In re S.W., 12–FS–434.

• Decision Date: 17 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–FS–434.,12–FS–434.
• Citation: 124 A.3d 89
• Parties: In re S.W., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

124 A.3d 89

In re S.W., Appellant.

No. 12–FS–434.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Sept. 26, 2014.

Decided Sept. 17, 2015.

Chris Kemmitt, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Jaclyn Frankfurt, and Monica Douglas, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.

John W. Donavan, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General at the time the brief was filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Rosalyn Calbert Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, and Janice Sheppard, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief, for the government.

Opinion

BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judge:

This case presents a “rare” instance in which we conclude that “a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda [v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).]” Dickerson v. United States,530 U.S. 428, 444, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). Specifically, we conclude that a juvenile's confession during custodial interrogation was involuntary, in spite of an effectively delivered Mirandawarning and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Mirandarights, and we reverse the trial court's adjudication of delinquency.²

Following a consolidated suppression hearing and bench trial, appellant S.W., a fifteen-year-old juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent on four counts: (1) carjacking, (2) attempted unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, (3) unlawful entry of a motor vehicle, and (4) threats to do bodily harm.³On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements that he made during post-arrest interrogation. Appellant's principal argument is that the interrogating detective's pre-Mirandaremarks rendered the subsequent Mirandawarning ineffective as a matter of law and, consequently, that his confession must be suppressed. Alternatively, appellant argues that the detective's remarks prevented him from making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

We hold that the interrogating detective delivered an effective Mirandawarning and that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Mirandarights, but that he did not do so voluntarily. In so holding, we avoid a per serule that either invalidates a Mirandawarning as a matter of law when law enforcement officials make pre-Mirandawarning remarks, or that validates a Mirandawarning as a matter of law when law enforcement officials read the warning verbatim from a waiver card.⁴We reinforce the necessity of looking holistically at every custodial interrogation in reaching a conclusion specific to the facts presented. No “talismanic incantation” is necessary to satisfy Miranda.Missouri v. Seibert,542 U.S. 600, 611, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)(citation omitted). Nor will “mere recitation of the litany [of rights]” suffice in every circumstance. Id.Rather, our inquiry is case-specific, asking “whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his [or her] rights as required by Miranda.” Id.(internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).

I. Factual Background

A. The Incident

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on January 22, 2012, Tiffany Dougall was pumping gas into her car at a gas station on the corner of Benning Road and East Capitol Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C. She had left the driver-side door ajar with the keys in the ignition. Appellant approached Ms. Dougall's car, sat in the driver seat, and attempted to start the car. As appellant tried to close the car door, Ms. Dougall pulled the door open and retrieved her keys, thwarting appellant's attempt. Appellant exited the car and Ms. Dougall called him a “stupid a- - [expletive],” to which he responded: “I should have shanked you. That's what we do around here.” Appellant then ran across the street and entered a metro station. Within approximately twenty minutes, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrested appellant and brought him back to the scene where Ms. Dougall identified him.

B. The Interview

MPD Detective Howard Howland questioned appellant at the MPD Juvenile Processing Center in a video-recorded session that began just before midnight and lasted approximately eighteen minutes. Appellant's right foot was cuffed to the floor of the interview room, but his hands remained free. Before issuing a Mirandawarning, Detective Howland introduced himself and asked appellant if he knew why he was under arrest.⁵When appellant did not respond, Detective Howland explained:

I know you know why you're up here, so I ain't gonna play the ‘I don't know’ crap, all right? I'm gonna give you an opportunity to give your version of what happened today, because ... I stand between you and the lions out there.... [W]e have a lot of things going on out there, and they're gonna try and say that you did it all.Okay? And I think what happened today was just a one-time thing. But before I came out here everybody said ... you did a whole bunch of stuff,but in order for us to have a conversation, I have to read you your rights and you have to waive your rights. If you answer no to any of the questions I ask you after I read you your rights, that's all, I mean, I can't have the interview, okay?

(Emphasis added).

Detective Howland read appellant his Mirandarights from a waiver card, and appellant, who had not spoken until this point, waived these rights verbally and in writing.⁶Appellant's demeanor and tone remained calm as he subsequently confessed to entering Ms. Dougall's car with the intention of taking it. After the confession, Detective Howland told appellant that he had spoken with appellant's grandmother, who told Detective Howland that she was worried about appellant, that he had just been released from a group home, and that he had been “reported missing.” Appellant began to cry at this point and explained that he had left the group home because he had a “beef with a whole lot of people.” Detective Howland stated, “[i]t sounds like you got a lotta anger” and “made some bad choices,” then told appellant to consider how it feels “for [his] grandmother to see [him] in court” or “locked up,” stating that people “who tried to do what [appellant] did ... get full of bullets.” Detective Howland then asked appellant what he would do differently if he could do everything over, and appellant responded “I wouldn't have went to that car.”⁷

C. The Motion to Suppress and Trial

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Howland, alleging, inter alia,that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Mirandarights, and that the coercive circumstances of the interrogation rendered his statements involuntary. During a hearing on the motion, the trial court viewed the video recording of appellant's interrogation and characterized Detective Howland's pre-Mirandaremarks as a “very simple set of statements” that did not violate “Miranda'sprophylactic rule”; in essence, informing appellant that “if you want to talk, this is your opportunity, but you don't have to.” The court described these statements as an “age-old tactic” of detectives: sharing pieces of known information to encourage a suspect to be forthcoming with additional information. The court further noted that Detective Howland issued a complete Mirandawarning and remained an “appreciable distance” from appellant during the conversation and that appellant did not ask follow up questions and appeared to understand the warning.

In assessing the validity of appellant's waiver, the trial court considered factors pertaining to knowledge, intelligence, and voluntariness and concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Detective Howland's remarks did not invalidate appellant's waiver. The trial court found no indication that appellant was in distress or discomfort and it observed that the combination of Detective Howland's assurance that he could not talk to appellant unless appellant waived his rights and appellant's ready responses to Detective Howland's questions indicated a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary conversation. Furthermore, the court observed that appellant talked freely, chose which questions to answer and which to ignore, seemed lucid and aware of what was happening, and had no mental health issues. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that appellant made the decision to waive his Mirandarights “based on his own free will, rational thought, [and] his own intellect,” and denied the motion to suppress. Following trial, the court adjudicated appellant delinquent on all four counts. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress on Mirandagrounds, “we must defer to the trial court's findings of historical fact as long as they are not clearly erroneous, and we must view the facts and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling.” Dorsey v. United States,60 A.3d 1171, 1190 (D.C.2013). However, we review the voluntariness of a Mirandawaiver, a legal question, de novo. See id.; In re M.A.C.,761 A.2d 32, 38 (D.C.2000).

Mirandarequires that police “adequately and effectively” warn a suspect of his or her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation if the suspect's statements are to be admissible at trial. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Robinson v. United States,928 A.2d 717, 725 (D.C.2007)(citation omitted). After receiving this warning, a suspect may opt to waive his or her rights. Miranda, supra,384 U.S. at 467, 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602(“No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings ... have been given.”). If a suspect opts to waive Mirandarights and later challenges the admissibility of his or her post-waiver statements, the government has the burden to show that the suspect's waiver was “made knowingly, intelligently, and...