In re Sapp, Bankruptcy No. 2-81-00423.
Citation | 11 BR 188 |
Decision Date | 14 April 1981 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 2-81-00423. |
Parties | In re Paul Joseph SAPP, Evelyn Louise Sapp, Debtors. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Sixth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Stephen R. Buchenroth, Columbus, Ohio, for Eagle Sav. Ass'n Mitchel D. Cohen, Columbus, Ohio, for debtors.
Frank Pees, Trustee.
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
Eagle Savings Association, a creditor holding a secured claim against the debtors in this Chapter 13 case, has filed an objection to confirmation of the proposed plan. The grounds asserted for objection and the Court's disposition of them are as follows:
Eagle Savings Association ("Eagle") elected, prior to the filing of the Chapter 13 petition herein, to accelerate the indebtedness of the debtors under a provision of the promissory note executed by the debtors that reads:
"If default be made in the payment of any installment under this note, and if such default is not made good prior to the date of the next such installment, the entire principal sum and accrued interest shall at once become due and payable without notice at the option of the holder of this note."
The debtors were in substantial default under the payment obligation of the note at the time acceleration was declared. The ability of Eagle to continue to use the acceleration clause to thwart the debtors' efforts to rehabilitate themselves financially and to cure pre-petition default on a number of their debt obligations is circumscribed by the provisions of § 1322(b)(3) & (5) of the Bankruptcy Code. Those statutory provisions have been interpreted by this Court in the case of In re Soderlund, 3 C.B.C.2d 255, 7 B.R. 44 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1980), which stated:
In re Soderlund, supra, 3 C.B.C.2d at 256.
As this Court has further said in In re Rogers, No. 2-80-04701 (S.D.Ohio, February 5, 1981) (unreported):
In re Rogers, supra.
The debtors in this case seek to "decelerate" the pre-petition acceleration. That right is clearly granted to the debtors in the Bankruptcy Code, and thus the first ground for objection to the debtors' plan is hereby overruled.
For the same reasons delineated above, Eagle's assertion that the last payment due Eagle does not extend beyond the term of the plan is inappropriate and without merit. Upon appropriate reinstatement (or "deceleration"), the last payment due Eagle does extend beyond the term of the plan and thus is properly treated under the provisions of § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. THE PLAN MODIFIES THE RIGHTS OF EAGLE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 1322(b)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE.
The right provided to these debtors under the provisions of § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code is granted notwithstanding the prohibition on modification contained in § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. In light of this Court's ruling on the ability of the debtors to "decelerate" the mortgage obligation owed Eagle, Eagle's objection to confirmation based upon the provisions of § 1322(b)(2)...
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