In re Sequoia G.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2021
• Docket Number: AC 44346
• Citation: 256 A.3d 195,205 Conn.App. 222
• Parties: IN RE SEQUOIA G. et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

205 Conn.App. 222

256 A.3d 195

IN RE SEQUOIA G. et al.^*

AC 44346

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 8, 2021

Officially released June 8, 2021^**

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother).

Benjamin A. Abrams, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Joseph A. Geremia, Jr., Waterbury, for the minor children.

Elgo, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The respondent mother, Michelle L., appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice.¹ On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly found that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. We disagree with the respondent and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, which the court found by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history, are relevant. "The family has an extensive history with [the Department of Children and Families (department)]. ... On July 31, 2008, neglect petitions were filed with the Superior Court for juvenile matters with regard to Sequoia, Tevvon and Benjamin. The children were adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective supervision was entered on April 29, 2009, and expired on June 17, 2009. On March 30, 2012, a ninety-six hour hold was invoked with regard to Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The hold was vacated on April 3, 2012. On April 8, 2012, neglect petitions were filed with the Superior Court for juvenile matters ... regarding Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The children were adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective supervision was entered on November 14, 2012, and expired on May 14, 2013.... Following a team meeting ... the department was concerned about Sequoia returning to the care of either parent. She was placed in a therapeutic foster home.

"On November 21, 2016, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice were removed from the father's care through an [order of temporary custody] .... Protective supervision of those three children was vested in the respondent. On January 26, 2017, and January 27, 2017, [the department] received referrals regarding the children's safety in [the respondent's] home. When [the department] responded to those referrals, [the respondent] reportedly yelled, screamed and used profanity. Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice were removed from her custody pursuant to a ninety-six hour hold on January 27, 2017. On January 30, 2017, an order of temporary custody was filed and granted. On March 30, 2018, the court granted a motion to modify the protective supervision to commitment regarding Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. All three children were committed to [the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families]. On April 23, 2018, [the petitioner] filed with the court four petitions for termination of parental rights regarding Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice." On September 24, 2019, prior to the start of evidence, the petitioner moved to withdraw [her] termination of parental rights petition as to Tevvon and, instead, filed a motion for permanent transfer of guardianship seeking to vest guardianship of Tevvon in his foster father, Gary R.

In its memorandum of decision, filed August 28, 2020, the court noted that the trial took place over the course of five days. The court stated that, despite having proper notice, the respondent was not present for trial and did not present any evidence or testimony to refute the grounds alleged in the termination of parental rights petitions. The court noted that, according to her counsel, the respondent was in Indiana. The court granted the petitioner's petition for a permanent transfer of guardianship as to Tevvon and appointed Gary R., as his permanent legal guardian.

The court found in the adjudicatory phase, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification; see General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1) ; and that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).² The court proceeded to the dispositional phase, in which it determined that it was in the best interests of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice that the respondent's parental rights be terminated with respect to those three children. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent does not challenge either the conclusions the court made during the adjudicatory phase or the court's decision to transfer permanent guardianship as to Tevvon.³ Her sole claim on appeal concerns the findings and conclusions made by the court during the dispositional phase, with respect to Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice. We do not agree with the respondent.

The following legal principles and standard of review guide our analysis. "This court will overturn a determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child only if the court's findings are clearly erroneous."

In re Kiara Liz V ., 203 Conn. App. 613, 626, 248 A.3d 813 (2021).⁴ "In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child. ... The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [the child's] environment. ... In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [ § 17a-112 (k) ]. ... The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered. ... There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph M ., 158 Conn. App. 849, 868–69, 120 A.3d 1271 (2015) ; see also General Statutes § 17a-112 (k).⁵

The court made findings pursuant to each of the seven statutory factors in § 17a-112 (k) before determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice, who at the time of the court's decision were fifteen, twelve and nine years old, respectively. The respondent challenges the court's findings as to two of these factors.

The respondent argues regarding the emotional ties factor, § 17a-112 (k) (4), that the court did not comment on the relationship between the children and her, but rather focused solely on the relationship between the foster parents and the children. She contends that the court ignored the testimony of Anice's foster parent, Gary R., that she had weekly phone contact with the respondent and had expressed that she would like to live with the respondent or her father and, if that is not possible, she would like to continue living with Gary R.⁶ We are not persuaded.

The court found as to the emotional ties factor that Benjamin has a positive relationship with his foster parents and Sequoia has a positive relationship with her foster mother, whom she approaches readily for affection and care. The court found that Anice would like to be adopted by Gary R. if she cannot return to her biological parents.

It was not inappropriate for the court to have considered the bond between the children and their foster parents. The plain language of § 17a-112 (k) (4) provides that the trial court shall consider and make written findings regarding "the feelings and emotional ties of the child ... to ... any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties ...." The court's findings as to the emotional ties factor indicate that the three children had been in their placements for more than one year at the time of its decision. In In re Nevaeh W ., 317 Conn. 723, 731–33, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015), our Supreme Court stated that "[n]othing in [ § 17a-112 (k) (4) ], however, required the trial court to consider only the children's emotional ties with the respondent. ... To the contrary, this court has repeatedly recognized that, in the dispositional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance of permanency in children's lives. ... Indeed ... [i]n regard to children who have bonded with their foster parents, [o]nce new psychological relationships form, separation from the new parents becomes no less painful and no less damaging to a child than separation from natural or adoptive caregiving parents. ... Termination of a biological parent's rights, by preventing further litigation with that parent, can preserve the stability a child has acquired in a successful foster placement and, furthermore, move the child closer toward securing permanence by removing barriers to adoption." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Although the court did not specifically discuss the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the respondent when stating its findings regarding § 17a-112 (k) (4), it does not follow that the court failed to consider those feelings and ties. Our Supreme Court stated in In re Nevaeh W., that, "in considering the trial court's findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4), we are mindful that an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding" and determined that even though the trial court did not specifically mention the emotional ties between the...