IN RE ROSS

• Decision Date: 25 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17343., No. 17342
• Citation: 272 Conn. 653,866 A.2d 542
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Application for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Dan ROSS as Next Friend on Behalf of Michael B. Ross. In re Application for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by the Office of the Chief Public Defender as Next Friend on Behalf of Michael B. Ross.

866 A.2d 542

272 Conn. 653

In re Application for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Dan ROSS as Next Friend on Behalf of Michael B. Ross.

In re Application for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by the Office of the Chief Public Defender as Next Friend on Behalf of Michael B. Ross.

Nos. 17342, 17343.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 21, 2005.

Decided January 25, 2005.¹

Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, for the plaintiff in error (petitioner Dan Ross).

Temmy Ann Pieszak, chief of habeas corpus services, with whom was Adele V. Patterson, assistant public defender, for the plaintiff in error (petitioner office of the chief public defender).

Harry Weller, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom were Kevin T. Kane, state's attorney, and Michael O'Hare, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state's attorney, and Jessica Probolus, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the defendant in error (respondent commissioner of correction).

Edward J. Gavin, Bridgeport, filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA, LAVERY, FOTI and DRANGINIS, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

In this proceeding, we are asked to consider a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error Dan Ross, as father and next friend of Michael Ross, and a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error office of the chief public defender of the state of Connecticut, as next friend of Michael B. Ross,² challenging the orders of the habeas court, entered on January 3, 2005, dismissing their respective petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that: (1) the habeas petitions submitted by the plaintiffs in error on behalf of Michael Ross were not legitimate filings; and (2) the plaintiffs in error did not have standing to file the petitions.³ We affirm the orders of the habeas court dismissing the habeas petitions of the plaintiffs in error and dismiss the writs of error.

The background of this case is described in State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 849 A.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 863 A.2d 654(2005). The record reveals the following additional relevant facts pertaining to events since those opinions were released. On December 27, 2004, each of the plaintiffs in error submitted to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as next friend of Michael Ross. The petitions requested, inter alia, a stay of execution of Michael Ross' death sentence and a hearing on Michael Ross' competence to waive further postconviction proceedings. The clerk's office received and date-stamped the petitions, but informed the plaintiffs in error that the petitions would be "held," rather than filed, and that it would not accept filing fees or docket the petitions. Thereafter, the habeas court scheduled a hearing for January 3, 2005,⁴ and notified the plaintiffs in error that no continuances would be granted. The chief public defender nonetheless filed a motion for a continuance that the habeas court denied. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted on January 3, 2005, to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to issue the writs sought by the plaintiffs in error. The habeas court specifically required that the plaintiffs in error demonstrate their standing to file petitions on behalf of Michael Ross by presenting evidence of Michael Ross' incompetence. Following the presentation of evidence, the habeas court concluded that the plaintiffs in error had failed to raise any doubt about Michael Ross' competence and, therefore, declined to issue the writs and dismissed the petitions because the plaintiffs in error did not have legal standing to pursue habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Michael Ross. On January 13, 2005, the plaintiffs in error filed motions for reconsideration and petitions for certification to appeal. The habeas court denied those motions and petitions. On January 18, 2005, the plaintiffs in error filed the present writs of error challenging the dismissal of their habeas petitions.

While these proceedings were pending, several other courts rendered decisions regarding Michael Ross' competency. On January 10, 2005, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut issued an order on a motion filed by Dan Ross seeking appointment as next friend of Michael Ross for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the state's protocol for lethal injection.⁵ See Ross v. Rell, Docket No. Civ. A. 3:04 CV 2186 C, 2005 WL 61494, *4 (D.Conn. Jan. 10, 2005). Following a hearing in which Michael Ross and his attorney participated, the District Court concluded that Dan Ross had "provided no affirmative evidence of [Michael Ross'] incompetence, incapacity or other disability," and that Michael Ross was competent to proceed on his own behalf. Id., at *2. Consequently, the court lacked "a sufficient basis to appoint a next friend to litigate in [Michael Ross'] name." Id.

In reaching its conclusions, the District Court evaluated the evidence adduced at the hearing in light of well established federal case law pertaining to standards for evaluating competency; see id., citing Cooper v. Okla homa, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996); and the "heightened" standard that applies when defendants seek to waive their constitutional rights, which requires a determination of whether the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. See Ross v. Rell, supra, 2005 WL 61494, *2, citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). The District Court ultimately concluded, on the basis of: (1) psychiatric evaluations of Michael Ross in 1995 and 2004; (2) an affidavit filed by Michael Ross in Superior Court in October, 2004; (3) the transcripts of recent Superior Court proceedings to determine Michael Ross' competency in October, 2004, December, 2004, and January, 2005; and (4) Michael Ross' participation in the District Court hearing on January 7, 2005, that Michael Ross exceeded the competency threshold required by prevailing federal and state standards. Ross v. Rell, supra, at *3. Subsequent to the decision of the District Court, this court issued an opinion on January 14, 2005, dismissing a previous writ of error brought by the chief public defender challenging the trial court's denial of its motion to appear as next friend of Michael Ross, a party in interest, an intervenor, or amicus curiae in postconviction proceedings in the three criminal cases against Michael Ross on the ground that Michael Ross was incompetent.⁶ See State v. Ross, supra, 272 Conn. at 579, 613, 863 A.2d 654. We concluded that the chief public defender did not have standing to represent Michael Ross as next friend because it had provided no "meaningful evidence" of Michael Ross' incompetence that would have entitled it to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id., at 611, 863 A.2d 654. We also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the chief public defender's motion to appear as amicus curiae.⁷ Id., at 611, 613, 863 A.2d 654. These conclusions were based on an analysis of the evidence similar to that undertaken by the District Court in Ross v. Rell, supra, 2005 WL 61494.

We first reviewed evidence regarding Michael Ross' competency presented at recent trial court proceedings in October, 2004, and December, 2004. See State v. Ross, supra, 272 Conn. at 609-11, 863 A.2d 654. In response to the chief public defender's representation that it had obtained evidence of Michael Ross' incompetence that never had been presented to any court, we also issued an order authorizing the chief public defender to file with this court an offer of proof detailing the evidence that would be presented if an evidentiary competency hearing were to be held. See id., at 592, 863 A.2d 654. The chief public defender subsequently filed an offer of proof with summaries of the proposed testimony of two psychiatrists, five attorneys within the office of the public defender, the state death penalty abolition coordinator for the Connecticut branch of Amnesty International and executive director of the Connecticut Network to Abolish the Death Penalty, and Dan Ross. Id. Several proposed exhibits also accompanied the chief public defender's offer of proof. Id.

We evaluated the evidence according to standards set forth in Whitmore v. Arkansas, supra, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717, which establishes two prerequisites for demonstrating next friend status,⁸Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313-14, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), which describes the standard for mental incompetence in this context,⁹ and Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990), which held that a trial court is not constitutionally required to grant next friend status if no "meaningful evidence" has been presented that a defendant is incompetent. See State v. Ross, supra, 272 Conn. at 598-602, 611, 863 A.2d 654. We concluded that the chief public defender had not presented any "meaningful evidence" of incompetence that would have entitled it to an evidentiary hearing. Id., at 611, 863 A.2d 654. Consequently, we determined that the chief public defender did not have standing as next friend to represent Michael Ross. See id. On January 18, 2005, the plaintiffs in error filed the present writs of error challenging the habeas court's rejection of their respective habeas petitions.¹⁰

I

The plaintiffs in error first challenge the habeas court's dismissal of their habeas petitions seeking next friend status. They contend that, although the habeas court has the power and duty to determine its own jurisdiction, it may not prevent full and fair litigation of the factual issue of standing. We are unpersuaded.

We begin with our standard of review. It is well established that "[w]hether a person who has alleged that a...