In re Smith, Bankruptcy No. 80-1088
Decision Date | 10 July 1980 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 80-1088,80-1091,180-00039.,179-00911 |
Citation | 5 BR 500 |
Parties | In re Philip A. SMITH, Jr., Debtor. In re Jeffery Stephen PIERCE and Mary Kathryn Pierce, Debtors. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Barry M. Barash & Charles E. Covey, Galesburg, Ill., for Smith and Pierce.
James S. Brannon, Trustee, Peoria, Ill., for Smith.
Barney Olson, II, Galesburg, Ill., for creditor, Public Finance Co. in Smith.
James S. Brannon, Peoria, Ill., for Trustee in Pierce.
DECISION AND ORDERS ON APPEAL
These cases present the question whether federal Truth in Lending claims (and similar consumer claims under state laws) may be allowed as exempt property to debtors under § 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent of any unused portion of amount of the homestead exemption. Debtors here claim such exemptions and have appealed denial thereof by the Bankruptcy Judge.
Debtors rely chiefly on the language "in any property" in § 522(d)(5) and on Collier on Bankruptcy, Fifteenth Edition, Volume 3, ¶ 522.14, as follows:
Debtors also rely on Matter of Upright, 1 B.R. 694 (Bkrtcy., 1979), which held business inventory exempt under this section.1 The Bankruptcy Judge here disagrees with Upright as judicial legislation because "the Code creates no exemptions for business related items." He says that "because of the legislative history of § 522, the language `in any property' means any property described in § 522." In essence, this view seems to be that, with all the care and effort which went into describing and delimiting the types of property which would be permitted as exempt to provide debtors a "fresh start" after bankruptcy, Congress obviously did not intend any large, additional "wild card" or "unfilled bin" theory of exemption here to be made up of any other kind of property which might exist.
Analysis of the legislative history supports that conclusion. Debtors here are seizing upon a glaring ambiguity in the statute to magnify their entitlement. The courts should not permit such, in derogation of Congressional intent, on the simplistic basis that the words "any property," wherever stated, must mean absolutely any property, or on the pure assumption that there was some intention, as Collier says, to prevent discrimination against non-homeowners.
No Congressional debates on the point have been cited, and the court has found none; but the analysis by the Bankruptcy Judge of the development of the new exemptions in bankruptcy, is persuasive. Finding that subsection (d) of § 522 devolved in large part from the Uniform Exemption Act of 1976, which devolved in considerable part from proposals of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, he traces the development as follows:
It is noted that clause (3) of subsection (c) of the Commission Act exempted cash, securities and receivables, including unpaid personal earnings, accrued vacation pay and income tax refunds, to the aggregate value of not more than $500.00. It is readily apparent that exemption of these types of property was not to be enhanced by unused homestead exemption.
The Bankruptcy Judge observed, with respect to the Uniform Exemptions Act:
To continue reading
Request your trial