In re Roderick's Estate

• Decision Date: 03 September 1930
• Docket Number: 22194.
• Citation: 158 Wash. 377,291 P. 325
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re RODERICK'S ESTATE. v. RODERICK. LINDQUIST

291 P. 325

158 Wash. 377

In re RODERICK'S ESTATE.

LINDQUIST v. RODERICK.

No. 22194.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 3, 1930

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; A. W. Hawkins, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Paul Roderick, deceased, wherein Helen Marie Lindquist, a minor, by her guardian ad litem objected to the distribution of the estate to the widow, and Louise Roderick, a minor, represented by Harcourt M. Taylor her guardian ad litem according to will. From a decree of distribution sustaining the will, the objector appeals.

Reversed and the cause remanded, with directions.

G. W Hamilton, of Prosser, and Thos. H. Wilson, of Yakima, for appellant.

Harcourt M. Taylor, of Yakima, for respondent.

MILLARD J.

Two minor daughters and their mother, who was the divorced wife of the testator, survivied Paul Roderick, who died February 22, 1927. By his will Roderick gave, subject to a bequest to his divorced wife, his estate to his daughter Louise Roderick. The other daughter was not mentioned in the will. That child, Lauretta May Roderick, was legally adopted July 24, 1916, by Lee Lindquist and wife, and her name changed to Helen Marie Lindquist. The omitted child, by her guardian ad litem, objected to the distribution of the estate according to the will. It was contended that Helen Marie Lindquist was entitled to one-half of the estate on the ground that a father failing to name one of his children in his will is deemed to die intestate as to such child. Holding the adoption was valid, the court entered final order and decree of distribution sustaining the will. Helen Marie Lindquist appeals from that decree.

Was the appellant, because of her adoption by Lee Lindquist, divested of her right of inheritance from her natural father?

That is the question presented by this appeal.

Would appellant be entitled to inherit from her natural father if he had not made a will? If so, the father died intestate as to appellant by reason of his failure to name her or provide for her in his will.

'If any person make his last will and die leaving a child or children or descendants of such child or children not named or provided for in such will, although born after the making of such will or the death of the testator, every such testator, as to such child or children not named or provided for, shall be deemed to die intestate, and such child or children or their descendants shall be entitled to such proportion of the estate of the testator, real and personal, as if he had died intestate, and the same shall be assigned to them, and all the other heirs, devisees and legatees shall refund their proportional part.' Section 1402, Rem. Comp. Stat. (Pierce's Code, § 10029).

Respondent argues that the word 'child,' as used in section 1402, Rem. Comp. Stat., does not include a testator's child who has become the child of others by adoption, and that the natural father was under no obligation to provide for the child upon his death.

The status of an adopted child is defined by section 1699, Rem. Comp. Stat. (Pierce's Code, § 9816), as follows:

'By such order the natural parents shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to such child, and the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to them, and shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child and legal heir of his or her adopter or adopters, entitled to all rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopter or adopters begotten in lawful wedlock: Provided, that on the decease of parents who have adopted a child or children under this chapter and the subsequent decease of such child or children without issue, the property of such adopting parents shall descend to their next of kin, and not to the next of kin of such adopted child or children.'

The foregoing statute gives to the adopted child the status of a natural child of the adoptive parent, and the child is given the right to inherit the property of the adoptive parent in the same manner as a natural child. Liberally construing the statute, we held in Re Masterson's Estate, 108 Wash. 307, 183 P. 93, that the adopted child is given the status of a natural child of the adoptive parent and that the child has the right to inherit from a brother or sister by adoption. We said:

'By this statute the natural parents are divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the adopted child, and the child is free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance of its natural parents. It is expressly provided that such adopted child shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child and legal heir of the adopters and entitled to all the rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopters begotten in lawful wedlock. The language of the statute is broad and comprehensive. One of the rights or privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a brother or sister, the natural son or daughter of the same parents. If the adopted child does not have the same right, then it is denied a right or privilege which the natural child has. The statute says that such adopted child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges as though it were begotten in lawful wedlock, and to all intents and purposes shall be the child and legal heir of its adopter. To hold that the adopted child cannot take an heir's portion of the estate of the natural son of the adopting parents would require a strict and narrow construction of the statute. The authorities are not in harmony as to whether such statutes are to be construed strictly or with a tendency to liberality in order that the primary purpose of such statutes, which is to promote the welfare of unfortunate children, may be carried into effect. Many of the cases adhere to a strict construction, but the prevailing tendency of the more modern authorities is in the direction of a liberal construction.'

In Re Hebb's Estate, 134 Wash. 424, 235 P. 974, 975, we held that an adopted child was entitled to inherit from the parent of his adoptive father, saying:

'This statute has on a number of occasions been before this court, and the effect of the cases has been to give it a construction which places an adopted child in exactly the same position as a natural child so far as that is possible. In other words, to make the status the same as to all rights, privileges, and obligations * * * an adopted child is a descendant of his adoptive parents.'

By our construction of section 1699, Rem. Comp. Stat., it is argued, we are committed to the doctrine that the effect of an adoption is to substitute the adopting parent for the parent by blood, therefore we should 'give to that conclusion its logical results.'

'Once we have reached the conclusion that the effect of an adoption under the Code is to substitute the adopting parent for the parent by blood, we must give to that conclusion its logical results. From the time of the adoption, the adopting parent is, so far as concerns all legal rights and duties flowing from the relation of parent and child, the parent of the adopted child. From the same moment, the parent by blood ceases to be, in a legal sense, the parent. His place has been taken by the adopting parent.' In re Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 P. 938, 940, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062.

The general rule is that:

'An adopted child is, in a legal sense, the child both of its natural and of its adopting parents, and is not, because of the adoption, deprived of its right of inheritance from its natural parents, unless the statute expressly so provides.'...