In re Sneddon

• Decision Date: 08 December 1914
• Parties: IN RE SNEDDON.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

144 P. 676

74 Or. 586

IN RE SNEDDON.

Supreme Court of Oregon

December 8, 1914

In Banc.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coos County; John S. Coke, Judge.

In the matter of proceedings to have one Charles Sneddon committed for insanity. From an order of commitment he appealed to the circuit court, where on a trial to a jury he was declared sane and discharged, and from an order overruling a motion to set aside the verdict and judgment on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter Ellen Sneddon and the State appeal. Affirmed.

The abstract of record before us discloses that, on the petition of Ellen Sneddon in the county court of Coos county, Charles Sneddon was brought before that court, and with the assistance of two practicing physicians was examined and adjudged insane by that court and ordered conveyed to the Oregon State Hospital at Salem. Sneddon appealed to the circuit court, where a motion to dismiss his appeal was overruled. A jury trial was had January 20, 1914, and a verdict returned to the effect that he was of sound mind. Thereupon it was ordered and adjudged that he was sane, and that he be discharged from custody as an insane person. The state of Oregon appearing by the district attorney and Ellen Sneddon, the complainant, by her attorney, both moved to set aside the verdict and judgment on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. This motion was overruled on February 11, 1914, and both Ellen Sneddon and the state appeal.

L. A Liljeqvist, Dist. Atty., of Coquille, for the State. Harry G Hoy, of Marshfield, for appellant Ellen Sneddon. William T Stoll and J. M. Upton, both of Marshfield, for respondent Charles Sneddon.

BURNETT J. (after stating the facts as above).

There are 11 assignments of error set forth in the abstract, which may be reduced to three heads: (1) That there was no appeal from the adjudication of insanity made by the county court, and hence the circuit court erred in not dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction; (2) that it was error to grant a trial by jury; and (3) that the court erred in making the order of February 11, 1914, denying the motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the circuit court. It is not specified that the court erred in making the order discharging Sneddon from custody on January 20, 1914.

Section 936, L. O. L., declares:

"The county court has the exclusive jurisdiction, in the first instance, pertaining to a court of probate; that is, * * * (7) to take the care and custody of the person and estate of a lunatic or habitual drunkard, and to appoint and remove guardians therefor. * * *"

In chapter 342 of the Session Laws of 1913 the procedure for commitment of insane persons is laid down. It is there provided in section 3 of the act that:

"The county judge of any county in this state, upon being notified in writing that any person by reason of insanity is unsafe to be at large or is suffering from exposure or neglect, shall cause such person to be brought before him at such time and place as he may direct, and shall also cause to appear one or more competent physicians who shall proceed to examine the said person as to his mental condition. Should the said examining physician find, and certify under oath, that said person is insane, and the said county judge be of the same opinion, he shall order such insane persons committed to the proper state hospital for the insane."

Section 4 provides:

"The county judge shall cause to be recorded in the records of the court a full account of the proceedings had at the said hearing and examination, together with the judgment and order of the court and a copy of the warrants issued as hereinafter provided."

This is clearly a detail of procedure provided for the exercise of the general jurisdiction of the county court described in section 936, L. O. L.

We find that in section 945, L. O. L.--

"the provisions of chapter 5, title 7, relating to appeals are intended to apply to judgments and decrees of the county court in all cases, but not to its decisions given or made in the transaction of county business. In the latter case, the decisions of the court shall only be reviewed upon the writ of review provided by this Code."

Chapter 5 is the general chapter upon the subject of appeals. It is there said:

"A judgment or decree may be reviewed as prescribed in this chapter, and not otherwise. An order affecting a substantial right, and which in effect determines the action or suit so as to prevent a judgment or decree therein, or a final order affecting a substantial right, and made in a proceeding after judgment or decree, or an order setting aside a judgment and granting a new trial, for the purpose of being reviewed, shall be deemed a judgment or decree." Section 548, L. O. L.

There are several things described in the second clause of that section which ordinarily would not be considered as a judgment or decree, but which are made such by force of the statute for the purposes of appeal. In a sense they are conventional judgments or decrees, but are not intended to exclude ordinary judgments or decrees from the effect of the statute relating to appeals. The general rule is that a final determination of any proceeding before a court of record is a judgment or decree. We have thus in the present case a final determination of the county court as to the legal condition of a particular person within the meaning of section 756, L. O. L. declaring:

"* * * In case of a judgment, decree, or order against a specific thing, or in respect

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