In re Short's Estate

• Decision Date: 01 January 1855
• Citation: 16 Pa. 63
• Parties: In re Short's Estate.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

16 Pa. 63

In re Short's Estate.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

APPEAL from the decree of the Register's Court for the city and county of Philadelphia.

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The case was argued, on the part of the appellant, by H. D. Gilpin.—It was contended that the decree of the register's court, now appealed from, ought to be reversed, because,

1. The law of Pennsylvania, as it existed at the time of the testator's death, when the estate liable to taxation passed from him to his collateral relatives, expressly limited the tax to property then within this commonwealth.

2. The act of Assembly passed on the 11th March 1850, and since the death of the testator, which has varied this law, does not, by its terms, apply to the case of a person who had died before its enactment.

3. If the language of that act were capable of such a construction, it will not be sanctioned by judicial tribunals, because it would make the law retrospective and destructive of vested interests.

4. If a construction of the language of that act could apply it retrospectively to the case of a person who had died before its enactment, still it has relation only to such of his property as was actually within this commonwealth when he died.

Reference was made to the case of Alexander's Estate, 4 Pa. Law Journ. 448; Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 Barr 142; Commonwealth v. Duffield, 2 Am. Law Jour. 86.

In relation to the second point or exception, that the act of March 1850 did not apply in its terms to a person who died, and whose estate had become vested in collateral relatives before its enactment; that it had not necessarily such a meaning; that its language appeared to be prospective — to relate to cases occurring after its enactment; that a construction which would give an operation to an act which would interfere with rights already accrued should not be adopted, unless its language was incapable of a different construction: 4 Ser. & R. 401; 7 Johns. 501; 5 W. & Ser. 199; 2 Barr 25.

But such a construction would violate those clauses of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which declare that "no one shall be deprived of his property unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land," and that "no law impairing contracts shall be made," and that clause of the constitution of the United States which declares that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." That the transfer of property by will is subject to the laws and governed by the principles which are applicable

to transfers effected by the acts of the parties. The judicial principles which would control and regulate this property, in case Mr. Short had sold it at the date of his will, must control it, though he devised it: 2 Black. Com. 294, 378; 4 Ser. & R. 364; 3 Rawle 132; 2 Whar. 396; 3 id. 15; 5 W. & Ser. 173; 8 id. 50; 5 Barr 149; 1 Jones 494; 2 Cranch 277; 7 id. 166; 4 Whar. 122; 12 id. 213; 1 Howard 311.

In this case, if the construction be that the property out of the State is taxable, it will require the appropriation of only about the one-half or two-thirds of the property left within the State and in the hands of the executor to discharge it on property out of the State, and paying to the legatees out of the State; but cases may occur where all the assets in Pennsylvania may be required to pay the tax on property abroad passing to legatees who are abroad.

Scott and Hood, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by GIBSON, C. J.

That Mr. Short's property out of the State subjected him to personal liability for taxes assessed on it here in...