In re Rodriguez-Tejedor
| Decision Date | 24 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | File A30 212 057.,Interim Decision Number 3454 |
| Citation | 23 I&N Dec. 153 |
| Parties | In re Jesus Enrique RODRIGUEZ-TEJEDOR, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, GUENDELSBERGER, MATHON, GRANT, MOSCATO, MILLER, BRENNAN, OSUNA, and OHLSON, Board Members. Concurring Opinions: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; joined by SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; HOLMES, FILPPU, COLE, and JONES, Board Members; ESPENOZA, Board Member. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: ROSENBERG, Board Member.
GRANT, Board Member:
In a decision dated May 4, 2000, the Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, and under section 241(a)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988),2 as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Finding the respondent ineligible for relief from deportation, the Immigration Judge ordered him deported from the United States to Mexico. The respondent has appealed. Oral argument was heard in this matter on April 26, 2001. The appeal will be dismissed.
The facts of this case are undisputed. The respondent was born on December 25, 1960, in Mexico. On April 15, 1968, he was adopted by his paternal grandparents. His adoptive father is a United States citizen by birth. His adoptive mother, who died in 1994, was a lawful permanent resident. He entered the United States on or about July 27, 1972, as a lawful permanent resident. On October 25, 1989, the respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and voluntary manslaughter, for which offenses he was sentenced to imprisonment for 35 years and 20 years, respectively. Based on these convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) on April 10, 1990, alleging that the respondent was deportable.
At his deportation hearing, the respondent denied alienage, claiming that he was eligible for a certificate of citizenship under section 322(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1433(a) (1994). Proceedings were adjourned three times to give the Service an opportunity to adjudicate the respondent's Application for Certificate of Citizenship (Form N-600), which the record reflects he filed on April 30, 1997. On May 24, 1999, the Service denied the respondent's application because he was over the age of 18 at the time it was filed.
The respondent then claimed to have acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent neither acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act nor derived citizenship under section 322(a) of the Act. Having determined that alienage was established, the Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable as charged and ordered him deported from the United States to Mexico. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent contends, as he did at the deportation hearing, that he is eligible for a certificate of citizenship under section 322 of the Act and that he acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act. In response, the Service concurs with the Immigration Judge's decision and urges us to adopt that decision. We will address each issue in turn.
First, section 322(a), as it was in effect at the time the respondent filed his Application for Certificate of Citizenship, clearly stated that an individual must be under 18 years of age at the time the application for such certificate is filed by the citizen parent of the individual. Similarly, the regulation set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 322.2(a) (1997) clearly states that "a child on whose behalf an application for naturalization has been filed . . . must: (1) Be unmarried and under 18 years of age, both at the time of application and at the time of admission to citizenship. . . ." In the instant case, the respondent did not file his N-600 application until April 1997, when he was 36 years old.
Second, we concur with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not acquire United States citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act, because that provision requires that the child be born of a United States citizen. There is no indication that this section applies to an adopted child such as the respondent.
The respondent's appeal would have been promptly dismissed but for the recent enactment of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 ("CCA"). Depending on the effect given to the CCA's amendment of section 320 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994), pertaining to automatic acquisition of citizenship by foreign-born children adopted by United States citizens, the respondent may or may not be deemed to have acquired United States citizenship at the time of his admission as a lawful permanent resident. We therefore turn to consideration of this issue.3
As a preliminary matter, we recognize that shortly after we heard oral argument in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the CCA did not act to retroactively confer citizenship upon individuals such as the respondent in this case. See Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357 (9th Cir. 2001). Because this case arises within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, the decision in Nehme is binding regarding our specific holding in this case. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989). Nevertheless, because this issue will inevitably arise outside the Fifth Circuit, we proceed, in the interest of establishing a uniform nationwide rule, to set forth our independent analysis of this issue.4
We also recognize that, since we heard oral argument in this case, the Service has issued an interim rule implementing Title I of the CCA. Children Born Outside the United States; Applications for Certificate of Citizenship, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (2001). Consistent with our decision in this case, the Supplementary Information section specifically provides that Title I of the CCA does not apply to foreign-born children who are 18 years or older on February 27, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,139. The interim rule at 8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2) provides that individuals must meet all statutory requirements, including the age requirement, on or after February 27, 2001, to be eligible for citizenship under section 320 of the Act. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,144. Because the Board has independently reached the same conclusion as the Service, we need not address the issue, raised at oral argument, whether Service regulations interpreting a statutory provision are binding on this Board. We do not share the concerns expressed in the separate opinion of Board Member Rosenberg that the Service's actions in promulgating this regulation suggest an "inherent conflict" between its status as both a rule-making agency and a litigant before this Board, and that such actions call into question the integrity of our quasi-judicial role. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2001). The Service's motion to hold these proceedings in abeyance pending the publication of its regulations implementing Title I of the CCA will be denied as moot.
In Title I of the CCA, Congress replaced the automatic citizenship provisions set forth in former sections 320 and 321 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 and 1432 (1994), with a more generous provision now codified at section 320 of the Act. Section 321 of the Act was repealed. With these amendments, Congress intended to "streamline" automatic citizenship for children born abroad who are subsequently adopted by a United States citizen parent, or at least one of whose parents subsequently naturalized as a United States citizen. H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 4 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1499, 1500-01; H.R. 2883, 106th Cong. (2000). The four sections of Title I of the CCA are summarized below.
Section 101 of the CCA amended section 320 of the Act to provide automatic citizenship for a child born outside the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled: (1) at least one parent is a United States citizen; (2) the child is under 18 years old; and (3) the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the United States citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. This provision applies to a child adopted by a United States citizen, as defined in section 101(b)(1)(E) or (F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) or (F) (1994).5
Section 102 of the CCA amended section 322 of the Act to provide for the issuance of a certificate of naturalization to a child born outside the United States when the following conditions are met: (1) at least one parent is a United States citizen who has met certain physical presence requirements or has a citizen parent who has met such requirements; (2)...
To continue reading
Request your trial