In re Southwestern Fabricators, Inc.
Decision Date | 08 June 1984 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 783-01929. |
Citation | 40 BR 790 |
Parties | In re SOUTHWESTERN FABRICATORS, INC., Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Texas |
Robert W. Swanson, Austin, Tex., for debtor.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") objected to the noticed intention of the trustee in this Chapter 7 case to abandon a portion of an account receivable to a creditor, J & J Steel and Supply Company ("J & J Steel"). The following summary constitutes findings of fact and conclusions of law after nonjury trial.
The facts substantially are uncontroverted. Prior to bankruptcy the debtor had engaged in the structural and reinforcing steel fabrication business. On an occasion prior to bankruptcy of debtor Oasis Pipeline Company had contracted with Bowen Construction Company ("Bowen") for the construction by Bowen of a natural gas pipeline in Ward County, Texas. Bowen issued its subcontract to debtor to fabricate various compressor stations along the pipeline. J & J Steel was a supplier to debtor of materials valued at $10,162.18 required for the completion of debtor's subcontract.
On October 27, 1983, debtor filed petition for order for relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11, United States Code. On that date Bowen had not paid debtor the full amount of monies due under the subcontract and debtor had not paid J & J Steel for the materials purchased by it and used on the Bowen subcontract. In its subsequently filed schedules debtor listed $4,119,367.58 in liabilities and $1,615,494.66 in assets, of which $448,994.66 represented accounts receivable owed by others to debtor.
J & J Steel was scheduled by the debtor as an unsecured creditor dating from April 5, 1983, with the total amount of the J & J Steel debt listed as "unknown". At the § 341 meeting on December 30, 1983, the trustee announced his intention to abandon specifically to J & J Steel $8,000.001 of a receivable from Bowen Industries. FDIC, contending that it has a prior claim to the receivable from Bowen, objected to the proposed action on the part of the trustee.
State law is determinative on the issue of entitlement to property rights while federal bankruptcy law is relevant on the issue of priorities of rights. The parties have stipulated that FDIC does in fact possess a validly perfected lien on accounts receivable of the debtor. They have further stipulated that J & J Steel was a supplier to the debtor and that it had perfected a mechanic's lien against oil and gas properties under the provisions of the Hardeman Act, VACS art. 5452 et seq.2
Specifically J & J Steel contends that it has timely and properly perfected its subcontractor's lien provided by art. 5474 of the Hardeman Act and therefore is not required to perfect under Article 9 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. It posits that to the extent of $10,162.18 the Bowen indebtedness to the debtor is a trust fund for its benefit as provided by VACS art. 5472e. Thus it contends that under state law it has property rights in the receivable.
Article 5472e provides:
FDIC challenges the assertion of property rights in the Bowen receivable advanced by J & J Steel on three separate bases. First, it contends that no trust fund exists until the money is actually paid to the contractor or the subcontractor from whom the materialmen is claiming. Second, it claims that if the money had been paid to the debtor the FDIC, as the owner of the account receivable, is entitled to setoff the overhead expenses of the debtor against the amount received. Finally, it argues that art. 5472e does not apply to banks and since FDIC claims to be in the position of The First National Bank of Midland it is entitled to that same legislature-granted exemption.
The intent of the Texas legislature in enacting § 4, arguably annulling the trust fund concept when a bank is involved, is obscure. In fact, it is not clear that § 4 sets out an absolute exemption to the bank where there are not transactions involving one or more of the other entities mentioned in § 4 . . . savings and loan association, other lenders, title companies, or closing agents. The Supreme Court of Texas has not meaningfully addressed the issue. Also I presently an unpersuaded that FDIC can advance a setoff claim based on any nebulous "overhead" argument. However, resolution of the issues in this case based on the second and third defenses advanced by FDIC is pretermitted, because I have determined that no trust fund in fact exists.
The relevant terminology of § 1 art. 5472e provides that "all monies paid to a . . . subcontractor . . . under a construction contract . . . are hereby declared to be trust funds for the benefit of . . . materialmen who may . . . furnish . . . material for the construction . . ." The statute clearly omits inclusion in the trust fund any monies which merely might be due or owing to the subcontractor . . . the monies actually must have been paid before the trust...
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