In re Roneika S.

• Decision Date: 03 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2719, Sept.Term, 2005.,2719, Sept.Term, 2005.
• Citation: 173 Md. App. 577,920 A.2d 496
• Parties: In re RONEIKA S.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

920 A.2d 496

173 Md. App. 577

In re RONEIKA S.

No. 2719, Sept.Term, 2005.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 3, 2007.

Jeremy M. McCoy (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellant.

Allison M. Sayers (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for appellee.

Panel HOLLANDER, KRAUSER and BARBERA, JJ.

BARBERA, J.

In this appeal we discuss what a petition alleging juvenile delinquency must contain as a factual basis to support the allegation. The issue implicates the requirement of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the specific dictates of Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-8A-13 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ") and Maryland Rule 11-103.

On November 10, 2005, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that Roneika S. had made a false statement to a police officer in violation of Maryland Code (2002), § 9-501 of the Criminal Law Article ("CR").¹ Roneika S. filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allegation. The Circuit Court for St. Mary's County, sitting as the juvenile court, conducted a hearing on the motion and, agreeing with Roneika S., dismissed the petition.

The State appealed and argues, among other things, that the petition alleged sufficient facts to support the allegation. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the petition set forth an adequate factual basis for the charged delinquency.

BACKGROUND

The juvenile delinquency petition alleged that "on or about April 21, 2005, at Lexington Park, St. Mary's County," Roneika S. "did make a false statement to DFC Cara Grumbles, a peace officer, knowing the same to be false, with the intent to deceive and with the intent to cause an investigation or other action to be taken, in violation of CR 9-501 of the Annotated Code of Maryland[.]" The petition listed Roneika S.'s full name, address, date of birth, her physical description, and the name and address of her parent. The petition also listed the names and addresses of witnesses.

Roneika S., by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition. She claimed that the petition did not sufficiently allege the facts supporting the charged delinquent act, thereby violating the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The juvenile court entertained the motion at the scheduled adjudication hearing.

Roneika S.'s counsel argued at the hearing that the petition failed to include a "to wit" clause with specific allegations:

[COUNSEL]: [The petition] doesn't say that the false statement—it doesn't say what she said . . . . [I]t needs to say, she did make a false statement about the presence of [A.S.], or it needs to say, to wit, she did make a false statement about her involvement in the fight . . . or, Your Honor it needs to say, to wit, she did make a false statement about [another person] breaking windows in her house, because false statements were made then, Your Honor, but, not every false statement made that night . . . was made with the intent to cause an investigation or other action to be taken. True statements were made that night or false statements were made that night, and what the accused needs . . . to know, well, what statement are you talking about, because lots of things can be said, but it is what the law does not prohibit is any sort of blanket falsehood mentioned to the officer.

* * *

. . . And the problem with this case is Roneika did make some false statements that night, but she also made true statements. And we need to know, in order to give her a fair trial, a fair hearing, and in order to prepare for trial, we need to know what statement is—the State alleges is in fact false, because that is—that is a constitutional notice problem, Your Honor.

Counsel asserted that, if the State was not prepared to amend the petition at the hearing, then "[the petition] really should be dismissed."

The juvenile court noted that the rules of procedure permitted amendment of the petition, with the court's approval.² To that defense counsel replied: "[W]hat would the amendment be, what would the to wit say, because I think it needs that."

The court then heard from the State on the motion. The State informed the court that it had provided counsel with discovery material that supplied the specific details counsel was seeking concerning the alleged false statement:

[Roneika S.'s counsel] is indicating that his client made numerous false statements and he is unaware of which false statements constitutes the offense in this particular case. And I can only tell the Court that the State did provide discovery, and in the discovery the police officer indicated that she reported for a property destruction, and throughout the police report she refers to the property destruction, and quite frankly says that that is the basis for the false statement, that [Roneika S.] indicated somebody committed a property destruction, and through the police officer's initiation,³ that was determined not to be the case. I would also just tell the Court that the statement, we have received no bill of particulars, there was no request made by the defense to ask if there was more specific information that was provided for these charges, which clearly the Legislature provides for, and it wasn't done. I think [Roneika S.] has been sufficiently put on notice as to what the charge is.

Counsel for Roneika S. did not reply to the State's comment, and the court proceeded to rule on the motion to dismiss. The court began by citing Anderson v. State, 385 Md. 123, 867 A.2d 1040 (2005) and Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 490 A.2d 1277 (1985), cases which set forth the purpose of the criminal charging document. Reciting from Williams, the court noted that the charging document must fulfill the constitutional requirement of informing the accused of the accusation, more particularly by

one, put[ting] the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend by characterizing and describing the crime and conduct, two, protecting the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense, three, enabling the accused to prepare for his trial, four, providing a basis for the Court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document and, five, informing the Court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case.

The court recognized that "cases have recently upheld charging documents that merely state that the Defendant unlawfully committed a crime, as defined by the Criminal Code, at a specific time and place within the State." Nevertheless, the court decided that

the brief description in this charging document does not satisfy the purposes listed above . . . . The defendant in this specific case knows that she was charged with making a false statement to the police on or about April 21, 2005, but does not know what statement the State is claiming was false, which statement. This prevents the defendant from preparing for trial because until the date of the trial, the defendant has no idea what statement the state is claiming is false, notwithstanding the issue of discovery. In addition, this charging document does not protect the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense, again, because the specific statement or the content of the specific statement is not set forth. Because the charging document does not set forth the allegedly false statement with any type of particularity to allow the defendant to prepare for trial, the Court would have to dismiss, and so your motion is granted.

DISCUSSION

The State mounts three arguments in support of vacating the judgment of dismissal. The State argues that the delinquency petition satisfied the requirements of the law concerning notice of the charge. The State also argues that, even assuming the petition falls short of those requirements, the juvenile court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition, rather than amending it or granting a continuance for the purpose of amending it. Last, the State argues that the court should not have dismissed the petition given the State's proffer, not disputed by Roneika S., that notice of the specified false statement was provided through discovery.

Roneika S. counters all of the State's arguments. She also interposes the preliminary argument that the appeal should be dismissed because the State seeks relief—reinstatement of the delinquency petition and an adjudicatory hearing—that would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We first address Roneika S.'s double jeopardy argument.

I.

We begin with the settled proposition that "the provisions against being twice placed in jeopardy, contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and as a part of the common law of Maryland are `fully applicable to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings.'" In re: Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 531, 601 A.2d 1102 (1992)(quoting Parojinog v. State, 282 Md. 256, 260, 384 A.2d 86 (1978)); accord In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185, 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (stating that, "for purposes of the double jeopardy prohibition, a juvenile delinquency proceeding is treated as a criminal prosecution"). Double jeopardy principles preclude, among other things, further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the accused. State v. Taylor, 371 Md. 617, 630-33, 810 A.2d 964 (2002).

Roneika S. argues that double jeopardy principles prevent the State from prosecuting an appeal in this case because "the juvenile court made a determination that the State had insufficient proof on which to proceed with the charges." She relies on Taylor, supra.

Taylor involved appeals from two separate criminal proceedings. In each case, the trial judge had granted a pre-trial motion to dismiss for...