In re Sprague's Estate

Decision Date04 December 1900
Citation84 N.W. 293,125 Mich. 357
PartiesIn re SPRAGUE'S ESTATE; Appeal of MOORE (two cases). v. MOORE et al. SPRAGUE
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

No. 1. Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Byron S. Waite, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Adeline L. Sprague. From an order denying probate of a will, Irene Sprague Moore brings error. Affirmed.

No. 2. Certiorari to circuit court, Wayne county; Byron S. Waite Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Amelia L. Sprague. From an order appointing an administrator, Irene S. Moore brings certiorari. Affirmed.

No. 3. Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; George S. Hosmer, Judge.

Bill by Thomas S. Sprague against Irene S. Moore and others defendants. From an order overruling demurrers to the bill the trustee defendant appeals. Reversed.

These three suits are so intimately connected, involving the same documents, that they will be disposed of in one opinion. Adeline L. Sprague, the mother of the appellant, duly executed her will on September 3, 1877, in which, after bequeathing to her daughters, equally, her household furniture, books, etc., used in connection with her homestead, she bequeathed all the residue and remainder of her estate to her children, equally. On April 22, 1889, she conveyed to the appellant Irene Sprague Moore all her property, real, personal, and mixed, in trust for the express uses and purposes set forth in the instrument bearing even date therewith. The deed also empowers the trustee 'to sell, transfer, convey, collect, invest, and reinvest the same, and to do all things necessary or proper in connection therewith, which said first party might or could have done but for these presents.' She reserved a life estate in her homestead in the city of Detroit. The declaration of trust reads as follows: '(1) That said Irene Sprague Moore, as trustee, shall take, hold, manage, care for, sell transfer, convey, collect, invest, and reinvest the property by said deed conveyed, in her best discretion, during the lifetime of said Adeline L. Sprague, and to that end do all and any things necessary or proper in connection therewith. (2) That said trustee shall pay all and any legal and necessary expenses incident to the trust, and all actual and bona fide indebtedness of said first party now existing on which she is liable as principal; also, all indebtedness which she is or may become legally bound to pay, whether as surety, indorser, or maker of any promissory notes or other obligations now existing, made or incurred for the accommodation or benefit of others, and which such others should, or of right ought to, pay. (3) Out of the income, if there shall be sufficient at all times, otherwise from the principal as may be needed, to yield and give said first party a full and ample support during her natural life, according to the station in life she now occupies,--and, for a definition thereof, it shall be at least the sum of three thousand dollars per annum, if so demanded, payable in monthly installments, or as she shall request,--and in addition thereto all extraordinary expenses, medical and other attendance, or other expenditures necessary or proper for the said first party's comfort or welfare; also, to pay all funeral and cemetery expenses of the death and burial of said first party, and for the erection of a suitable monument over her grave, the same to be in said trustee's discretion. And, for any expenditure made in her discretion under this clause of this instrument, she shall be accountable to no other beneficiary under this trust. During the lifetime of said first party, out of any remaining income said trustee, in her discretion, may pay to each of the beneficiaries, and to all of full age alike, annually, a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars per year, and any sum withheld from the minor beneficiary, Gracie Deats, shall be equalized at, if not before, the termination of this trust. (4) The other beneficiaries under this trust are my seven children, Amelia L. Sprague, Irene Sprague Moore, Rollin C. Sprague, George H. Sprague, Mary A. Stofelet, Ida L. Taylor, Thomas S. Sprague, and my granddaughter, Gracie Deats; and it is my desire and the purpose of this trust that they shall share equally and ratably in all past, present, and future benefits received from me and my estate, including this trust estate. I therefore direct that as soon as practicable after my death said trustee shall proceed to the distribution of the trust estate among all of said persons as if she were executor and this was my last will. In making such distribution all advances made by me heretofore to each and all of them, all debts due or to become due from them to me or my trustee, and all payments made by me or my trustee, and advances made to Hattie A. Deats (which shall be charged to Gracie Deats), and all hereafter, on the account or for the benefit of each and all of them, shall be considered as part of said trust estate for the purpose of ascertainment of the shares of each; and each shall be paid the amount of such share, less such advancements, charges, debts, or payments. Obligations heretofore entered into for the benefit of any of said beneficiaries, and hereafter paid by said trustee, shall bear interest at six per cent. per annum, and be charged to such beneficiaries' share. (5) Should any of said beneficiaries die before me, his or her share shall be paid to his or her estate for distribution according to the laws of Michigan. (6) Any statement of advances, payments, charges, and debts hereafter signed by said first party shall hereafter be considered as final, and shall not be questioned by trustee or beneficiaries.' Mrs. Moore accepted the trust, and proceeded to execute it. Amelia L. Sprague, an incompetent, died January 13, 1892. Adeline L. Sprague died May 1, 1899. The only property which it is suggested was not covered by the trust was, as testified to by the husband of Mrs. Moore, 'some household furniture, and things that she had bought in the ordinary course of life; and she had this on hand at the time of her death.' These were of insignificant value; the witness testifying that such things, he presumed, cost $200 to $400. Forty dollars in money was found in the house. The trustee took possession of this property, and divided a part of it among the children, sold the remainder, and has the money. Mrs. Moore presented the above-named will for probate. Probate was denied upon the ground that it was revoked by the trust deed. That is the question involved in the first-named suit. In suit No. 2, Thomas S. Sprague applied for letters of administration upon the estate of Amelia L. Sprague, deceased. This was upon the theory that it was proper, if not necessary, to make her estate a party to the bill filed for an accounting against the trustee, Mrs. Moore. Mrs. Moore contested the appointment of an administrator upon the ground that 'the petitioner was not the husband or next of kin, or a grantee or any one of them, or a creditor of the deceased, or in any way interested in the estate, and therefore had no power to petition to have an administrator appointed.' The court overruled the objection, and appointed an administrator. In the third suit a bill was filed against the trustee for an accounting. All the children of Adeline L. Sprague and her granddaughter, and the estate of Amelia, are made parties to that bill. To this bill the trustee demurred, for the following reasons: (1) That the legal respresentatives of Amelia L. Sprague are not made parties defendant to the suit; (2) that the legal representatives of Adeline L. Sprague are not made parties defendant to the suit. This demurrer was overruled, and from that decree the trustee has appealed.

Moore & Moore, for appellant trustee.

George W. Radford, for appellee Thomas S. Sprague.

Gray & Gary, for appellee Rollin C. Sprague.

GRANT, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The sole question in suit No. 1 is, did the trust deed and the declaration of trust revoke the will? The statute of this state governing the revocation of wills is quoted in full in Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 18, 54 N.W. 699. We there stated and applied the doctrine of implied revocation. The conveyance of real estate and the transfer by sale or gift of personal property revoke wills devising the same property. The conveyance of all the property devised revokes the will in toto, and conveyance of part of the property revokes the will pro tanto. Chancellor Kent thus states the law upon the subject: 'The doctrine, hard and unreasonable as it may appear in some of its excrescences on this subject, and notwithstanding it has been repeatedly assailed by great weight of...

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