In re Sneeden

• Decision Date: 16 April 1895
• Citation: 62 N.W. 1009,105 Mich. 61
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE SNEEDEN.

62 N.W. 1009

105 Mich. 61

IN RE SNEEDEN.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 16, 1895

Habeas corpus for the custody of Mary B. Sneeden, a minor. Dismissed.

William W. Irwin, for petitioner.

McBride & Danhoff, for respondent.

McGRATH L. J.

This is habeas corpus in behalf of the father against the grandfather to obtain the custody of a daughter of petitioner. The child was born November 29, 1888. The mother died in January, 1889, since which time the child has been with the grandparents. In September, 1893, the father married again and now seeks to obtain possession of the child. In August 1894, a like application was made to the circuit court for the county of Ottawa, when, after the taking of testimony and a full hearing, the court filed a very full and exhaustive finding, remanding the child to the custody of the grandparents. Respondent answers that the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties are the same as when the judgment of the circuit court was rendered, and contends that petitioner is concluded by the determination of that court. Whatever may be the rule respecting a person imprisoned, the general rule is that, as to the custody of children, the determination of a court on habeas corpus is conclusive in a subsequent application for the writ, unless some new fact has occurred which has altered the status of the case. 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 238; Church, Hab. Corp. (2d Ed.) p. 575, � 387; Freem. Judgm. (4th Ed.) � 324; Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64; McConologue's Case, 107 Mass. 170; State v. Malone, 3 Sneed, 413; State v. Bechdel, 37 Minn, 360, 34 N.W. 334; Bonnett v. Bonnett, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N.W. 91. In Re Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N.W. 692, it was held that the refusal to discharge a prisoner was not a bar to another writ based upon the same state of facts, nor to a hearing and discharge thereon, but in State v. Bechdel, supra, the Snell Case is distinguished from those in which the writ is sued out merely for the purpose of determining which of two parties is entitled to the custody of an infant. In the latter case the court held that the question was not whether the infant was restrained of her liberty, but who is entitled to her custody; that the gist of the charge was not that the child was restrained or deprived of her liberty, but that such restraint was in prejudice of the right of the petitioner to her custody; that the case was really one of private parties contesting private rights under the form of proceedings in habeas...