In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2016-01, SC16-724.

• Citation: 213 So.3d 680 (Mem)
• Decision Date: 09 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC16-724.,SC16-724.
• Parties: IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT 2016–01.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

213 So.3d 680 (Mem)

IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT 2016–01.

No. SC16-724.

Supreme Court of Florida.

[March 9, 2017]

Judge Frederic Rand Wallis, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Bart Schneider, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator,

Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Julianne M. Holt, Past President, Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Public Defender, 13th Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida, Responding with Comments

PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted a report proposing amendments to seven existing standard criminal jury instructions and the addition of two new instructions. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Committee proposes amending existing instructions 3.6(a) (Insanity); 5.1 (Attempt to Commit Crime); 5.2 (Criminal Solicitation); 5.3 (Criminal Conspiracy); 6.6 (Attempted Manslaughter by Act); 7.7 (Manslaughter); and 8.25 (Violation of a Condition of Pretrial Release from a Domestic Violence Charge).¹ The Committee also proposes adding new instructions 3.6(p) (Abnormal Mental Condition) and 7.7(a) (Aggravated Manslaughter).

Before filing its report with the Court, the Committee published its proposals for comment. Upon consideration of the comments submitted, the Committee modified some of its proposals. The Committee did not republish its proposals.

After the Committee filed its report, the Court published the Committee's proposals for comment. A comment was received from the Florida Public Defender Association regarding existing instructions 3.6(a) and 8.25, and new instruction 3.6(p). A response was filed by the Committee.

Having considered the Committee's report, the comment filed, and the Committee's response, we hereby authorize for publication and use amended instructions 3.6(a), 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 6.6, 7.7, and 8.25, and new instructions 3.6(p) and 7.7(a), with the following modification. We amend the new comment to instruction 5.3 to include the phrase "renunciation remains a defense to conspiracy to commit a crime where some harm was done." The phrase was omitted by the Committee, and its addition conforms the new comment for instruction 5.3 with the new comment added to instructions 5.1 and 5.2.

Accordingly, the instructions, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, are authorized for publication and use.² In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

LAWSON, J., did not participate.

Appendix

3.6(a) INSANITY

An issue in this case is whether (defendant)was insane when the crime allegedly was committed.

A person is considered to be insane when:

1. [He] [She] had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect.

2. Because of this condition

a. [he] [she] did not know what [he] [she] was doing or its consequences or

b. although [he] [she] knew what [he] [she] was doing and its consequences, [he] [she] did not know it was wrong.

Give if applicable.

A defendant who believed that what [he] [she] was doing was morally right is not insane if the defendant knew that what [he] [she] was doing violated societal standards or was against the law.

All persons are presumed to be sane. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is precise, explicit, lacking in confusion, and of such weight that it produces a firm belief, without hesitation, about the matter in issue.

In determining the issue of insanity, you may consider the testimony of expert and nonexpert witnesses. The question you must answer is not whether the defendant is insane today, or has ever been insane, but whether instead the defendant was insane at the time the crime allegedly was committed.

Give if applicable.

A defendant who believed that what [he] [she] was doing was morally right is not insane if the defendant knew that what [he] [she] was doing violated societal standards or was against the law.

Give if applicable.

Unrestrained passion or ungovernable temper is not insanity, even though the normal judgment of the person is overcome by passion or temper.

^*Give if applicable and if requested.

Although insanity is a defense, mental or psychiatric conditions not constituting insanity are not defenses to any crime in this case. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that (defendant) was insane at the time of the crime(s) alleged, any evidence of mental illness, an abnormal mental condition, or diminished mental capacity may not be taken into consideration to show that [he] [she] lacked the specific intent or did not have the state of mind essential to proving that [he] [she] committed the crime[s] charged [or any lesser crime].

Give if applicable.

If the evidence establishes that the defendant had been adjudged insane by a court, and has not been judicially restored to legal sanity, then you should assume the defendant was insane at the time of commission of the alleged crime, unless the evidence convinces you otherwise.

Give in all cases.

If you find that (defendant)committed the crime but you find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was insane, then you should find [him] [her] not guilty by reason of insanity.

If your verdict is that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, that does not necessarily mean [he] [she] will be released from custody. I must conduct further proceedings to determine if the defendant should be committed to a mental hospital, or given other outpatient treatment or released.

Comment s

If drugs or alcohol are involved, see Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967).

^*This paragraph should be read only where it is applicable and appropriate under the facts of the case. "[D]iminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida." Evans v. State, 946 So.2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006); Lukehart v. State, 70 So.3d 503, 515 (Fla. 2011). Evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is inadmissible "for the purpose of proving either that the accusedcould not or did not entertain the specific intent or state of mind essential to proof of the offense, in order to determine whether the crime charged, or a lesser degree thereof, was in fact committed." Chestnut v. State, 538 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1989). In some cases, however, such evidence, or something that jurors might interpret as such evidence, might be admitted presumably for another purpose or might simply be obvious or apparent from the facts of the case. In such cases, it could be appropriate in the court's discretion to give this instruction to avoid the possibility of juror confusion.

See Instruction 3.6(p) for an instruction regarding abnormal mental conditions not constituting insanity.

This instruction was adopted in 1981 , and was amended in 1986 [483 So.2d 428], 1994 [636 So.2d 502],and 2006 [939 So.2d 1052], and 2017.

3.6(p) ABNORMAL MENTAL CONDITION

^*Give if applicable and if requested, and only if insanity is not an issue and if no notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity has been filed. If insanity is an issue in the case, give instruction 3.6(a).

Mental illness, an abnormal mental condition, or diminished mental capacity is not a defense to any crime in this case. Any such evidence may not be taken into consideration to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent or did not have the state of mind essential to proving that [he] [she] committed the crime[s] charged [or any lesser crime].

Comments

^*This instruction should be given only where it is applicable and appropriate under the facts of the case. "[D]iminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida." Evans v. State, 946 So.2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006); Lukehart v. State, 70 So.3d 503, 515 (Fla. 2011). Evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is inadmissible "for the purpose of proving either that the accused could not or did not entertain the specific intent or state of mind essential to proof of the offense, in order to determine whether the crime charged, or a lesser degree thereof, was in fact committed." Chestnut v. State, 538 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1989). In some cases, however, such evidence, or something that jurors might interpret as such evidence, might be admitted presumably for another purpose or might simplybe obvious or apparent from the facts of the case. In such cases, it could be appropriate in the court's discretion to give this instruction to avoid the possibility of juror confusion.

This instruction was adopted in 2017.

5.1 ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CRIME

§ 777.04(1), Fla._Stat.

Use when attempt is charged or is a lesser included offense.

[To prove the crime of Attempt to Commit (crime charged),the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:]

Use when necessary to define "attempt" as an element of another crime (such as felony murder).

[In order to prove that the defendant attempted to commit the crime of (crime charged),the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:]

1. (Defendant) did some act toward committing the crime of (crime attempted) that went beyond just thinking or talking about it.

2. [He] [She] would have committed the crime except

...