In re Stansell

• Decision Date: 01 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–4244,15–4244
• Citation: 828 F.3d 412
• Parties: In re: Michael Stansell, Movant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

828 F.3d 412

In re: Michael Stansell, Movant.

No. 15–4244

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: July 1, 2016

ON RESPONSE: Paul Kerridge, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Respondent. ON MOTION: Michael Stansell, Grafton, Ohio, pro se.

Before: SUTTON and COOK, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.^*

OPINION

SUTTON

, Circuit Judge.

Federal law generally gives habeas petitioners one shot to pursue their claims in federal court. For petitions filed after the first one—“second or successive” petitions in the language of the statute—applicants must overcome strict limits before federal courts will permit them to seek habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)

. At issue in today's case is whether Michael Stansell's habeas petition—filed after the State added a post-release control requirement to his judgment of conviction—is “second or successive” and thus subject to those limits. We hold that it is not and transfer it to the district court for consideration as an initial petition.

I.

In 1998, Stansell pleaded guilty in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to multiple sex-related felonies. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2907.02(A)

–(B), 2907.04, 2907.05(A) –(C), 2907.322 –.323. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years to life in prison, and his attempts to obtain relief on direct appeal fell short. See

State v. Stansell , 91 Ohio St.3d 1527, 747 N.E.2d 252 (2001) (unpublished table disposition); State v. Stansell , No. 75889, 2000 WL 426547, at *1, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2000). He fared no better in federal court, where a district court denied his habeas petition in 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

In 2013, Stansell returned to state court, seeking to vacate the portion of his sentence that designated him a “sexually violent predator.” Resp't App. 109 (Ex. 17); see Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2971.01(H)(1)

, 2971.03(A)(3). The trial court denied his motion. A state appeals court affirmed. But, in doing so, it ruled that the trial court had erred when, as part of Stansell's original sentencing in 1998, it failed to impose a term of post-release control. State v. Stansell , 10 N.E.3d 795, 798–99 (Ohio Ct.App.2014) ; see also Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2929.19(B)(2)(c), (e), 2967.28(B)(1).

(Post-release control under Ohio law is similar to supervised release under federal law. It is “a period of supervision by the adult parole authority after a prisoner's release from imprisonment” during which the individual must comply with certain conditions. Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.01(N)

. As a few examples, the individual might have to undergo random drug testing, live in a halfway house, or maintain employment. E.g. , id. §§ 2929.16(A)(4), 2929.17(H), (J).)

The state appeals court remanded Stansell's case “for the limited purpose of properly advising and imposing upon Stansell the requisite period of postrelease control.” Stansell , 10 N.E.3d at 799

. The trial court did just that, telling Stansell that he would be subject to five years of post-release control after his prison term and that the parole authority could sanction him, in some cases by sending him back to prison, if he violated the conditions of post-release control.

This new judgment prompted Stansell to return to federal court, seeking authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition. His petition contains one claim for relief, a claim that he also raised in his first petition—that the state trial court violated his due process rights when it classified him as a sexually violent predator during his original sentencing in 1998.

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limits the authority of the federal courts to grant relief to individuals who previously filed a habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)

; see

Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996). The Act requires petitioners challenging state court judgments to seek authorization in a federal appeals court before filing a “second or successive application” in district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application ... that was presented in a prior application,” the statute says, “shall be dismissed.” Id. § 2244(b)(1)

. And “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application ... that was not presented in a prior application,” the statute adds, “shall be dismissed unless” one of two conditions applies. Id. § 2244(b)(2) (emphasis added). The first condition covers claims based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). The second covers claims based on new facts that “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and that “establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B). Individuals who seek to vacate their federal sentences must meet similar requirements before filing a second or successive motion. Id. § 2255(h).

Magwood v. Patterson

explains the meaning of the phrase “second or successive” in the federal habeas statute. 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010). An Alabama court had sentenced Magwood to death, but a federal district court granted him a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on an error that occurred during his sentencing. Id. at 324–26, 130 S.Ct. 2788. The state court then held another sentencing proceeding and re-imposed the death penalty, which triggered a second federal habeas petition from Magwood. Id. at 326, 328, 130 S.Ct. 2788. The Supreme Court held that he could file this petition, which challenged his new capital sentence but not his underlying conviction, without clearing the “second or successive” hurdles. Id. at 331, 342, 130 S.Ct. 2788.

One part of the inquiry, the Court showed, is easy: The phrase “second or successive” modifies “habeas corpus application.” Id. at 331–32, 130 S.Ct. 2788

; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)–(2). But what, the Court asked, is a “habeas corpus application”? 561 U.S. at 332, 130 S.Ct. 2788. It found the answer in § 2254, which directs federal courts to “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see

id. § 2254(b)(1) ; 561 U.S. at 332, 130 S.Ct. 2788. Habeas petitioners, Magwood recognized, “seek[ ] invalidation (in whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing [their] confinement,” which means “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” 561 U.S. at 332–33, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (quotation omitted). If an individual's petition is the first to challenge a particular state judgment—even if the applicant has previously filed other petitions challenging other judgments—the petition is not “second or successive.” Id. at 331–33, 130 S.Ct. 2788. Because Magwood had been resentenced since filing his first habeas petition, he had received a new judgment, which meant he could challenge his resentencing proceedings without having to worry about overcoming the “second or successive” bar. Id. at 331, 339, 342, 130 S.Ct. 2788.

In adopting a judgment-focused interpretation of the phrase “second or successive,” Magwood

rejected the claim-by-claim approach advanced by the State and the dissent. Id. at 331, 130 S.Ct. 2788 ; see

id. at 349–50, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). That approach would have required courts to look at each claim raised in a habeas petition and determine whether the applicant had a “full and fair opportunity” to raise that claim in a prior petition. Id. at 335, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (majority opinion); see

id. at 349, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But because “second or successive” modifies the word “application,” not “claim,” courts need not assess the nature of the petitioner's claims so long as he challenges a new judgment. Id. at 330–36, 130 S.Ct. 2788

(majority opinion).

King v. Morgan

extended Magwood to challenges to a conviction . 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir.2015). After his conviction in an Ohio court, King unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. Id. at 156. The trial court subsequently vacated his sentence, but when he received a higher minimum prison term after resentencing, he turned to the federal courts once more. Id. Like Magwood, King had obtained an intervening judgment between his two habeas petitions. But unlike Magwood, his second-in-time petition raised challenges to his sentence and his conviction, even though he had received only a new sentence (rather than a new trial) in the interim. Id. at 157. King's petition, we held, was not second or successive under Magwood 's “judgment-based” approach, prohibiting us from slicing King's “application” into distinct “claims” and thus from assessing whether each one challenged his conviction or his sentence. Id. ; see

Magwood , 561 U.S. at 331, 130 S.Ct. 2788 ; see also

Askew v. Bradshaw , 636 Fed.Appx. 342, 346–50 (6th Cir.2016). Instead, we treated King's application—his entire application—as the first one to challenge his new judgment, which meant he did not have to meet the second or successive requirements.

Stansell asks us to take Magwood

and King one step further. The common thread in Magwood and King is that both cases involved petitioners whose entire sentences were invalidated and who received full resentencing proceedings. See

Magwood , 561 U.S. at 326, 130 S.Ct. 2788 ; King , 807 F.3d at 156. Yet Stansell's sentence was only partially vacated (to the extent it did not include a term of post-release control), and he was only partially resentenced (to impose that term). Does this partial resentencing create an intervening judgment that permits...