In re Sarelas

• Decision Date: 05 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72 D 2.,72 D 2.
• Citation: 360 F. Supp. 794
• Parties: In the Matter of Peter S. SARELAS, an Attorney.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

360 F. Supp. 794

In the Matter of Peter S. SARELAS, an Attorney.

No. 72 D 2.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

June 5, 1973.

Peter S. Sarelas, pro se.

U. S. Atty., James R. Thompson, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Respondent is an attorney admitted to the bar of this court. In a disciplinary proceeding brought by The Chicago Bar Association, he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years having ". . . exhibited a continuous course of conduct . . . by instituting groundless lawsuits against the members of the bar, the bench, and laymen . . ." who crossed him, and thereby bringing the legal profession and the judiciary into disrepute. In re Sarelas, 50 Ill.2d 87, 98-99, 277 N.E.2d 313, 318-319 (1971).

There is no need to review here the nature of and the allegations contained in respondent's lawsuits even though a recitation of them furnishes an exegesis of the basis of the charge. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court clearly and succinctly summarizes at least fifteen suits filed by the respondent within a decade, all of which contained abusive and vituperative language and all of which were dismissed by the courts in which they were filed.

Respondent has broadly challenged almost every aspect of this disciplinary proceeding. Consequently, the opinion of this court will be of equally broad scope even though respondent's specific contentions may not be mentioned.

AUTHORITY OF THE COURT

The power of a court to suspend an attorney from practice before that court is too well established to conceivably be doubted. The considerations involved when this action is taken were well summarized by Chief Justice Marshall one and one-half centuries ago:

"On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise.

The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to reside in the court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised. . . ." Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 529-530, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824).

The purposes for which the power to suspend is exercised have long been recognized to be of such paramount importance that any form of misconduct which might impair the trust and confidence of the public in the legal profession and in the integrity of the courts may be the occasion for disciplinary action. The Supreme Court long ago clearly and simply enunciated this principle:

"We do not doubt the power of the court to punish attorneys as officers of the same, for misbehavior in the practice of the profession. This power has been recognized and enforced ever since the organization of the courts, and the admission of attorneys to practice therein. If guilty of fraud against their clients, or of stirring up litigation by corrupt devices, or using the forms of law to further the ends of injustice; in fine, for the commission of any other act of official or personal dishonesty or oppression, they become subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, in every instance where an attorney is charged by affidavit with fraud or malpractice in his profession, contrary to the principles of justice and common honesty, the court, on motion, will order him to appear and answer, and deal with him according as the facts may appear in the case." Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374, 19 L.Ed. 214 (1868).

A federal court has the duty to exercise its "controlling power" to suspend an attorney in order to maintain the respectability of and confidence in the bar when an attorney has been previously suspended by a state court. The judgment of the state court automatically casts grave doubt upon the fitness of the attorney to continue to be a member of the profession because it carries an inherent inference of the absence of the personal and professional qualities which an attorney must at all times possess. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917).

Only if an examination of the record upon which the state court judgment is based renders it suspect will a federal court not recognize and follow it. Three conditions have been held to negate the conclusive effect of a state court judgment of suspension:

"1. That the state procedure, from want of notice or opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a clear conviction on our part that we could not, consistently with our duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, we were constrained to do so. Id., at 51, 37 S.Ct. at 379.

More recent decisions indicate that the standards of Selling ". . . authoritatively expounded . . . the responsibility that remains in the federal judiciary. . . ." Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1277, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957). The great respect and deference which federal courts continue to give to decisions of the state courts regulating the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before them is best illustrated by the most recent Supreme Court review of a federal disciplinary proceeding, In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). Rather than determining whether the conduct of the attorney justified his suspension from the Ohio bar as the concurring opinion would have done, id. at 552, 88 S.Ct. 1222 (White and Marshall, JJ. concurring), the majority of Court carefully premised its decision not to give the Ohio judgment conclusive effect upon the reason that the attorney was not given timely notice of the grounds for which he was ultimately suspended in accordance with the first requirement of Selling. In sum, whether or not an attorney's acts indicate a lack of the upright professional and private character necessary to demonstrate or to maintain his good standing remains a matter of judgment for the states to determine for themselves within, of course, the broad confines of due process protection of fundamental freedoms. Law Students Civil Rights Research Counsel, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S.Ct. 720, 27 L.Ed.2d 749 (1971) (New York bar admission screening procedures valid upon their face); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L.Ed.2d 657 (1971) (political association); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971); id. at 9, 91 S.Ct. 702 (Stewart, J., concurring) (political belief); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967) (privilege against self-incrimination); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) (political association); Cf. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971) (freedom of speech). See also Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (freedom of speech).

THE ILLINOIS SUSPENSION ORDER

The first determination pursuant to Selling must be whether minimal due process rights in the form of adequate notice and opportunity to be heard were provided in the state disciplinary proceeding. Respondent's own chronology submitted with his response to the citation of this court indicates that he had notice of the inquiry eleven months before the first session before the Grievance Committee of The Chicago Bar Association was held. The formal complaint was filed fully eight months beforehand. Although respondent asserts that there was no response to his discovery requests, he was informed at the outset of the proceedings that the evidence against him of misconduct consisted of the records of the various lawsuits which he had filed and the dispositions of them. No new charges or new theories of misconduct were ever offered. An amendment to the complaint merely added counts referring to actions involving the respondent not mentioned in the original complaint, two of which were in the nature of supplemental complaints dealing with suits began after the original complaint was filed. Additional time was afforded the respondent to answer both the original complaint and the amendment. In re Sarelas, supra at 96 of 50 Ill.2d, 277 N.E.2d 317. Cf. In re Ruffalo, supra.

The record clearly shows that the respondent was given ample notice of the proceedings, their nature, the asserted misconduct, and the amendment to the complaint. He was given an opportunity to respond to both the complaint and the amendment, was allowed to have other parties present at the hearing, was allowed to object to the proceedings every other minute, and was allowed to vilify and to threaten the Commissioners. Respondent was beyond all doubt afforded due process and something more besides.¹

As to whether the evidence supported the facts found to have established the lack of upright private and professional character, the second determination pursuant to Selling, there may well have been no clearer case since the effects of apple eating were noticed by the proprietor of the Garden of Eden. This court has read the entire voluminous record of the state proceedings, most of which consists of the complaints filed by the respondent and their dispositions.² In addition to the documentary evidence of his misconduct, the record contains respondent's vilification and vituperation of those named in his complaints, the members of the bench and bar...