In re Smith

• Decision Date: 10 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 10–0048.,10–0048.
• Citation: In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616 (Tex. 2010)
• Parties: In re Billy James SMITH, Relator.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

333 S.W.3d 582

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616

In re Billy James SMITH, Relator.

No. 10–0048.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Nov. 10, 2010.Decided March 4, 2011.

Kristopher Edwin Moore, Kevin Glasheen, Glasheen, Valles, Inderman & DeHoyos, LLP, Odessa, for Billy James Smith.Martin Cherry, General Counsel, Philip A. Lionberger, Office of Attorney General, Asst. Solicitor General, Greg W. Abbott, Attorney General, Clarence Andrew Weber, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, David S. Morales, Office of Attorney General, Deputy First Asst. Attorney General, Austin, James C. Ho, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas, for Susan Combs.Justice MEDINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Texas Wrongful Imprisonment Act, which is now known as the Tim Cole ¹ Act, a wrongfully-imprisoned person may seek compensation from the state for the period of wrongful imprisonment.Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 103.001(a).Application is made to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, who is authorized to determine eligibility and the amount owed to the claimant.Id.§ 103.051(b).The amount owed is determined by multiplying a fixed amount, currently set at $80,000 per year, by the period of wrongful imprisonment.Id.§ 103.052(a)(1).In calculating the wrongful-imprisonment period, the Act excludes any period for which the claimant was serving a concurrent sentence.Id.§ 103.001(b).

Relator, who was on parole at the time of his wrongful conviction, complains that he is entitled to additional compensation because the Comptroller erroneously applied the concurrent-sentence restriction to reduce his award.Relator submits that he would not have been imprisoned but for the wrongful conviction and that the resulting revocation of his parole should not be used to reduce his award.The Comptroller concluded that the concurrent-sentence restriction applied and reduced the claimant's compensation accordingly.We do not agree that the concurrent-sentence restriction applies under these circumstances and conditionally grant the relator's petition for mandamus relief.

I

In December 1970, Billy James Smith was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 25 years in prison.He was released on parole in 1983.In 1986, Smith was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to life imprisonment.His parole on the 1970 robbery conviction was also revoked.On June 11, 1987, his sentence on the robbery conviction was discharged, but he remained in prison under the life sentence for sexual assault.

In 2006, Smith applied for a state writ of habeas corpus.SeeTex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07(establishing procedure for habeas corpus relief in non-death-penalty cases).He alleged that DNA testing and other evidence proved his actual innocence.Seeid.arts. 64.01–.05(explaining procedure for obtaining forensic DNA testing).The application was filed in the convicting criminal district court, but made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals because it involved a final conviction in a felony case.Id.art. 11.07, § 3.

The trial court found that DNA testing exonerated Smith, and released him from custody on July 7, 2006.Seeid.art. 11.65(b)(providing that convicting court may order the release of the applicant on bond).The convicting court's findings were transmitted to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which subsequently agreed in an unpublished per curiam opinion that Smith had “established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the DNA results.”Ex Parte Smith,2006 WL 3691244, *1(Tex.Crim.App., Dec. 13, 2006);see alsoTex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, §§ 3,5.The Court of Criminal Appeals accordingly granted Smith's application on the basis of his actual innocence.

A little less than three years later, Smith applied for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, seeking approximately $1,593,000.SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 103.003(requiring application to be filed within three years of pardon or relief granted on the basis of innocence).The Comptroller approved Smith's application, but determined he was owed a lesser amount, approximately $1,527,000, after applying the concurrent-sentence restriction.Seeid.§ 103.001(b).Smith accepted the reduced award under protest, asked the Comptroller to reconsider her determination, and when she denied his request, filed this original proceeding.

II

The Comptroller's decision is not appealable, but a claimant may seek review through an original mandamus proceeding.Id.§ 103.051(e).The original proceeding must be filed in this Court because only the Supreme Court may issue a writ of mandamus against an officer of the executive department of this state, such as the Comptroller.A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp,904 S.W.2d 668, 672(Tex.1995)(orig. proceeding).The Court's mandamus authority extends “to order or compel the performance of a judicial, ministerial or discretionary act or duty that, by state law, the officer or officers are authorized to perform.”Tex. Gov't Code § 22.002(c);see alsoTex. Const. art. V, § 3.

Although mandamus will not issue to control an officer's legitimate exercise of discretion, it may issue to enforce the performance of a nondiscretionary or ministerial act.Cobra Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sadler,447 S.W.2d 887, 896(Tex.1969)(orig. proceeding).In this regard, a public officer has no discretion or authority to misinterpret the law.See, e.g., Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock,531 S.W.2d 593, 602(Tex.1975)(original proceeding to compel the comptroller to issue a warrant for payment of architects' services);Gordon v. Lake,163 Tex. 392, 356 S.W.2d 138, 141(1962)(original proceeding to compel secretary of state to file a corporate charter);Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Pollard,118 Tex. 138, 12 S.W.2d 137, 139(1929)(original proceeding to compel attorney general to approve bonds and certify them to comptroller for registration).Similarly, when an alleged mistake of law involves an issue of statutory construction, our review is de novo.First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs,258 S.W.3d 627, 631(Tex.2008).

III

Wrongfully-imprisoned persons have not always been entitled to compensation from the state.The common law provided no recourse for the innocent.State v. Oakley,227 S.W.3d 58, 62(Tex.2007).It was not until 1965 that the Legislature enacted the first wrongful-imprisonment statute.Act of May 28, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 507,1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1022, 1022–24;see alsoTex. Const. art. III, § 51–c(constitutional amendment authorizing compensation legislation).Since then, the statute has undergone several revisions and is now found in Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 103.001–.154.

Chapter 103, also known as the Tim Cole Act, presently grants compensation to persons who fulfill two requirements.Act of May 27, 2009, 81st Leg., R. S., ch. 180, § 1,2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 523.First, the person must have “served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state.”Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 103.001(a)(1).Second, the person must have received either “a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced,” or “been granted relief on the basis of actual innocence of the crime for which the person was sentenced.”Id.§ 103.001(a)(2)(A)–(B).Smith met these requirements.

Additionally, Smith was required to follow certain statutory procedures to obtain compensation.He was required to file an application for compensation with the Comptroller's office, which he did.Seeid.§ 103.051(a).The Comptroller, in turn, was under a legal duty to process Smith's claim, verify his eligibility for compensation, and determine the amount of compensation, if any, that he was owed.Id.§ 103.051(b)(1)–(2), (c).The Comptroller complied.

In determining Smith's eligibility and the amount of compensation owed him, the Comptroller was also required to determine whether any statutory restrictions applied to Smith's claim.There are a number of restrictions that may apply depending on the facts, but pertinent here is the concurrent-sentence restriction.Id.§ 103.001(b).Under this restriction, a person may have his claim reduced, or entirely extinguished, if he was under a concurrent sentence for another crime to which the Act does not apply while he was serving all or part of a sentence for which the Act does apply.Id.In other words, a person is entitled to compensation for imprisonment for a crime he did not commit unless he was also serving a concurrent sentence for a crime he did commit.

When Smith was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for the 1986 aggravated sexual assault, he was on parole for his 1970 robbery conviction.The sexual assault conviction revoked that parole.From August 7, 1986, when Smith's wrongful sentence began, to June 11, 1987, when his concurrent sentence on the 1970 robbery conviction discharged, Smith was serving concurrent sentences.Smith's sentence on the wrongful sexual assault conviction ended on July 7, 2006.

Applying the concurrent-sentence restriction, the Comptroller determined that Smith was eligible for wrongful-imprisonment compensation from June 12, 1987, to July 7, 2006, a total 19 years and 25 days.Smith contends that he is entitled to an additional sum for the time he was incarcerated following the revocation of his parole for the robbery conviction to the date of its discharge.The question before us is whether a parolee, whose parole is revoked because of a wrongful conviction, is entitled to compensation under the Act for the period of imprisonment the parolee would have otherwise served out of prison on parole.The question is one of statutory construction.

IV

When construing a statute, we begin with its language.“[W]e consider it ‘a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it chooses...