In re Schuyler's Steam Towboat Co.

Citation136 N.Y. 169,32 N.E. 623
PartiesIn re SCHUYLER'S STEAM TOWBOAT CO.
Decision Date29 November 1892
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

Proceeding for the dissolution of the Schuyler's Steam Towboat Company. From an order of the general term (19 N. Y. Supp. 565) affirming an order granting an injunction restraining the further prosecution of suits brought in the United States district court, Michael J. Moran and others appeal. Affirmed.

Carpenter & Mosher, (Joseph F. Mosher, of counsel,) for appellants.

James W. Eaton, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

A receiver of the property and effects of the above-named corporation was duly appointed by a special term of the supreme court of the state sitting at Albany on the 31st of July, 1891, and the order appointing him was filed and entered in the proper clerk's office August 1, 1891, at 11 A. M. The receiver executed his bond, and it was duly approved August 3, and filed in the clerk's office August 4, 1891. The proceeding was one for the voluntary dissolution of a corporation, and the distribution of its property and assets among those entitled to receive the same. Intermediate the time when the receiver was appointed and the execution and filing of his bond, and in the afternoon of August 1st, a Mr. Moran, in his own behalf and in behalf of other creditors of the corporation, libeled several vessels which were the property of the corporation, by filing libels in the United States district court for the eastern district of New York, and upon process issued from that court the marshal took possession of such vessels. When Moran instituted his proceedings he says he had been informed that application had already been made for the appointment of a receiver, but he was not informed, and did not know, that one had been appointed. Finding the marshal in possession of the vessels, and as he refused to give up such possession, the receiver instituted these proceedings to restrain the libelants from further steps in the United States district court. The courts below have granted the order restraining further proceedings, and the other parties have appealed here. The courts below have held that by the proper presentation of a petition to a state court, praying for the dissolution of the corporation, and by the appointment of a receiver upon due notice of the application to the attorney general, the court acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the proceeding, and took the property of the corporation into the custody of the law for the purpose of due administration; and that, having thus acquired jurisdiction of such subject-matter and taken the property into the custody of the law, although the receiver had not actually and physically seized and taken it into his manual possession, the state court acquired the exclusive jurisdiction and right to take such possession and make a final decree; and that the libelants acquired no rights under their process, and should not be permitted to further proceed in the district court. The libelants, on the other hand, contend that this is a question of jurisdiction over the particular property, and that court obtains it which through its process and officer first actually seizes and takes possession of the property itself; and that, although the receiver may have had a prior right to take possession, it was not exercised before actual possession was taken under the process from the United States court, and hence the first manual possession must determine the question of jurisdiction. We think the contention of the libelants ought not to prevail. The question of the effect of the appointment of a receiver upon the title to the property of the person or corporation for which he was appointed is not a new one. In Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sandf. Ch. 257, it was said that when the appointment of a receiver was completed the title to all property and effects which were subject to the order vested in him. To the same effect are Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142-148, and Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489-496. The appointment of receiver is completed at the furthest by the filing and entering of the order appointing him, although before he proceeds to the discharge of his duties he may be directed to execute and file a proper bond. When that is done, he can take actual, manual possession of the property, and his title relates back to the time of his appointment. In re Christian Jensen Co., 128 N. Y. 550, 28 N. E. Rep. 665, and cases cited by EARL, J. In Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 494, it was said that property that was liable to levy under execution at law could not be levied upon subsequent to an order appointing a receiver, as such order was equivalent to an actual levy upon the property. I think the proposition involved in this case has been held adversely to the claim of the libelants by the decision in Re Christian Jensen Co., supra. The receiver was there appointed March 10th, his bond filed March 11th, and on March 12th he took possession of some of the property of the corporation. On the 11th of March, intermediate the appointment and qualification of the receiver, certain parties commenced an action against the corporation, and sued out process in replevin in a New York district court, and under it took possession of certain property, which was then in the possession of the corporation. On the same day an action against the corporation was commenced in...

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21 cases
  • Rodgers v. Pitt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • September 18, 1899
    ... ... 238, 241; Schuehle v ... Reiman, 86 N.Y. 270, 273; In re Schuyler's Steam ... Towboat Co., 136 N.Y. 169, 175, 32 N.E. 623, Gay v ... Iron Co., 94 Ala. 303, 308, 317, ... ...
  • Simmons v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 1950
    ...S.W. 647, 649, 26 Am.St.Rep. 776; Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 129, 29 S.Ct. 230, 53 L.Ed. 435, 440; Re Schuyler's Steam Tow-Boat Co., 136 N.Y. 169, 32 N.E. 623, 20 L.R.A. 391, 392; 45 Am.Jur. 119, sec. 141. The effect of the appointment of the receiver by the Texas court was to place him......
  • Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • July 23, 1965
    ...liens, as to which federal jurisdiction was exclusive. The Supreme Court there reversed Matter of Trustees of Schuyler's Steam Tow Boat Corp., 136 N.Y. 169, 32 N.E. 623, 20 L.R.A. 391 (1892), a case much relied on by C&H. See also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492-493, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 93 L......
  • Cobe v. Ricketts
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 7, 1905
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