In re Squillacote
| Decision Date | 17 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-BG-1847.,98-BG-1847. |
| Citation | 790 A.2d 514 |
| Parties | In re Theresa M. SQUILLACOTE, Respondent. A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Caroline A. Judge, with whom Mark W. Foster, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for respondent.
Elizabeth J. Branda, Executive Attorney, for the Board on Professional Responsibility.
Joyce E. Peters, Bar Counsel, and Michael S. Frisch and Elizabeth A. Herman, Senior Assistant Bar Counsels, filed a brief for the Office of Bar Counsel.
Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and SCHWELB and FARRELL, Associate Judges.
Theresa Marie Squillacote, a member of our Bar, was convicted by a jury of (1) conspiracy to commit espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) & (c); (2) attempted espionage and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 794(a); (3) obtaining national defense information and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 793(b); and (4) making false official statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Ms. Squillacote was sentenced to imprisonment for 262 months. Her convictions were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971, 121 S.Ct. 1601, 149 L.Ed.2d 468 (2001).
On January 5, 1999, this court suspended Ms. Squillacote from practice and directed the Board on Professional Responsibility to determine the nature of the discipline that should be imposed by the court. The court specifically directed the Board to review the elements of the offenses to determine whether the crimes involve moral turpitude per se, and thus require disbarment. See D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (2001).
On March 9, 2001, in a Report and Recommendation written by the Board's Chair, Ms. Patricia A. Brannan, a majority of the Board concluded that the three espionage-related offenses of which Ms. Squillacote was convicted constitute moral turpitude per se. One member of the Board, Mr. Paul L. Knight, dissented in a written opinion. A copy of the Board's Report and Recommendation, including Mr. Knight's dissent, is attached hereto as Attachment A. Both Bar Counsel and Ms. Squillacote excepted to the Board's recommendation, contending that the espionage-related offenses do not constitute moral turpitude per se. The arguments on both sides of this issue have been ably presented in the majority and dissenting opinions set forth in Attachment A. The question is one of law, and we have independently reviewed the two opinions in the Board's Report, as well as the written and oral submissions of the Board and of the other parties. We conclude, substantially for the reasons stated in the opinion for the majority of the Board, that the espionage-related offenses constitute moral turpitude per se. Accordingly, Theresa M. Squillacote is hereby disbarred.
So ordered.1
ATTACHMENT A
This matter comes before the Board on Professional Responsibility (the "Board") to determine the discipline to be imposed upon Respondent, a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the "Court"). Respondent was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia of conspiracy to commit espionage, attempted espionage, obtaining national defense information, and making a false statement. We conclude that because Respondent was convicted of a crime that involves moral turpitude per se, she should be automatically disbarred by the Court pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2503(a).
Respondent is a member of the Bar of the Court, having been admitted by examination on February 28, 1984. Brief of Bar Counsel at 1.
Respondent was indicted, along with two other co-defendants, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (the "District Court"), by the February 1998 Term of the Grand Jury. Indictment, United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 97-948-M (E.D.Va.). On October 23, 1998, she was found guilty by jury verdict of: (1) conspiracy to commit espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), (c) ("Count 1"); (2) attempted espionage and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 794(a) ("Count 3")2[;] (3) obtaining national defense information and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 793(b) ("Count 4"); and (4) false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ("Count 5"). Judgment, United States v. Squillacote, No. 98-CR-61-2 (E.D. Va Jan. 22, 1999) (Hilton, C.J.).
Bar Counsel filed a certified copy of the docket entry reflecting the findings of guilt with the Court on December 15, 1998; a certified copy of the judgment of conviction was later reported to the Court on February 12, 1999. On January 5, 1999, the Court suspended Respondent and directed the Board to institute a formal proceeding for determination of the nature of the final discipline to be imposed, and specifically to review the elements of the offenses for the purpose of determining whether or not the crimes involve moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C.Code § 11-2503(a). In re Squillacote, No. 98-BG-1847 (D.C. Jan.5, 1999). Bar Counsel filed a brief on February 1, 1999, arguing that the offenses at issue do not involve moral turpitude per se and recommending that the Board direct a hearing committee to consider whether Respondent's conduct involves moral turpitude on the facts. Respondent filed a response on October 2, 2000. While Respondent disagreed with many of Bar Counsel's characterizations of the activity that led to her conviction, she agreed that the matter should be referred to a hearing committee. After reviewing the initial filings from Bar Counsel and Respondent, the Board requested, by letter dated November 3, 2000, further briefing on why espionage should not be deemed to involve moral turpitude per se. In response, Bar Counsel and Respondent have filed further briefs, both concluding that the issue whether Respondent's conduct involves moral turpitude on the facts should be submitted to a hearing committee.
In a case such as this, where our only task is to decide whether the statutes Respondent was convicted of violating involve moral turpitude per se, the facts of the actual case are largely irrelevant. See In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C. 1979)(en banc). Nonetheless, we include a brief factual background here to give context to the legal question of moral turpitude.3
Respondent was married to co-defendant Kurt Stand. Stand, whose parents were born in Germany, was recruited by the foreign intelligence arm of the East German intelligence agency. The East German agency trained Respondent and Stand. Respondent moved to Washington, D.C. and attended law school at the suggestion of the East German intelligence agency. Respondent worked as an attorney at the National Labor Relations Board, then on detail to the House Armed Services Committee. In 1991, she began work as an attorney at the Department of Defense (the "DOD"). At the DOD, she held a security clearance and had access to valuable information.
After the collapse of East Germany,4 Respondent and her co-conspirators began spying on behalf of the then-Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Respondent continued her activities on behalf of the Russian Federation.
In 1995, Respondent established an espionage relationship with the Republic of South Africa by writing a letter, under a false name, to a senior official in the South African government and the South African Communist Party. Respondent and a co-conspirator then attempted to commit espionage with an individual who purported to be a South African intelligence officer but who, in fact, was an FBI agent operating undercover. Respondent copied three classified Department of Defense documents and delivered them, with an additional, original document, to the undercover agent. Respondent continued meeting and corresponding with the undercover agent until her arrest in October 1997.
Our inquiry begins with D.C.Code § 11-2503(a), which provides in pertinent part:
When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, ... the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member.
The question for the Board, then, is whether Respondent has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. "To be sure, the statute is mandatory in its terms." Colson, 412 A.2d at 1164. Once it is determined in one case that a particular offense is a crime of moral turpitude per se—that is, every conviction for that particular offense must necessarily involve moral turpitude—our inquiry is very limited. See id. We then ask only whether the respondent was convicted of the crime; if the Court agrees, his or her disbarment follows automatically. See id. If, however, a determination is made that an offense does not involve moral turpitude per se, we still consider, through referral to a hearing committee in the first instance, whether on the facts of the particular case the respondent engaged in a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. at 1165. If so, and the Court agrees, the respondent's disbarment follows. See id. In any event, a respondent is not permitted to retry his or her criminal case in the proceeding to determine whether the facts demonstrate moral turpitude. See id. at 1167. The record of conviction conclusively establishes the respondent's guilt; the only question is whether the particular crime involves moral turpitude. See id.
Respondent was convicted of four offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a), (c); (2) attempted espionage and aiding and abetting thereto, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 794(a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Krouner, 04-BG-431.
...put respondent on clear notice that conviction for crimes of moral turpitude per se results in automatic disbarment, e.g., In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514 (D.C.2002); In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290 (D.C.1993); Colson, supra, 412 A.2d 1160, he cannot claim ignorance of the potential consequenc......
-
In re Rohde
..., 48 A.3d 170 (D.C. 2012).10 In re Glover-Tonwe , 626 A.2d 1387 (D.C. 1993).11 In re Sluys , 632 A.2d 734 (D.C. 1993).12 In re Squillacote , 790 A.2d 514 (D.C. 2002).13 Virginia case law construing the statute requires "actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident" "but "hold[s] the d......
-
Hailstock v. United States
...has taken a “substantial step toward commission of the crime,” In re Johnson, 48 A.3d 170, 173 n. 8 (D.C.2012) (citing In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514, 521 (D.C.2002)). The evidence in this case satisfied these tests. Appellant entered the bedroom where C.W. was resting and got onto the bed......
-
In re Johnson
...“the least culpable offender under the terms of the statute necessarily engages in conduct involving moral turpitude,” In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514, 517 (D.C.2002)—or whether the Board “will want to err on the side of admitting evidence that goes to the moral implications of the particul......