In re Stanton, 83-142.
| Decision Date | 30 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-142.,83-142. |
| Parties | In re John J. STANTON, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and NE-BEKER and MACK,* Associate Judges.
This matter is before us for our consideration of the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility.
The Board finds two separate acts of "neglect of a legal matter . . .", 6 DR § 101(A)(3), and two separate instances of "intentional failure to seek a client's lawful objectives." 7 DR § 101(A)(1). The Board recommends suspension for a year and a day. We adopt the Board's recommendation.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED by the court that respondent John J. Stanton, be, and hereby is suspended for a year and a day from the practice of law for the reasons set forth in the appended Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility.
This order of suspension shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this opinion. D.C. Bar R. 11 § 19(3).
So ordered.
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN J. STANTON, RESPONDENT.
Respondent was charged in two separate cases (No. 31-81 in which the complainant was Mr. Johnson) with neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him [DR 6-101(A)(3) and intentional failure to seek a client's lawful objectives [DR 7-101(A)(1) 1 In the Johnson case, respondent was also charged with conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice [DR 1-102(A)(5) 1 These cases were consolidated for hearing, and the Hearing Committee found a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 7-101(A)(1) in the case involving complainant Faison and a violation of only DR 6-101(A)(3) in the case involving complainant Johnson.
We adopt the Hearing Committee's findings of fact as set forth on pages 2-4 and 10-11 of its Report; they are amply supported by evidence of record. We also agree with the Committee's conclusion that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3) in both cases. However, while the Hearing Committee did not find a violation of DR 7-101(A)(1) in the Johnson case, we conclude that there were violations of DR 7-101(A)(1) in both cases.1
In June 1981 Mr. Faison was arrested on a felony charge. At this time there were already two misdemeanor charges pending against Faison, and shortly thereafter another misdemeanor bail-jumping charge was lodged against him for failure to appear at a hearing in one of the misdemeanor cases. Respondent was appointed as Faison's counsel in the felony case and in the misdemeanor bail-jumping case on June 13, 1981. On that day bond was set at $3,000 for both the felony and misdemeanor bail-jumping charges. A $5,000 bond had been set previously in each of the two pending misdemeanor cases. During the week of June 13, Faison twice requested respondent to file a bond review motion and in the ensuing three weeks made efforts to discuss his case with respondent. Respondent did not file such a motion and did not discuss the case with Faison.
At the urging of Faison's girlfriend, respondent made an unsuccessful attempt to reach Faison by telephone at the jail in late June. On June 25 Mr. Verrone, Faison's counsel in one of the misdemeanor cases, filed a bond review motion in which, among other things, he gave an explanation for Faison's failure to appear at the May 12 hearing which resulted in his bail-jumping charge. This motion was granted on July 1, and the bond was reduced to $2,500.2
On July 6, 1981, respondent conferred with Mr. Verrone about the status of the case that he was handling and the possibility of a plea bargain covering all three of the misdemeanor cases. This conversation and the attempted phone call to Faison at the jail were the only things done by respondent on behalf of Faison after the preliminary hearing in the felony case on June 19, 1981, until July 7, 1981.
On July 7 when Faison was in court for a status call in his misdemeanor cases, he talked to respondent and asked him to speak to the U.S. Attorney's Office about a plea bargain in the felony case. Respondent did so at that time, but the Assistant U.S. Attorney was not prepared to make a plea agreement. When Faison and respondent met in the cellblock on July 7, Faison informed respondent that he had filed a complaint the previous day with Bar Counsel concerning respondent's failure to render assistance to him.
On July 14, 1981, Bar Counsel informed respondent by letter that he was in an adversary relationship with his client and should seek permission to withdraw. On July 18 respondent rejected Bar Counsel's request that he seek permission to withdraw.
Faison was arraigned on an indictment returned in the felony case on July 29; respondent was absent due to illness and another attorney represented Faison. The felony case was continued to August 27 for a status hearing. In the meantime Faison had filed pro se motions for bond review and for discovery.
There was no communication between Faison and respondent after July 7, except for a meeting in the courthouse cellblock on July 24 when Faison was there for a status conference on his misdemeanor cases. Respondent did nothing on Faison's behalf after July 7.
Sometime prior to the August 27 status hearing, the court removed respondent and appointed new counsel for Faison.
Mr. Johnson was arrested on October 2, 1980, on a warrant charging petty larceny. As a result of a search conducted at the time of the petty larceny arrest, he was also charged with violation of the Dangerous Drug Act.3 On that same day respondent was appointed to represent Johnson in both of these cases.
At a preliminary hearing on the drug case on October 30, 1980, the prosecutor offered to drop one of the two charges against Johnson if he would enter a guilty plea to the other. On respondent's advice, the offer was declined. Both cases were assigned to Judge Hess who set the petty larceny case for trial on May 28 and the drug case for trial on June 4, 1981.
Respondent was not present when the larceny case was called for trial on May 28 because of his attendance in another courtroom. Based on mistaken information as to the reason for respondent's absence, Judge Hess removed respondent from the larceny case and appointed attorney Jankovich to represent Johnson in the larceny case which was continued.
The drug case came on for trial on June 4, 1981. After the jury had been impanelled, Johnson sought to enter a plea of guilty. During Johnson's attempt to plead guilty, respondent limited himself to urging Johnson to tell the court what it was that Johnson wanted. Other than responding to the court's inquiry concerning how much investigation respondent had performed, respondent said nothing to the court in aid of Johnson's attempted plea and, so far as the record shows, said nothing to Johnson except to urge Johnson to tell the court what was on his mind.
The judge declined to accept Johnson's plea on account of Johnson's apparent confusion, and the case went to trial, which resulted in Johnson's being found guilty. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Hess removed respondent as counsel for Johnson and, on June 24, 1981, vacated the jury verdict.
Johnson was committed to jail at the conclusion of the trial. Later, Johnson did plead guilty in the larceny case, and the drug case was dropped. Johnson was then sentenced to sixty days with credit being given for the time already served. Since the time Johnson had served by then exceeded sixty days, Johnson was released at the time of his sentencing.
Our review of the extensive record in this case leaves us with no doubt that respondent neglected the legal matters of Johnson and Faison that were entrusted to him and that, in several instances, he willfully failed to" pursue the lawful objectives of his two clients. The record in this case is highly detailed, and respondent contests almost none of the facts recited above. The Hearing Committee's meticulous report sets forth its findings of fact and carefully ties them to the record.
Those facts show that in the Faison case respondent failed to file a bond review motion when requested to do so by his client; failed to communicate in any significant fashion with his client; failed to investigate the facts of his client's case. Like the Hearing Committee, we do not reach the question whether any one of these failures by itself would amount to a violation of the disciplinary rules. Our unequivocal conclusion is that the sum total of all of these failures violates both DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect) and DR 7-101(A)(1) ().
Turning first to the bond review motion, as we pointed out in In re Rosen, Bar Docket Nos. 347-80, et al., decided April 28, 1982, now pending in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, there may be certain extreme situations in which a bond review motion is utterly futile. In our view, those situations are limited to ones in which there is no possibility of release.
Faison found himself in a far different situation. There is no question that securing Faison's release, given the fact that he was subject to three separate bonds, would have been a difficult undertaking indeed. However, so far as we are aware a lawyer is not excused from performing legitimate tasks on behalf of his client simply because of their difficulty. The truth is that much could have been, and was subsequently done by other counsel, to reduce Faison's bond. That being the case, the precious right of respondent's client to secure his freedom before trial should not have been so lightly put aside by respondent.
There is no doubt in this record that the client requested that a bond review motion be filed. Therefore, respondent's refusal to carry out his client's...
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Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals
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