IN RE ROMAN
Decision Date | 06 April 2010 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 08-9002-am,07-9064-am. |
Citation | 601 F.3d 189 |
Parties | In re Hector M. ROMAN, Attorney. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Hector M. Roman, Esq., New York, N.Y., pro se.
Before: CABRANES, SACK, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
By order filed in November 2007, this panel referred Hector M. Roman to this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances ("the Committee") for investigation of the matters described in that order and preparation of a report on whether he should be subject to disciplinary or other corrective measures. Supplemental referral orders were filed in April 2008.
During the Committee's proceedings, Roman had the opportunity to address the matters discussed in the Court's referral order, to testify under oath at a hearing held in December 2008, and to present post-hearing supplementary materials. Roman represented himself during the Committee's proceedings. Presiding over the hearing were Committee Chair Mary Jo White, Esq., and the Honorable Howard A. Levine. In January 2009, the Committee filed with the Court the record of the Committee's proceedings and its report and recommendations. Thereafter, the Court provided Roman with a copy of the Committee's report, and Roman filed a response in April 2009.
In its report, the Committee concluded: (a) Roman was subject to reciprocal discipline, pursuant to Second Circuit Local Rule 46.1(f), based on the prior imposition of discipline by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; and (b) as a separate matter, Roman was subject to discipline for his behavior in this Court, based on clear and convincing evidence that he had engaged in conduct "unbecoming a member of the bar" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c). See Report at 12-15. After finding various aggravating and mitigating factors, see id. at 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, the Committee recommended that Roman be suspended from practice before this Court for a three-month period, based on both the Ninth Circuit's suspension and his conduct before this Court, with each basis operating as an independent ground for the recommended suspension, see id. at 15. In response, Roman states that he does not contest the Committee's recommendation that he be suspended for three months based on the Ninth Circuit suspension, but asks that the suspension not be based on his conduct before this Court. Response at 3-8.
Upon due consideration of the Committee's report, the underlying record, and Roman's response, we adopt the Committee's factual findings concerning Roman's Ninth Circuit suspension and his misconduct in this Court. We also adopt the Committee's conclusions that Roman's Ninth Circuit suspension warrants reciprocal suspension by this Court and that his separate misconduct in this Court was sufficiently serious that it warrants independent disciplinary action. However, for the reasons discussed below, we impose disciplinary sanctions that differ somewhat from those recommended by the Committee.
Former Second Circuit Rule 46.1(f) governed this Court's reciprocal discipline procedures until January 1, 2010, when it was superseded by current Second Circuit Local Rule 46.2(c). We need not decide which version of the rule governs Roman's case, since the same result is reached under both versions. Former Local Rule 46.1(f), in pertinent part, provided as follows:
Former Second Circuit Rule 46.1(f)(1)-(2). Current Local Rule 46.2(c), in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Second Circuit Local Rule 46.2(c)(2)-(3).
Although this Court has not yet explicitly ruled on the issue, we now make clear that former Local Rule 46.1(f) and current Local Rule 46.2(c) reflect a rebuttable presumption that the reciprocal discipline imposed by this Court will be identical—or as close to identical as our rules and the circumstances permit—to the discipline imposed by the prior court or other disciplinary authority. This presumption, although not explicitly referred to as such, has long guided this Court's reciprocal discipline practice and is consistent with the practice of other circuits. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2005) ( ); In re Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 727 (9th Cir.2002) (); In re Fallin, 255 F.3d 195, 197 (4th Cir.2001) ( ); In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir.1998) () (citations omitted). See also ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, R. 22(D) (2002) ( ); ABA Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, R. II(D) (1978, 1991) (providing for identical discipline unless certain criteria are satisfied).1
Furthermore, the disciplined attorney bears the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that a different disposition would be appropriate (unless the Committee, or the Court itself, moves for modification or revocation). See In re Friedman, 51 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1995) ( ). An attorney seeking to demonstrate either that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed at all or that the "terms and conditions" of the reciprocal discipline should not be "comparable" to those imposed by the other attorney disciplinary authority, Second Circuit Rule 46.2(c)(2); Former Second Circuit Rule 46.1(f)(1), must satisfy the standard set forth in Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917), which requires the attorney to show:
1. that the ... procedure used by the prior court from want of notice or opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a clear conviction on our part that we could not, consistently with our duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar or impose any other disciplinary sanction imposed by the prior court except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, we were constrained so to do.
Selling, 243 U.S. at 51, 37 S.Ct. 377. In sum, the Selling standard bars reciprocal discipline when the Court finds "(1) absence of due process in the prior disciplinary procedure, (2) substantial infirmity in the proof of lack of private and professional character, or (3) `some other grave reason' sufficient to indicate that reciprocal disbarment or other reciprocal discipline is inconsistent with `principles of right and justice.'" In re Tidwell, 295 F.3d 331, 333-34 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Selling, supra).
As noted in In re Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2000), several other courts have supplemented the Selling criteria with a fourth reason for not imposing reciprocal discipline—namely, that a reciprocal order should not issue if an attorney's misconduct warrants "substantially different discipline" than that imposed by the court that imposed the original discipline. Edelstein, 214 F.3d at 131-32 ( ). We treat the noted fourth category as subsumed by the "grave reason" category set forth in Selling. See id. at 132 (...
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... ... Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Patterson , 2001 OK 51, 28 P.3d 551 (same). The United States Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of United States Court of Appeals also impose reciprocal discipline. See, for example, In re Roman , 601 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010), where the court discussed both reciprocal discipline in the Circuit Courts as well as application of Selling v. Radford , 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917). In re Roman , 601 F.3d at 192-194. Respondent's discipline herein was not imposed as ... ...
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