In re State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't
| Citation | 356 P.3d 26 |
| Decision Date | 18 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 35,427.,28,294.,31,941,35,427. |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellant. Concerning Janet Mercer–Smith and James Mercer–Smith, Respondents–Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
356 P.3d 26
STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellant.
Concerning Janet Mercer–Smith and James Mercer–Smith, Respondents–Appellees.
31,941
28,294.
No. 35,427.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 18, 2015.
Certiorari Granted, Aug. 26, 2015,
Walz & Associates, P.C., Jerry A. Walz, Narvaez Law Firm, P.A., Henry F. Narvaez, Bryan C. Garcia, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Denise M. Chanez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Comeau, Maldegen, Templeman & Indall, LLP, Larry D. Maldegen, William P. Templeman, Stephen J. Lauer, Dan Cron Law Firm, P.C., Dan Cron, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees.
OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.
{1} In this case we assess what may be the outer edges of a court's exercise of its contempt power. At the Respondent parents' (James and Janet Mercer–Smith) urging the district court found the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) in contempt of court for contravening the district court's order concerning foster placement of two of their children in its custody. The Mercer–Smiths then sought, and the district court granted, damages for loss of enjoyment of life because the possibility for reconciliation with their children had been reduced as a result of CYFD's contemptuous conduct. It awarded the Mercer–Smiths over $1.6 million in damages for loss of enjoyment of life and over $2 million in attorney fees and costs for prosecution of the contempt action. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} The case began in 2001 and evolved to encompass four distinct phases—abuse and neglect, foster placement, contempt, and contempt damages—that we summarize in turn. More details are provided as necessary to our discussion of CYFD's arguments on appeal.
A. Abuse and Neglect Petition
{3} In February 2001 the Mercer–Smiths' three daughters, Julia, Rachel, and Allison, were removed from their home based on allegations by Julia and Rachel that they had been abused by their parents. CYFD took custody of the three girls and filed an abuse/neglect petition against the Mercer–Smiths. In August 2001 the Mercer–Smiths and CYFD entered into a stipulated disposition whereby the Mercer–Smiths stipulated that “James Mercer–Smith will enter a plea of no contest to the following allegations: ... James Mercer–Smith touched his children Julia and Rachel in a way that made them feel uncomfortable and which they reasonably perceived as sexual.” They also stipulated that “Janet Mercer–Smith will enter a plea of no contest to the following allegations: ... Janet Mercer–Smith knew or should have known that her husband ... touched their children Julia and Rachel in a way that made them feel uncomfortable and which they reasonably perceived as sexual.” In return, CYFD agreed to “recommend to the District Attorney that the treatment plan established through the Children's Court case is the most effective way to address the problems that exist with this family rather than through a criminal prosecution.”
{4} The Mercer–Smiths' pleas were accepted by the district court, which ordered that custody of the three girls would remain with CYFD and ordered compliance with a treatment plan. The goal of the treatment plan was reunification of the girls with their
parents. The abuse and neglect proceedings were effectively concluded by entry of the Mercer–Smiths' pleas; neither termination of parental rights nor criminal proceedings were ever initiated against the Mercer–Smiths. Several months later, Allison was returned to the Mercer–Smiths' custody.
{5} In August 2002 the district court adopted a planned permanent living arrangement for Julia and Rachel. After this shift, reunification of Julia and Rachel with their parents was no longer a goal. While in CYFD's custody, Julia and Rachel lived for approximately eighteen and twenty-eight months, respectively, at Casa Mesita, a treatment group home.
B. Placement Hearing and Order
{6} In June 2003 CYFD proposed to remove Julia and Rachel from the group home and place Julia with the Schmierer family and Rachel with the Farley family. The Mercer–Smiths objected to this plan on the ground that Jennifer Schmierer and Gay Farley, both of whom had been employees at Casa Mesita, had a conflict of interest (or “dual relationship”) based on their therapeutic relationships with Julia and Rachel at the group home. The Mercer–Smiths were also concerned that living with the Schmierers and Farleys would reduce the possibility of reconciliation with their daughters.
{7} After several days of hearings, the district court found that the proposed placements would constitute “dual relationship[s]” and “potentially exploitive relationship[s].” It concluded that “[CYFD's] proposed placement of [the girls] into the home of Jennifer and Eric Schmierer [or Dwayne and Gay Farley] constitutes an abuse of discretion.” The district court's order to this effect (the Placement Order) was entered on November 3, 2003.
{8} Following the placement hearing, Rachel and Julia lived for approximately three-and-one-half months with Martin and Jeanne Ritter. After that period, CYFD changed the girls' living arrangement to “[s]emi [i]ndependent [l]iving.” While living under this arrangement, the girls rented a room from Melissa Brown, Gay and Dwayne Farley's daughter, who lived a few houses from the Farleys.
C. Contempt Proceedings
{9} Approximately eight months later, the Mercer–Smiths moved to hold CYFD in contempt for violating the Placement Order.1 The parties engaged in discovery and a contempt hearing began in November 2006. The Mercer–Smiths did not present any witnesses, relying instead on their exhibits and CYFD's responses to requests for admissions, as well as requested admissions that were deemed admitted by the district court. CYFD called two witnesses, Rebecca Liggett, CYFD counsel for the Mercer–Smiths' case, and Carmela Alcon, the county office manager for Protective Services, a CYFD division. The district court entered extensive findings of fact and concluded that “CYFD, as an agency, engaged in activity and took direct actions that were in contempt of the November 3, 2003, [district c]ourt's [f]indings of [f]act and [c]onclusions of [l]aw and [d]ecision on [p]lacement.” It therefore held CYFD in contempt of court. The district court's findings are discussed in more detail below.
D. Contempt Damages
{10} A five-day bench trial on damages began in May 2011. The district court also heard additional evidence and argument on October 19, 2011. Sixteen witnesses testified. The Mercer–Smiths argued that they had suffered emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life and requested compensatory damages for those losses as well as attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in pursuing enforcement of the Placement Order. CYFD made a number of motions to preclude or admit certain evidence and to limit damages, the denials of which are discussed
in detail below. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court found that “James Mercer–Smith suffered injuries and other harms caused by CYFD's contemptuous conduct” and that such injuries included past and future emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and “psychological expenses,” and awarded compensatory damages of $616,000. It found that Janet Mercer–Smith suffered the same injuries and awarded compensatory damages of $1 million. Finally, the district court awarded the Mercer–Smiths compensatory attorney fees and litigation costs of $2,034,922, plus applicable gross receipts tax. CYFD appealed.
E. General Law of Contempt
{11} In order to provide context for the analysis that follows, it is useful to provide an overview of the law of contempt, including generally recognized available remedies. “The district court has inherent power to sanction for contempt.” Purpura v. Purpura, 1993–NMCA–001, ¶ 6, 115 N.M. 80, 847 P.2d 314 ; see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13. The contempt power is necessary to allow courts to “to regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings,” and “[i]t has long been recognized that a court must be able to command the obedience of litigants and their attorneys if it is to perform its judicial functions.” State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Baca, 1995–NMSC–033, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although this power is a broad one, our Supreme Court has cautioned that “a court should invoke its inherent powers sparingly and with circumspection.” Id. ¶ 25.
{12} “Contempts procedurally are either civil or criminal in nature [but] the line of demarcation between the two is somewhat hazy.”State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 1957–NMSC–071, ¶ 6, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223. Generally, the type of contempt at issue depends on the purpose behind the contempt determination. “Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce...
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