In re Sing Lee

• Decision Date: 28 February 1893
• Citation: 54 F. 334
• Parties: In re SING LEE. In re CHING JO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

54 F. 334

In re SING LEE. In re CHING JO.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan.

February 28, 1893

D. E Corbitt, for petitioners.

L. G Palmer, Dist. Atty., and J. B. McMahon, Asst. Dist. Atty for the United States.

SEVERENS District Judge.

The respondents in these cases, who are Chinese persons, being found at Petoskey, in this district were arrested and taken before United States Commissioner Call upon the charge of being and remaining within the United States in violation of the acts of congress excluding Chinese laborers who have entered this country since the passage of the principal act of 1882. Upon a summary proceeding, such as is provided for by those acts, the respondents were on the 7th day of February found guilty, and thereupon the commissioner sentenced them to imprisonment at hard labor for the period of 20 years in the county jail of Kent county, and adjudged that they be then removed to China. They were committed in accordance with that sentence, and on the 21st inst. applied to the district judge for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that they were in custody under the aforesaid sentence and order of the commissioner, setting it out in full, and further alleging that they were not guilty, setting forth a fact which their counsel claims shows that they were not amendable to that proceeding, namely, that they were lawfully residents in the United States prior to the passage of the act of 1882, above referred to. The district attorney and his assistant, being notified, attended, and the grounds for the application for the writ were fully argued by counsel for the respective parties.

These grounds, as presented by counsel for the respondents, and strenously urged, are that the provisions of the recent act of May 5, 1892, prescribing the practice in such cases, and in pursuance of which the present conviction was had, do not provide due process of law, in that the proceeding is summary, and affords no opportunity for a trial by jury, nor even a regular hearing in any court of justice; that they fail to give to all persons the equal protection of the laws; that the statute of 1892 also declares that without any evidence the party is presumed to be guilty; and that he can only establish his innocence by affirmative testimony, showing his right,-- which, it is alleged, is contrary to the fundamental principles imbedded in the constitution of the United States. They further claimed the right to prove that the commissioner had no jurisdiction by reason of the fact, as asserted, that the respondents were lawfully resident in the country before the passage of the act of 1882. No other objections are indicated by the petition or were presented in the argument.

To us who live far inland, and not so much subject to the evils intended to be guarded against by these exclusion acts, the lines laid down for their enforcement may seem hard, and because such summary dealing with the rights of persons are out of the common order to which we are accustomed and are liable to produce injustice in many cases on account of their summary expedition and the presumption against the prisoners, they may seem severe; but if the power resides in congress to enact such provisions, the discretion whether it will do so rests in the lawmaking power, and the courts must presume it was exercised upon sufficient reasons.

In support of the several objections on behalf of the respondents enumerated above, it was insisted, first, that certain rights are guarantied by the constitution to all persons within the jurisdiction covered by it, among which is the right to a trial by a jury of any fact upon the issue of which a man may be deprived of his liberty, and expelled from the country, and that this is what is required by due process of law. But it is erroneous to suppose that due process of law necessarily implies a trial by jury, or even a trial before a court organized according to common-law forms, and proceeding according to common-law methods. That is due process of law which is according to the method of legal proceedings employed in similar cases. Murray's Lessee v. Improvement Co., 18 How. 272. There are a great variety of special cases in which, on account of the necessity for prompt action, and because the regular course of proceedings in a court of justice by jury trial would involve delay, and contravene the object sought to be attained by the proceeding, it has always been customary to adopt a summary method. That is one of the principal reasons for the adoption of such proceedings, and there is ground for supposing it to have been a controlling one in the enactment in question. Other cases which might be instanced where summary methods are customary are where steps must be taken to prevent the spread of a pestilence or such mischiefs, and under treaty stipulations for the extradition of criminals. If the process is customary, it is that which is due. It is easy to see that the presence of this class of persons was regarded by congress as dangerous to our society and institutions, and that the general purpose of these exclusion acts is effectually and promptly to exclude their admission into the country, and to expel them if they have already gained a foothold.

It cannot be doubted that congress has power to prevent such persons, being aliens, from entering the country, and the...