In re Samuel Davies

• Citation: 93 Pa. 116
• Parties: In re Samuel Davies.
• Decision Date: 03 May 1880
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 116

93 Pa. 116

In re Samuel Davies.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 2, 1880.

May 3, 1880.

February 2d 1880.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ. GREEN, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1880, No. 61.

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William H. Ruddiman and F. Carroll Brewster, for plaintiff in error.—There was no case, and there existed no professional relations or duty on the part of the plaintiff in error, in Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, which gave that tribunal occasion or authority for the exercise of this power. The case and the relations and duty were in Common Pleas, No. 4. That was the proper forum where the amount due was demandable and the misconduct regularly punishable. The action of Common Pleas, No. 2, was clearly coram non judice. By article 5, sect. 6, of the constitution it is provided that in the county of Philadelphia all jurisdiction and power shall be vested in four distinct and separate courts, and "the said courts in Philadelphia shall be designated respectively as the Court of Common Pleas number one, number two, number three, and number four * * * and the several courts shall distribute and apportion the business among them in such manner as shall be provided by rules of court, and each court to which any suit shall be thus assigned shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings at law and in equity, commenced therein, subject to change of venue as may be provided by law." Courts of Common Pleas, Nos. 2 and 4, are thus made distinct and separate, and any suit in one, in all its processes, conditions, liabilities, and results is within the exclusive jurisdiction of that one. If answerable anywhere, Davies was answerable in Common Pleas, No. 4. His præcipe was lodged there, his appearance recorded there, his duties were consequent upon them there, and that was the forum for any order or rule upon him concerning the business in that court. "Exclusive jurisdiction" was in "number four," and there it must have inception and completion. In thus attaching to itself jurisdiction in the premises, and proceeding independently by rule and adjudication, the court below violated the requirements of the constitution, and their judgment is void, and of no effect. The plaintiff in error has not had his day in court — a court distinct and exclusive.

Neither Mr. Spencer nor Mrs. Curtiss were parties asking for the rule on Davies. There is, therefore, no complaining or responsible party in court or upon record moving for such action. On the 28th of May 1878, Davies paid Mrs. Curtiss $100, which she acknowledged was in full satisfaction of her claim. After such acknowledgment there was no basis for a proceeding, and it was too late for the grave and summary process of a rule. The evidence was that Davies had permission to use the bond. The case must be flagrant and the facts clear of doubt to call for action so severe as to strike respondent's name from the list of attorneys. It is submitted that in the absence of positive evidence of any dishonest intent, or of persistence in wrong-doing, the court is not justified in resorting to a measure so extreme as to deprive the respondent of the valuable right which pertains to his office of attorney.

R. L. Ashhurst and Samuel Dickson, for Censors of Law Association. —The contention that this matter was under the sole cognisance of Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, and that no other court could take cognisance of the matter is completely answered by the undisputed facts. This bond was not obtained by Mr. Davies in any legal proceeding whatever. There was never any legal proceeding from anything that appears relating to it. It was deposited with the Guarantee Company by Mrs. Curtiss as security for rent of premises occupied by her son-in-law, Spencer. This was a transaction in pais, and no part of a court proceeding. The plaintiff in error, who had been her attorney in other matters, Mrs. Curtiss employed to get the bond back. This he accomplished by negotiation. No rule could be taken in the case in No. 4. In that case Davies had not been guilty of any misconduct. The Censors were right in taking it as an independent new proceeding in the first court they could. Had it not been for the delay in endeavoring to give Mr. Davies a hearing before proceeding against him, the case would have gone to No. 1, in the ordinary course. Even if this was not so, can it be argued that the courts are bound to shut their eyes to misconduct by their attorneys unless committed in their courts in pending cases? Mrs. Curtiss distinctly authorized the commencement of the proceedings, and never recalled or revoked her authority prior to the granting of the rule. But apart from any authority from her, the courts have ample power on their own motion to purge the list of attorneys of improper persons, and can act whenever the matter is brought to their attention in a proper manner. And can it be questioned that the Board of Censors of the Law Association is competent as the representatives of the general body of the bar, to bring such matters to the attention of the court, and ask their action?

The rule was not to compel Davies to pay over money but to disbar him for misconduct as an attorney-at-law. The only defence having the appearance of merit is the allegation that Davies had received the permission of Mrs. Curtiss to use the bond. Unfortunately this is not made out by the evidence, and, as shown by the learned judge below in his opinion, it is contradicted by the whole weight and tenor of that evidence; in fact it rests upon the unsupported assertions of Mr. Davies himself in his testimony. It is inconceivable that one who had been permitted to have the use of the bond would have written a series of communications filled with pitiful evasions and excuses for its non-return. And still more amazing that he would have quietly submitted to arrest and allowed the case to be returned to a criminal court for trial when he had a ready defence.

Mr. Justice MERCUR delivered the opinion of the court, May 3d 1880.

An attorney-at-law sustains an important relation in the administration of justice. He possesses certain powers and privileges from which others are excluded, and assumes important duties and obligations towards both court and client. He is an officer of the former, and a representative of the latter. His position is so responsible, his opportunities for good and for evil...