In Re Seven Barrels of Wine, in Re

Decision Date14 January 1920
PartiesIn re SEVEN BARRELS OF WINE.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Escambia County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Statutory proceeding begun by the seizure of seven barrels of wine which were in the possession of Antonio Marasso and oters claimants, followed by proceedings in which the greater part of it was ordered destroyed, and claimants appeal. Order reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where a commodity constituting property, not inherently dangerous to persons or to their fundamental rights, or injurious to the public welfare because of its mere possession, is lawfully possessed before and at the time of the adoption or enactment of laws forbidding its possession, and such continued possession is not for an unlawful purpose or use, and is not an incipient nuisance, and does not jeopardize the rights of others or the public welfare, and when a reasonable opportunity to lawfully dispose of the commodity before its seizure is not afforded, the enforcement of such laws, as against such previously acquired lawful possession, may deprive persons of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Such enforcement may also violate property rights secured by the state Constitution.

While the amendment to article 19 of the state Constitution may, to conserve the general welfare, in effect quality rights lawfully existing before the adoption of the amendment, it does not purport to wholly destroy property rights in liquors and wines or other commodities that were lawfully acquired and possessed as property before the change in the organic law. The organic amendment and the statute enacted to enforce it expressly provide for stated limited property rights in wines that may be lawfully acquired and held in possession.

The provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, securing defined property rights against invasion by state authority are limitations upon the lawmaking power of the Legislature as well as upon the powers of the other departments of the state government; and property not harmful in itself, that is legally acquired as such by persons for lawful purposes, and not used, or designed to be used, for or in connection with or in furtherance of, an unlawful act or purpose, cannot legally be destroyed by the authority of a statute that is enacted subsequent to the lawful acquisition of the property when such destruction is not expedient to conserve the rights of others or of the public welfare. The police power of the state is not absolute. It is subject to controlling provisions of the federal and state Constitutions.

A statute being reasonable susceptible of two interpretations by one of which it would be clearly constitutional, and by the other of which its constitutionality would be doubtful the former construction should be adopted.

In determining the legality and effect of a statutory regulation, the court should ascertain the legislative intent; and, if the ascertained intent will permit, the enactment should be construed and effectuated so as to make it conform to, rather than violate, applicable provisions and principles of the state and federal Constitutions, since it must be assumed that the Legislature intended the enactment to comport with the fundamental law.

A statute must be so construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid, not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.

A statute is not to be given a retrospective effect unless its terms show clearly that such an effect was intended.

The rule that statutes are not to be construed retrospectively unless such construction was plainly intended by the Legislature applies with peculiar force to those statutes the retrospective operation of which would impair or destroy vested rights.

A statutory regulation may, consistently with organic law, be applied to one class of cases in controversy, and may violate the Constitution as applied to another class of cases. This does not destroy the statute, but imposes the duty to enforce the regulation when it may be legally applied.

A statute should not, by construction, be given a retrospective effect when it would jeopardize the validity of the statute, or when it would make its application conflict with organic law.

A statute should not be so construed or applied as to make it conflict with organic law, when a construction or application conformable to the Constitution is practicable and the legislative intent is not thereby thwarted, since it must be assumed that the Legislature contemplated the enactment of a law that would conform to the Constitution, and that it would be applied to classes of cases in which it may be validly enforced.

Statutory regulations may not wholly destroy the right to acquire, possess, and protect any species of property that had already been lawfully acquired and possessed for legal purposes before the enactment of the statute, and a reasonable opportunity to lawfully dispose of it is not afforded before its seizure, unless, because of its nature the property jeopardizes the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or unless the property is knowingly used in violation of law to the detriment of the public.

Property is acquired and held subject to then existing laws, and also subject to future enactments that reasonably regulate its use in the interest of the public welfare.

Property, already lawfully acquired for legal purposes, is not subject to be wholly destroyed by virtue of the police power, under statutes enacted after the lawful acquisition of the property, unless the property is of such a nature that it has become, or been adjudged to be, or declared by a valid law to be, a nuisance, or unless it otherwise endangers the public safety, health, or welfare, or unless it is designedly used for, or in connection with, or in furtherance of, an illegal act or purpose that injuriously affects public rights or the general welfare.

A valid exercise of the police power of the state cannot be stayed by the acquisition of property after the enactment of a statute declaring such property to be noxious and making the possession of it unlawful, even though the property is acquired before the enactment takes effect or becomes operative, it being within the power of the Legislature to enact such a law to become effective or operative at a future day. In such a case the noxious property is acquired with full notice of its infirmity, and that after a day certain its possession will by mere lapse of time be unlawful.

A nuisance may be abated, but inoffensive private property may not be arbitrarily destroyed.

The provisions of chapter 7736, Laws of Florida, approved December 7, 1918, authorizing the seizure and destruction of intoxicating liquors and beverages that are held in possession in violation of the statute, do not apply to wine legally acquired before the enactment of the statute, and held under the circumstances stated in the opinion, where the wine is not legally declared to be, and is not in fact shown to be, an incipient nuisance, and it does not otherwise imperil the common good, and it is not used or designed to be used for, or in connection with, or in furtherance of, an unlawful act or purpose, and its mere possession does not impair public rights or jeopardize the public welfare.

COUNSEL John S. Beard and Philip D. Beall, both of Pensacola, for appellants.

Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and D. Stuart Gillis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Among the provisions of chapter 7736, Laws of Florida, approved December 7, 1918, are the following:

'Sec. 3. That is shall be unlawful for any person, association of persons, or corporation, or any agent or employé of any person, association of persons, or corporation, to have in his, her, their, or its, possession, custody or control, in this state, any alcoholic or intoxicating liquors or beverages, except as is hereinafter provided.'
'Sec. 5. * * * Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to make it unlawful for any person over the age of twenty-one years to possess, have in custody or control, in such person's bona fide residence, for the personal use of himself, or herself, and family, and not to be disposed of to any other person in any way, not exceeding four quarts of distilled alcoholic or intoxicating liquors or beverages and twenty quarts of malt or fermented alcoholic or intoxicating liquors or beverages, either or both, but this shall not be construed to permit any such person to possess, have in custody or control, more than the maximum quantity of the particular class of liquors herein mentioned. * * *
'Sec. 15. That the right of property in and to all alcoholic or intoxicating liquors or beverages, whether spirituous, vinous or malt, manufactured, sold, bartered, or exchanged, transported or possessed by any person, association of persons, or corporation, in violation of any of the provisions of this act, and all extract, essence or tincture of Jamaica ginger sold, dispensed or given away, in violation of any of the provisions of this act, and all other personal property that may have been used by any person, association of persons, or corporation in the violation of any of the provisions of this act or which may have been used to facilitate the violation of any of the provisions of this act, and all of the things mentioned in section four of this act, including automobiles, motortrucks, wagons, buggies, boats, vessels and other water craft, and all machines traveling through the air, and all other means of conveyance, used in the violation of any of the provisions of this act, or to facilitate the violation of any of
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
56 cases
  • Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Lakeland
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • August 1, 1927
    ... ... Co. v. Anderson, 233 U.S ... 325, 34 S.Ct. 599, 58 L.Ed. 983; In re Seven Barrels of ... Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627; Dahnke-Walker Milling ... Co. v. Bondurant, 257 ... ...
  • State v. Watkins
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1923
    ... ... shall such officers be entitled to more than seven thousand ... five hundred ($7,500.00) dollars per annum' is ... unconstitutional and void.' ... 692; Burr v. Florida East Coast R ... Co., 77 Fla. 259, 81 So. 464; In re Seven Barrels of ... Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627; Florida East Coast R ... Co. v. State, 79 Fla. 66, 83 So ... ...
  • Lewis v. Leon County
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1926
    ... ... Burr ... v. F. E. C. Ry. Co., 77 Fla. 259, 81 So. 464; Seizure of ... 7 Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627; F. E. C. Ry ... Co. v. State, 79 Fla. 66, 83 So. 708. But the ... Bowden, 87 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916D, 913, ... Ann. Cas. 1915D, 99; In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 ... Fla. 1, 83 So. 627; Burr v. Florida East Coast R ... Co., 77 Fla ... ...
  • Amos v. Mathews
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1930
    ... ... 688; Burr v. Florida East Coast R ... Co., 77 Fla. 259, 81 So. 464; In re Seven Barrels of ... Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627; Pompano Horse Club v ... State, 93 Fla. 415, text ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT