 VT 8, ¶ 27, 209 Vt. 557, 209 A.3d 570 (per curiam).I. Hearing Panel Findings ¶ 23. Respondent challenges only two factual findings of the hearin......
  • Wool v. Office of Prof'l Regulation
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • 12 Junio 2020
    ...the public, to maintain public confidence in the bar, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in misconduct. Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Robinson, 2019 VT 8, ¶ 73, ___ Vt. ___, 209 A.3d 570). We observed that the process does not provide "a means of redress for one claiming to have been perso......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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