In re State ex rel. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 10 June 2019
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-19-00200-CR
• Citation: In re Rodriguez, NUMBER 13-19-00200-CR (Tex. App. Jun 10, 2019)
• Parties: IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. RICARDO RODRIGUEZ JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. RICARDO RODRIGUEZ JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

NUMBER 13-19-00200-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

June 10, 2019

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides¹

Relator the State of Texas ex rel. Ricardo Rodriguez Jr., the District Attorney for Hidalgo County, Texas, filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate an order granting the discovery of grand jury testimony in a criminal case.² See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.02(a), (d). We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

The grand jury charged real party in interest Rodolfo Rosas by indictment with one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a). On January 18, 2019, Rosas filed a "Motion for Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony" which requested that the trial court order the State "to transcribe and provide to the Defendant the testimony of any witnesses who testified before the grand jury in this case." The motion reads, in relevant part:

The Defendant has reason to believe that a witness or witnesses testified before the grand jury on the facts of this case currently pending against the Defendant. The grand jury returned an indictment in this case on December 18, 2018.

. . . .

The State of Texas has made known that it intends to try this case. It is necessary for the Defendant to receive effective assistance of counsel at trial to have available the transcript[s] of the witnesses' grand jury testimony for purposes of discovery and cross-examination.

. . . .

The Defendant has a particularized need for said testimony under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 20.02. The material sought is necessary to avoid possible injustice in this proceeding. Defendant needs to be able to know what the witnesses knew and testified to as it pertains to Defendant's claim of self[-]defense and the circumstances surrounding the alleged victims in order to fairly defend himself.

On February 19, 2019, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on various matters. At the hearing, Rosas's counsel informed the trial court that he was requesting that it order the grand jury testimony to be disclosed "so we can see what was presented." In apparent connection with this argument, Rosas's counsel also asserted that there was a "pattern" of the police "not doing their job." He alleged that "[t]hey failed to fingerprint the vehicle,they failed to fingerprint the gun. Just simple things that should have been done." Without further discussion, the trial court orally granted Rosas's motion for disclosure of the grand jury testimony. After the trial court issued its oral ruling, the prosecutor requested time to prepare for a hearing on the request for the grand jury transcripts because the motion had not been set for hearing that day, but the trial court responded, "Again, I am granting the motion." On February 22, the trial court signed an order granting Rosas's motion for the discovery of grand jury testimony which ordered the State "to provide the full transcripts of the Grand Jury proceedings against Defendant at least one week prior" to the trial date.

On March 18, 2019, the trial court held another pretrial hearing. In addition to other matters, Rosas again reiterated his request to obtain the grand jury testimony. The trial court informed the parties that it was his understanding that "[t]here is no transcript." In addressing this issue, a prosecutor informed the court that Hidalgo County "does not utilize a court reporter for Grand Jury proceedings," and instead "uses audio recording equipment." The prosecutor stated that "I think we use . . . tapes." The prosecutor informed the trial court that he did not know if the State had the tapes of the grand jury proceedings, but he did not think that it did. Another prosecutor responded to the court's inquiry that "[w]e do not." A third prosecutor informed the court that she had spoken with the individual who presented this case to the grand jury. That individual told her that "if there was a tape with testimony" it would be provided to the prosecutors "as part of our file." The third prosecutor informed the court that such a tape "has not been provided, therefore, it does not exist," but confirmed that she would "verify" that information. At theend of the argument, the trial court again verbally ordered the State to present to defense counsel "what it was that you presented in terms of evidence to the . . . Grand Jury."

This original proceeding ensued on April 26, 2019. By one issue, relator contends that the respondent has clearly erred in requiring the State "to produce and turn over transcripts of grand jury proceedings" because Rosas failed to show a particularized need for the transcripts. This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Rosas. Rosas argues that the trial court's ruling was discretionary, and it did not abuse its discretion in ordering production of the grand jury testimony. Rosas also argues that the State possessed surveillance videotapes of the night of the alleged incident which have "substantial and exculpatory" value, and the trial court possessed discretion to order the grand jury transcripts produced to him so that he could determine if the State provided the surveillance footage to the grand jury for its review prior to indictment.

II. STANDARD FOR MANDAMUS RELIEF

Mandamus relief may be granted if the relator shows that: (1) the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law. In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding).

To obtain mandamus relief, the act sought to be compelled must be a ministerial act that does not involve a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young, 236S.W.3d at 210. The ministerial-act requirement is satisfied if the relator can show a clear right to the relief sought. In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122. A clear right to relief is shown when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision "under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles." Id.; see Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). If the trial court lacks authority or jurisdiction to take a specific action, the court has a ministerial duty to refrain from taking that action, to reject or overrule requests that it take such action, and to undo the action if it has already taken it. In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (orig. proceeding). In contrast, a ministerial act is not implicated if the trial court must weigh conflicting claims or collateral matters which require legal resolution. State ex rel. Hill v. Ct. of Apps. for Fifth Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (orig. proceeding).

III. GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

"[T]he longstanding common law and statutory rule that grand jury proceedings are secret is a fundamental component of our system of criminal justice." Kelly v. State, 151 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614, 619-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (discussing the historical underpinnings regarding the secrecy of grand jury proceedings). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly mandates that "[t]he proceedings of the grand jury shall be secret." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.02(a). Thus, "[t]he law clearly spells out the trial court's duty to keep grand jury proceedings secret." In re State, 516 S.W.3d 526, 528-29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, orig. proceeding). The Fourteenth DistrictCourt of Appeals has summarized the various reasons for mandating secrecy regarding grand jury proceedings as follows:

The policy reasons for secrecy are compelling. It ensures the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations. It prevents other persons subject to indictment, or their friends, from importuning the grand jurors; no undue influence should be permitted to sway its counsels or govern its action. Moreover, grand jurors should be free from the apprehension that someone may disclose subsequently their opinions and votes. The requirement of confidentiality also prevents subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted. Further, secrecy encourages free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes. Witnesses can give evidence without fear of reprisal from an accused or any other person. Confidentiality also protects the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation. Such a consideration is particularly important in light of the fact that an elected official's reputation may be irreparably harmed by public disclosure even though investigation of the allegations reveals no basis for prosecution. It also saves persons who have been cleared by the grand jury from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt. Additionally, the requirement saves the public the trouble, expense, and disgrace of having matters disclosed that no longer have any merit. Finally, grand jury secrecy also prevents the escape of those whose indictment is contemplated.

Stern, 869 S.W.2d at 621-22. Accor...