In re State, A–15 Sept. Term 2016

Decision Date24 April 2018
Docket Number077672,A–15 Sept. Term 2016
Citation182 A.3d 917,233 N.J. 44
Parties STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF C.K.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

James H. Maynard, Morristown, argued the cause for appellant C.K. (Maynard & Sumner, attorneys; James H. Maynard, on the briefs).

Elizabeth R. Rebein, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Elizabeth R. Rebein, of counsel and on the briefs).

Fletcher C. Duddy, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy, on the letter brief).

Laura A. Cohen argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the Advocates for Children of New Jersey, and the Northeast Juvenile Defender Center (Rutgers University School of Law—Newark Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic and Constitutional Litigation Clinic, attorneys; Rebecca J. Livengood, on the brief).

Louise T. Lester, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Louise T. Lester, Trenton, of counsel and on the brief).

Karen U. Lindell submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center (Juvenile Law Center, attorneys; Karen U. Lindell, and Marsha L. Levick, of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ–VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion.

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses are barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan's Law. N.J.S.A. 2C:7–1 to –11, –19; N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2(g). That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society.

Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and now challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2(g)'s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles.

Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2 subjects all sex offenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetime registration and notification requirements. Unlike subsection (g), however, subsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is "not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." Subsection (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles, such as defendant, are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated.

The record in this case reveals what is commonly known about juveniles—that their emotional, mental, and judgmental capacities are still developing and that their immaturity makes them more susceptible to act impulsively and rashly without consideration of the long-term consequences of their conduct. See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 152 A.3d 197 (2017). The record also supports the conclusion that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of committing sex offenses, such as C.K., who have been offense-free for many years and assessed not likely to reoffend, pose little risk to the public. Indeed, categorical lifetime notification and registration requirements may impede a juvenile's rehabilitative efforts and stunt his ability to become a healthy and integrated adult member of society.

We conclude that subsection (g)'s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violate the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan's Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan's Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.

Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan's Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2(f).

I.
A.

We begin with the juvenile offenses that triggered the registration and notification requirements in this case. When C.K. was approximately fifteen years old, he began sexually assaulting his younger adopted brother, A.K., who was then seven years old. After A.K. turned sixteen, he disclosed his older brother's abuse to his priest and then to the police.

The State charged C.K. with committing, while he was a juvenile, the offense of aggravated sexual assault against his adopted brother. At the time of the charge, C.K. was twenty-three years old.

The State moved to waive C.K. to the Criminal Part, Law Division, for trial as an adult. The State withdrew its waiver motion after C.K. agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated sexual assault charge in juvenile court. In his plea colloquy, C.K. admitted that when he was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, he performed oral sex on his younger brother. In 2003, C.K. was sentenced to a three-year probationary term, conditioned on his attending sex-offender treatment and having no contact with his brother unless recommended by a therapist. The court also ordered C.K. to comply with the Megan's Law requirements and barred him from working with children without the court's permission.

The State classified C.K. as a Tier One offender—the lowest risk category for re-offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7–8(c)(1). As a Tier One offender, C.K. is required to register annually with the law enforcement agency in the municipality where he resides. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7–2 ; Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws 9 (rev'd Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Attorney General Guidelines ].

In the years after turning eighteen, C.K. received an undergraduate degree in psychology from Catholic University and a master's degree in counseling from Montclair State University. At the time of his arrest, C.K. was a teacher's assistant for children with autism

. After his juvenile adjudication, C.K. stopped working with children. By age thirty-three, C.K. had worked for many years at a nonprofit agency that provides adults suffering from mental illness a range of services, such as securing psychiatric treatment and affordable housing. C.K. has turned down opportunities for professional advancement from fear that a background check might "out" his status as a Megan's Law registrant. It has now been more than twenty years since C.K. engaged in any unlawful conduct and more than fourteen years since his juvenile adjudication.

B.

In 2008, five years after his juvenile adjudication, C.K. filed his first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), seeking, among other things, a judicial declaration that the Megan's Law lifetime registration and notification requirements violated his constitutional rights. The PCR court denied the petition in its entirety. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of C.K.'s petition, suggesting that an evidentiary record would be necessary to support his constitutional arguments.

In November 2012, C.K. filed his second PCR petition, alleging that his earlier PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly challenge the constitutionality of his Megan's Law requirements. The second PCR court held an evidentiary hearing. C.K. presented five expert witnesses who testified about the current body of research on juvenile sex offender recidivism. C.K. also offered psychological assessments about his mental, emotional, and career development during his adult life. The State cross-examined C.K.'s witnesses but offered no rebuttal testimony or expert reports. The following summarizes the record before us.1

At the evidentiary hearing, C.K. called Dr. Jackson Tay Bosley, Dr. Sean Hiscox, Dr. Robert Prentky, and Dr. James Reynolds, clinical psychologists with expertise in the treatment and rehabilitation of both juvenile and adult sex offenders. Dr. Hiscox was additionally qualified as an expert in the risk assessment of adult and juvenile offenders. Nicole Pittman, Esq., testified about the effects of placing juvenile offenders on registries based on her nationwide research on the subject.

All of the expert witnesses asserted that juvenile sex offenders are more amenable to rehabilitation and less likely to reoffend than adult sex offenders. They stressed that juvenile offenders, because of their lack of maturity and delayed social and emotional development, are fundamentally different from adult offenders.

The experts pointed to multiple studies confirming that juveniles who commit sex offenses are more likely to act impulsively and be motivated by sexual curiosity, in contrast to adult sex offenders who are commonly aroused by deviant sexual behavior or engage in predatory or psychopathic conduct. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Michael H. Miner, Juvenile Sex Offenders: A Case Against the Legal and Clinical Status Quo, 17 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 293, 297–99 (2005); Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US 27–29 (2013) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry ]. Dr. Hiscox explained that "adolescent sex offense recidivism rates are...

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