In re S.J.K., No. 2006-0673.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: Lundberg Stratton
• Citation: 114 Ohio St.3d 23,2007 Ohio 2621,867 N.E.2d 408
• Docket Number: No. 2006-0798.,No. 2006-0673.
• Decision Date: 13 June 2007
• Parties: In re S.J.K.

867 N.E.2d 408 114 Ohio St.3d 23 2007-Ohio-2621 In re S.J.K. No. 2006-0673. No. 2006-0798. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted February 28, 2007. Decided June 13, 2007.

[867 N.E.2d 409]

S. David Worhatch, Stow, counsel for appellant, S.J.K.

Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee, state of Ohio.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

114 Ohio St.3d 24

{¶ 1} We must determine whether the imposition of points against a traffic offender's driving record and the effect of the points on the driver's insurability constitute a "collateral disability" so as to preserve the justiciability of an appeal even after the traffic offender has satisfied the judgment.

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that the imposition of points on a traffic offender's driving record is a statutorily imposed penalty sufficient to create a collateral disability as a result of the judgment and preserves the justiciability of an appeal even if the offender has voluntarily satisfied the judgment.

{¶ 3} On August 17, 2004, appellant, S.J.K., a minor, was cited for reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.20. Prior to trial, S.J.K. moved to dismiss on grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. After several continuances, the case was tried before a magistrate on February 24 and 25, 2005. The magistrate denied S.J.K.'s speedy-trial motion, concluded that S.J.K. was a juvenile traffic offender by virtue of his reckless operation, and ordered him to pay a fine of $20 and $62 in court costs. The record reflects that S.J.K. paid the fine and costs on February 28, 2005.

{¶ 4} S.J.K. then filed objections. The court overruled them, adopted the magistrate's decision, and entered judgment on May 4, 2005.

{¶ 5} S.J.K. appealed. The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because the appellant had already satisfied the judgment. S.J.K. opposed the motion, arguing that he continued to suffer adverse consequences as a result of the judgment — specifically, the assessment of points against his driving record, which may result in higher insurance premiums or jeopardize his ability to obtain insurance at all. The court of appeals acknowledged that S.J.K. had been assessed four points for the violation; however, the court concluded that the assessment was not a collateral disability. There was no evidence that the points jeopardized or impaired S.J.K.'s driving privileges. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot because S.J.K. had failed to demonstrate any collateral disability or loss of civil rights arising from his adjudication as a juvenile traffic offender.

{¶ 6} The court of appeals certified that its opinion in this case was in conflict with the judgment of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth District Courts of Appeals in State v. Ingalls, Stark App. No. 2003CA00311, 2004-Ohio-3441, 2004 WL 1465746; Cleveland v. Jennings (Feb. 17, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76810, 2000 WL 193253; Westlake v. Connole (Sept. 2, 1999), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 74727 and 74910, 1999 WL 685606; State v. Brown (Sept. 26, 1991), Mahoning App. No. 90 C.A. 107, 1991 WL 192140; and State v. Simmons (Dec. 26, 1989), Pickaway App. No. 88CA8, 1989 WL 159030.

114 Ohio St.3d 25

{¶ 7} We granted jurisdiction by accepting a discretionary appeal and by determining that a conflict exists over the following question:

{¶ 8} "Whether an assessment of points against a traffic offender's record qualifies as a `collateral disability' or a `loss of civil rights stemming from [the] conviction' sufficient to demonstrate that the traffic offender continues to have a `substantial

867 N.E.2d 410

stake in the judgment of conviction' even after paying the fines and costs also levied in the judgment of conviction."

{¶ 9} In State v. Wilson (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 N.E.2d 236, syllabus, we held that "[w]here a defendant, convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction." Once a sentence is served, any appeal is moot because there is no subject matter for the court to decide. St. Pierre v. United States (1943), 319 U.S. 41, 42, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199. S.J.K. has the burden of establishing that his appeal is not moot. Wilson; State v. Golston (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226, 643 N.E.2d 109. Under the disjunctive test in Wilson, he must offer evidence of either "some collateral disability" or "loss of civil rights" from the judgment or conviction. Id. at syllabus.

{¶ 10} S.J.K. does not allege a loss of his civil rights. He contends that the imposition of points on his driver's license is a collateral disability because points affect his driving record and they, in turn, will affect his insurability and the cost of insurance in the future. A collateral disability is an adverse legal consequence of a conviction or judgment that survives despite the court's sentence having been satisfied or served. See Pollard v. United States (1957), 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393. For example, a person may be subject to further penalties or disabilities under state or federal law even after a judgment has been satisfied. St. Pierre, 319 U.S. at 43, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199.

{¶ 11} The state concedes that the court...