In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 00-32012. No. 03-3132.
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eighth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Minnesota |
Citation | 320 B.R. 895 |
Docket Number | No. 00-32012. No. 03-3132.,00-32012. No. 03-3132. |
Parties | In re SENIOR COTTAGES OF AMERICA, LLC, Debtor. Timothy D. Moratzka, Trustee of The Bankruptcy Estate of Senior Cottages of America, LLC and Senior Cottage Management, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Richard Morris, Morris, Carlson, Hoelsher, P.A., and Michael Cohen, Defendants. |
Decision Date | 18 February 2005 |
Robert C. Black, III, Black Law Office, Edina, MN, for Debtor.
This adversary proceeding came on before the Court for hearing on the motion of Defendants Richard Morris and Morris, Carlson, Hoelsher, P.A. ("MCH") for dismissal of the Plaintiffs complaint. The movants appeared by their attorney, Charles E. Lundberg (Thomas F. Miller, on the brief). The Plaintiff appeared in opposition to the motion. Upon the moving and responsive documents, the text of the Plaintiffs complaint, and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes the following order.
The Parties.
This adversary proceeding arose out of the bankruptcy cases of Debtors Senior Cottages of America, LLC ("Senior Cottages") and Senior Cottage Management, LLC ("Cottage Management"). The Plaintiff is the trustee of the bankruptcy estates in both cases.1 Defendants Morris and Cohen are attorneys at law. Defendant MCH is a law firm in which Defendant Morris is a principal.
Relevant Portions of Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Plaintiff commenced this adversary proceeding in his capacity as trustee. In the first and second paragraphs of the "Introduction" to his complaint, he announced:
In the remainder of the "Introduction," the Plaintiff goes on to identify one Murray R. Klane as an attorney-at-law, since disbarred in the State of Minnesota. He states that Klane invested in Senior Cottages and then became increasingly involved in its operations and governance, eventually becoming "the CEO or Chief Manager" of Senior Cottages and ultimately gaining "at all relevant points in time,... complete control of the daily operations of both" Senior Cottages and Cottage Management. He alleges that, by the spring of 1998, Senior "Cottages was unable to meet its obligations as they became due," though "many of its transactions and projects were midstream with high profit potential." After that, he states:
In a later section entitled "Background Facts," the Plaintiff fleshes out the summary of transactional history in his "Introduction" with more detailed fact allegations. In pertinent part, he pleads:
In the final fact allegations relevant to the motion at bar, the Plaintiff asserts that "the total value of the ongoing projects of Senior Cottages was therefore ... not less than $4,845,284.00," and that the amount of damages he may recover from the Defendants "has been established" accordingly.
The Plaintiff goes on to identify his causes of action in three separate counts of the complaint. In Count I, "Breach of Duty of Due Care and Negligence," he pleads:
In Count II, "Aiding and Abetting Fraudulent Transfer," the Plaintiff states:
Finally, in Count III, "Equitable Subordination," the Plaintiff requests that the "Defendants' claims, if any, in Senior Cottages' or the bankruptcy case of any affiliate of Senior Cottages, ... be equitably subordinated to all other claims and interests holders sic."
Motion at Bar.
Defendants Morris and MCH elected to respond to the Plaintiffs complaint by making the motion at bar, rather than by serving an answer. The motion sounds under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), which are made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7012(b).3 The movants advanced three different theories for their request for dismissal. The first two both go to Counts I and II of the Plaintiffs complaint; the third goes to Count III.
Discussion.
The centerpiece of the motion is the argument that Counts I and II do not recite facts that would establish the Plaintiffs standing to sue the movants under the legal theories of those counts. This argument is properly raised through a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). When it is, the focus is on the adequacy of the facts pled in the complaint, which are to be assumed as true. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7, 108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (citing Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). The movants argue that binding precedent conclusively denies the Plaintiff standing to maintain these causes of action, even assuming the truth of those facts that the Plaintiff has pled.
In the Eighth Circuit, the principal case on this issue is In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., Inc., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). Ozark arose out of an adversary proceeding brought by a trustee against the individual and corporate principals of the debtor-corporation. In that adversary proceeding, the trustee invoked the "alter ego" doctrine under state law, seeking a judgment piercing the corporate veil of the debtor. His goal was to have the principals held individually liable for the debtor's debts. In so suing, the trustee purported to act "on behalf of all of Ozark's creditors," 816 F.2d at 1223, and to use a right of action available under Arkansas state law to individual creditors of a corporation when its "corporate structure was illegally or fraudulently abused to the detriment of a third person," 816 F.2d at 1224 (citation and added emphasis omitted).
The bankruptcy court ordered judgment against the Ozark principals on the trustee's alter ego cause of action.4 On their appeal, the district court reversed.5 On the trustee's appeal from the district court, the Eighth Circuit focused on the issue of standing. It rejected all three statutory bases that the trustee argued for his...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Pollilo, Bankruptcy No. 02-38061bf (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1/15/2010), Bankruptcy No. 02-38061bf.
...In re American Rehab & Physical Therapy, Inc., 2006 WL 1997431, at *18 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC., 320 B.R. 895, 903 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Townsville, 268 B.R. 95, 99 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001); see generally In re Indian Palms Associates, Ltd., 6......
-
In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 05-3867.
...that Senior Cottages had a value in excess of creditors' claims against it. Moratzka v. Morris (In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC), 320 B.R. 895, 901 (Bankr.D.Minn.2005). The bankruptcy court added in a footnote that even if the trustee had alleged injury to Senior Cottages, the complai......
-
Kelley v. Bmo Harris Bank N.A. (In re Petters Co.), Jointly Administered under BKY 08-45257
...investors expected that their investments would be repaid. Dkt. 55 at ¶ 150.56 Moratzka v. Morris (In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC ), 320 B.R. 895 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).57 Id . at 898, 901–02.58 Id . at 901–02.59 In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC , 482 F.3d at 1006–07. At oral argument, ......
-
Kelley v. BMO Harris Bank N.A., Case No. 19-cv-1756 (WMW)
...debtor] itself" as opposed to "an injury to the individual interests of creditors of [the debtor]." In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 320 B.R. 895, 900-02 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). The bankruptcy court found that the trustee's complaint failed to do so because the debtor was "no more than a ......