In re Sanctions in State v. Zaragoza

• Decision Date: 15 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006AP139.,2006AP139.
• Parties: In the Matter of SANCTIONS IN STATE v. James ZARAGOZA. Amy M. Flottmeyer and Monroe County District Attorney's Office, Appellants, v. Circuit Court for Monroe County and Hon. Steven L. Abbott, Presiding, Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

730 N.W.2d 421

2007 WI App 36

In the Matter of SANCTIONS IN STATE v. James ZARAGOZA.

Amy M. Flottmeyer and Monroe County District Attorney's Office, Appellants, v. Circuit Court for Monroe County and Hon. Steven L. Abbott, Presiding, Respondents.

No. 2006AP139.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs August 8, 2006.

Opinion Filed February 15, 2007.

On behalf of the appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Amy M. Flottmeyer, Assistant District Attorney for Monroe County.

On behalf of the respondents, the cause was submitted on the brief of J. David Rice of Rice, Heitman & Davis, S.C., Sparta.

Before LUNDSTEN, P.J., DYKMAN and VERGERONT, JJ.

¶ 1 LUNDSTEN, P.J.¹

The State appeals a circuit court order assessing $250 in jury fees against it for cancelling a criminal jury trial less than two business days before the time scheduled for trial.² The State argues that the circuit court lacked the authority to assess jury fees against it under WIS. STAT. § 814.51. The State further argues that, even assuming the circuit court had such authority, the court erroneously exercised its discretion in assessing fees. We conclude that the circuit court has authority under § 814.51 to assess jury fees against the State and that the court properly exercised its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order.

Background

¶ 2 This appeal arises out of the State's prosecution of a domestic abuse case. Trial was scheduled for November 30, 2005. Approximately two to three weeks before this date, the prosecutor was informed that a key witness, the alleged victim, had moved to Chicago, but the witness also indicated to the State's victim-witness coordinator that she intended to appear at the trial. In addition, the witness's subpoena had been returned.

¶ 3 Late in the afternoon on Monday, November 28, the prosecutor was informed that the witness had contacted the district attorney's office by telephone and said that she would not appear for the November 30 trial. The prosecutor informed the circuit court that same afternoon at 4:00 p.m., less than two days prior to the scheduled trial. Following a hearing on the day set for trial, the circuit court assessed jury fees of $250 against the State under WIS. STAT. § 814.51 for the cancellation of the trial. We reference additional facts as needed in the discussion below.

Discussion

¶ 4 The State's arguments fall into two categories: lack of judicial authority and misuse of discretion. We address each in turn.

Circuit Court's Authority Under WIS. STAT. § 814.51

¶ 5 In assessing the $250 in jury fees against the State, the circuit court proceeded under WIS. STAT. § 814.51. That statute reads, in pertinent part: "The court shall have discretionary authority in any civil or criminal action or proceeding ... to assess ... juror fees ... against either the plaintiff or defendant ... if a jury demand ... is ... withdrawn within 2 business days prior to ... the commencement of the trial."³

¶ 6 The interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law for our de novo review. See Knight v. Milwaukee County, 2002 WI 27, ¶ 14, 251 Wis.2d 10, 640 N.W.2d 773.

[S]tatutory interpretation "begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).

¶ 7 The State relies on the Martineau rule, that is, the rule that "costs may not be taxed against the state or an administrative agency of the state unless expressly authorized by statute." Martineau v. State Conservation Comm'n, 54 Wis.2d 76, 79, 194 N.W.2d 664 (1972); see also DOT v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm'n, 176 Wis.2d 731, 736, 500 N.W.2d 664 (1993). The State argues that WIS. STAT. § 814.51 does not expressly authorize fees against the State because the statute employs the generic term "plaintiff," rather than expressly referring to the "State." The State asserts that the legislature must use the word "State" or some express reference that is comparable, such as the identity of a particular State agency, to satisfy the Martineau rule. We disagree.

¶ 8 We begin by observing that the State's only lack-of-authority argument is that WIS. STAT. § 814.51 does not satisfy the Martineau rule. Our non-exhaustive research suggests that there is room for debate as to whether the Martineau rule applies to the type of sanction authorized in § 814.51.⁴ Without discussing the matter the parties assume that the Martineau rule applies here. We need not resolve whether the rule applies, however, because we conclude below that, even if the Martineau rule does apply, the statute satisfies it.

¶ 9 In concluding that the legislature has "expressly authorized" that jury fees may be "taxed against the state," see Martineau, 54 Wis.2d at 79, 194 N.W.2d 664, we start with the undisputed proposition that in criminal cases the State is the plaintiff. The State is normally designated as "plaintiff" in criminal cases and is designated as such here in several filings by the State. Furthermore, the technical meaning of the term "plaintiff" is often defined in a manner broad enough to include the State in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 665 (2d ed.1995) (defining "plaintiff" as "the party who brings suit in a court of law").

¶ 10 The State does not cite any authority requiring the legislature to use the word "State," or an express reference that is comparable, to satisfy the Martineau rule. Rather, the State refers us to other statutes involving costs where the legislature expressly named the State by using the term "state agency." See WIS. STAT. §§ 227.485 and 814.245. Obviously these statutes satisfy the Martineau rule, but their existence does not persuade us that the legislature must expressly use the word "State" or a comparable term.

¶ 11 As a matter of sound grammar, the phrase "either the plaintiff or defendant" in WIS. STAT. § 814.51 necessarily refers to both civil and criminal actions. This is true because "civil" and "criminal" are set forth in the disjunctive and modify the clauses that follow. Thus, circuit courts are authorized to impose jury fees in "any civil .... action or proceeding ... against either the plaintiff or defendant" and to impose such fees in "any ... criminal action or proceeding ... against either the plaintiff or defendant." WIS. STAT. § 814.51.

¶ 12 Likewise, because the statute refers to the plaintiff and defendant in the disjunctive, the only reasonable reading of WIS. STAT. § 814.51 is that there must be a "plaintiff" and a "defendant" in "any ... criminal action or proceeding." The statute plainly provides that the circuit court may assess jury fees in "any ... criminal action or proceeding" against "either the plaintiff or defendant." WIS. STAT. § 814.51 (emphasis added). If the State were not the "plaintiff" in criminal cases for purposes of § 814.51, the statute's provision that the circuit court may assess jury fees against either party in a criminal case would be rendered a nullity.⁵

¶ 13 The flaw in the State's argument — that the legislature must use the word "State" or a comparable term as opposed to a generic term such as plaintiff — is exposed in the following hypothetical example. Suppose that a statute provides: "The circuit court has discretionary authority in a criminal case to assess jury fees against either the plaintiff or the defendant." Under the State's proposed approach, this statute would not authorize fees against the State even though it is plain the term "plaintiff" is a reference to the State. From a grammatical perspective, WIS. STAT. § 814.51 contains essentially equivalent language.⁶

¶ 14 In sum, we conclude that the term "plaintiff" in WIS. STAT. § 814.51 is an express reference to the State for purposes of the Martineau rule here. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that the circuit court lacked authority to impose jury fees against the State.

Circuit Court's Exercise Of Discretion

¶ 15 The State argues that, even if the circuit court had the authority to assess jury fees against it, the court misused its discretion. For the reasons below, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.

¶ 16 Whether a circuit court proceeds under WIS. STAT. § 814.51 or pursuant to its inherent authority, the court's decision to assess jury fees is a discretionary one. See § 814.51; O'Neil v. Monroe County Circuit Court, 2003 WI App 149, ¶ 13, 266 Wis.2d 155, 667 N.W.2d 774 (inherent authority). When discussing the applicable discretionary standards, the parties cite case law involving the circuit court's inherent authority to assess jury fees. We perceive no reason why we should review the circuit court's exercise of discretion differently depending on whether it relies on § 814.51 or on its inherent authority. On the contrary, the supreme court has said that the circuit court's assessment of jury fees under the circuit court's inherent authority must be "consistent with" the sanction authorized by § 814.51. State ex rel. Collins v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis.2d 477, 489, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990). Furthermore, the purpose of an assessment of jury fees is, at bottom, the same whether the circuit court proceeds pursuant to its inherent authority or under § 814.51. The assessment of jury fees serves as a tool for managing the court's business and ensuring its efficient functioning. See State v. Foster, 100 Wis.2d 103, 108-10, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981); see also House v. Circuit Court for Marinette County, 112 Wis.2d 14, 16-17, 331 N.W.2d 859 (Ct.App.1983) (making no distinction between the purpose...