In re Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso

Decision Date17 May 2021
Docket NumberNo. 08-19-00244-CV,08-19-00244-CV
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
Parties IN RE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF EL PASO, Relator.

RESPONDENT: Javier Alvarez, Judge, County Court at Law No. 3, 500 E. San Antonio, Suite 1001, El Paso, Tx 79901-2419.

ATTORNEY FOR RELATOR: Francis S. Ainsa Jr., Attorney at Law, 3801 N. Capital of Texas Hwy, Suite E240, PMB 653, Austin, TX 78746.

ATTORNEY FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: John P. Mobbs, Attorney at Law, 6350 Escondido Drive, Suite A-14, El Paso, TX 79912.

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.

OPINION

JEFF ALLEY, Justice

In this mandamus proceeding we decide whether a court can hear claims arising out of the reduction of a priest's payments from the local diocese. The claims are premised on the application of Texas's statutory age discrimination law and common law fraud. Because the application of those legal theories, under the unique facts of this case, runs head-long into church doctrine we conclude the claims are barred by ecclesiastical abstention.

I. BACKGROUND

Reverend Jose A. Olivas (Olivas) became a priest in the Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso (the Diocese) around 1980, but in 1999 his "faculty" was removed. "Faculties" are the equivalent of his license to perform duties as a priest. The Diocese removed Olivas's faculties based on a criminal complaint which has since been dismissed. Nonetheless, he has been on administrative leave ever since and the Diocese is unaware of any services that Olivas performs for it. The Diocese, however, has continued to pay Olivas while he was on administrative leave. This lawsuit arose when the Diocese reduced those payments in 2016. Following that decision, Olivas sued the Diocese, contending that the reduction in benefits was based on age discrimination, prohibited by the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). See TEX.LAB.CODE ANN. §§ 21.001 -.556. Olivas also alleges that the Diocese was liable for fraud by making material representations concerning his compensation.

The Diocese filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that the suit should be dismissed under the "ecclesiastical abstention" doctrine. The Diocese's rationale was that the case could not be resolved without a court or jury applying the Roman Catholic Church's canon law--something forbidden under the Free Exercise Clause to the United States Constitution. At the hearing on the motion, the Diocese sponsored two witnesses to explain that position. The first, Father Anthony Celino, has been the vicar general and chancellor for the Diocese. In both positions he assisted the Bishop in administration of the Diocese. Father Celino has a degree in "canon law" obtained from Catholic University of America. Father Celino testified that under canon law, when a priest is placed on administrative leave and his faculties are suspended, the bishop has an obligation "to give decent support to the priest." The term "decent support" arises from canon law and is determined solely at the discretion of the bishop, taking into consideration the needs of the individual priest and the resources of the Diocese. However, a priest aggrieved by that decision can ask the bishop to reconsider, and beyond that, can petition an entity called the Congregation for the Clergy.

In July 2013, Bishop Mark Seitz was appointed to oversee the Diocese. Bishop Seitz also testified at the hearing below and agreed that a priest who is carrying out his priesthood receives what canon law terms "remuneration." But a priest who is out of active ministry is not being remunerated for any service; instead, they receive "decent support" under canon law that is a form of charity. Its purpose is to make sure that the priest can take care of his basic needs.

In 2016, Bishop Seitz asked for a review all the cases regarding priests who were not in the ministry but who were receiving decent support. Following that review, he decided to reduce Olivas's support, explaining the decision this way:

I did it because I saw so many great needs in the Diocese and I only have so many funds to serve the needs, much other charitable work, as well. And I did look carefully into the situation of him and others who are in that circumstance to try to see whether a priest was capable of providing for his needs by other means than whatever I would provide and to assess what he would need beyond--beyond that, beyond what he's capable of providing for himself.1

The Bishop also testified that the Diocese has no contract of employment with Olivas, and the Diocese's obligation arises solely from canon law, as administered at his discretion. Neither the Bishop nor Father Celino believed that Olivas pursued a challenge of the Bishop's decision through the Congregation for the Clergy in Rome.

Olivas did not testify at the hearing. But through cross-examination of Father Celino, Olivas established that the Diocese has reported Olivas's monthly payments to the Internal Revenue Service through a W-2, which categorizes Olivas as an employee, and effects a withholding of federal income tax. Father Celino agreed that this was in error, as the payments should have been reported through a Form 1099 once Olivas's salary was converted from remuneration to decent support. The letter which the Diocese sent to Olivas informing him of the reduction also referred to the on-going payments as a "payroll check." Olivas also challenged Bishop Seitz's claim that he looked into Olivas's personal situation, at least to the extent that the Bishop never personally spoke to Olivas prior to reducing the amount of the payments. Correspondence from the Diocese did attest, however, that it had requested a copy of Olivas's most recent income tax filings prior to the reduction in payments.

Following the hearing, the trial court denied the Diocese's motion, which it now challenges in this mandamus.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show that a trial court has (1) clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).

We have previously written that "[m]andamus review is generally unavailable to challenge incidental district court rulings, such as the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, because there is an adequate remedy by appeal." In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. , 510 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding). However, if the action sufficiently implicates First Amendment concerns, the remedy of appeal may be inadequate. See In re St. Thomas High School , 495 S.W.3d 500, 514 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (religious school claiming violation of its First Amendment religious rights could not adequately challenge denial of plea to the jurisdiction by appeal). Or, as in In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. , we have granted mandamus relief when the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 510 S.W.3d at 559.

A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 840 ; In re ReadyOne Industries, Inc. , 394 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding). "The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred." Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Courts also explain the standard this way: the question is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id. Germane here, those guiding rules and principles are found in the developed body of Texas law found under the descriptor "ecclesiastical abstention."

III. ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]" U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. The First Amendment governs conduct of the several states by virtue of the 14th Amendment. See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut , 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Government action can burden the free exercise of religion by encroaching on a church's ability to manage its internal affairs. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America , 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) ; C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. 2007) ("Churches have a fundamental ‘right to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’ It is a core tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, in resolving civil claims, courts must be careful not to intrude upon internal matters of church governance[.]") (internal citations omitted). Specifically, civil courts cannot inquire into matters concerning "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them[.]" Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of Am. and Canada v. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. 696, 713-14, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), quoting Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 733, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). We follow this limitation in Texas under a doctrine referred to as ecclesiastical abstention. Masterson v. Diocese of N.W. Texas , 422 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. 2013) ; Episcopal Diocese of Ft. Worth v. Episcopal Church , 422 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. 2013).

While the First Amendment "severely circumscribes" the role that civil courts may play in resolving church-related ecclesiastical disputes, Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church , 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), it does not necessarily bar all claims...

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  • Salado v. Roman Catholic Diocese of El Paso
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  • In re El Paso
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
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    ...church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them[.]" Id. at 42 (quoting Serbian Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976)). And the ministerial exception-a s......
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