In re State ex. rel. K.M.
| Decision Date | 24 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 20040131-CA.,20040131-CA. |
| Citation | 136 P.3d 1230,2006 UT App 74 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, in the interest of K.M., a person under eighteen years of age. K.M., Appellant, v. State of Utah, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Joanne C. Slotnik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE, Jr.
¶ 1 K.M., a juvenile, admitted to one count of child abuse homicide, a third degree felony if committed by an adult. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-208 (2003). K.M. appeals, challenging the juvenile court's denial of her motion to withdraw that admission. We affirm.
¶ 2 On or about September 4, 2002, fifteen-year-old K.M. gave birth to a four-pound infant boy in the basement bathroom of her home. K.M. failed to summon help or otherwise attempt to keep the infant alive. Instead, she secreted the baby in the bathroom's window well. She later informed her mother of the baby's existence, and he was found dead in the window well.
¶ 3 The State brought a delinquency charge of murder, a first degree felony if committed by an adult, against K.M. for the death of the infant. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003). One day into her trial, K.M. and the State reached an agreement to resolve the matter, and K.M. entered an admission to an amended charge of child abuse homicide, a third degree felony if committed by an adult. See id. § 76-5-208.
¶ 4 The juvenile court, with the assistance of K.M.'s counsel, then conducted an admission colloquy pursuant to Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 25. K.M. was informed of and waived her trial rights, and she asserted to the court that she understood what she was doing and that she was not acting under any coercion. The court read K.M. the elements of the offense of child abuse homicide and asked her to admit or deny that on or about September 4, 2002, she, acting "with criminal negligence[,] caused the death of a person under 18 years of age and the death result[ed] from child abuse." K.M. admitted this offense.
¶ 5 The juvenile court then took a statement from K.M. to establish a factual basis for her admission. K.M. told the court in great detail about the events surrounding the child's birth and her actions thereafter. She explained that she did not know that she was pregnant and thought that she was merely having severe menstrual cramps. At some point she went into the bathroom and felt an "urge to push" and a "little body fell into [her] arms." The baby was not moving and K.M. pinched off the umbilical cord. K.M. did not want to put the baby on the toilet seat or the cold floor, so she opened the basement window and placed him in the window well. She watched him for five or ten seconds, and he remained motionless. She then attempted to clean herself up, and more than once she lost consciousness due to blood loss. K.M.'s mother discovered her and called an ambulance, which took K.M. to the hospital. At the hospital, K.M. admitted to her mother that she had given birth and placed her baby in the window well.
¶ 6 K.M. admitted to the juvenile court that she could have, and should have, summoned her aunt to assist her and the baby at the time of the birth. Her aunt, a licensed nurse with thirteen years of experience in newborn intensive care, was present in the home on the night of the birth and had been caring for K.M. throughout the evening.
¶ 7 K.M. testified that the baby never made a noise and was not breathing. At that point, the juvenile court asked if there was any evidence that the baby was born alive, and both the prosecutor and K.M.'s counsel responded that there was. K.M., however, would not admit to the court that the baby was born alive. Nevertheless, in light of the rest of K.M.'s testimony and the medical evidence identified by the parties' counsel, the juvenile court determined that there was a factual basis for K.M.'s admission to one count of child abuse homicide. The court then accepted the admission.
¶ 8 Prior to disposition, and after speaking with either a probation officer or a presentence investigator, K.M. filed a motion to withdraw her admission. The motion stated four grounds:
1. [K.M.] alleges that she was unaware that she was admitting to causing the death of the child who is the subject of this action.
2. [K.M.] alleges that she was pressured or coerced into admitting the amended allegation.
3. [K.M.] alleges that she believed the disposition in this case was guaranteed and not subject to the Court's discretion.1
4. [K.M.] alleges that she understood little or none of the colloquy with the Court or her counsel at the time of her admission.
The juvenile court heard testimony and argument on K.M.'s motion at the January 16, 2004 disposition hearing. K.M. testified that she had understood all of the rights that she waived at the admission hearing except for the right against self-incrimination. She also testified that she did not understand a lot of the "big words" used at the admission hearing, and that she felt she had been coerced into entering the admission. K.M.'s therapist also testified at the hearing.
¶ 9 At the conclusion of the testimony, the juvenile court heard arguments from both parties and took a short recess to allow the judge to review her notes and pertinent caselaw. When the court reconvened shortly thereafter, it denied K.M.'s motion, finding that K.M. had made a knowing and voluntary admission to the crime of child abuse homicide. Disposition followed immediately thereafter, and the court imposed and suspended thirty days of detention and placed K.M. on probation, ordering her to participate in various programs and complete 250 hours of community service. K.M. now appeals.
¶ 10 The only issue on appeal is the propriety of the juvenile court's denial of K.M.'s motion to withdraw her admission. We review a juvenile court's denial of a motion to withdraw an admission for abuse of discretion. See State v. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, ¶ 5, 100 P.3d 267, cert. granted, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). Factual findings made by the juvenile court in conjunction with its denial of a withdrawal motion are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. See id.
¶ 11 K.M. challenges the juvenile court's denial of her motion to withdraw her admission to child abuse homicide, a third degree felony if committed by an adult. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-208. We conclude that the juvenile court properly determined that K.M.'s admission was knowing and voluntary, and that it did not exceed the bounds of its discretion when it denied K.M.'s motion to withdraw that admission.
¶ 12 As a preliminary matter, we note that there appears to be little or no caselaw specifically analyzing the admission requirements of rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. See Utah R. Juv. P. 25. Both parties cite extensively to criminal cases analyzing rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to support their respective positions. See Utah R.Crim. P. 11. We agree with the parties that rule 11 cases are a persuasive source of authority to guide our interpretation and application of rule 25,2 an approach this court has taken in other juvenile court contexts. See In re S.A., 2001 UT App 308, ¶ 36, 37 P.3d 1172 (); In re W.S., 939 P.2d 196, 200-01 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) ().
¶ 13 Applying the rule 11 cases, certain principles and considerations governing juvenile admissions under rule 25 become apparent. Rule 25 is intended "to ensure that [juveniles] know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to [admit to an allegation]." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d 1242. Juvenile courts have a duty to "personally establish that the [juvenile's admission] is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the [juvenile] knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ¶ 11, 114 P.3d 569 (quotations and citation omitted). While the juvenile court has a duty to strictly comply with rule 25, see Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ¶ 11, 22 P.3d 1242, "strict compliance does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 9, 95 P.3d 276 (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 14 Of particular relevance here, a juvenile must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw her admission if it can be shown that she lacked understanding or knowledge of the consequences of her plea, or that her plea was involuntary. See Utah R. Juv. P. 25; State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ¶¶ 21-25, 26 P.3d 203. "Withdrawal `is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the [juvenile] court's sound discretion.'" Dean, 2004 UT 63 at ¶ 11, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). In reviewing a juvenile court's denial of a motion to withdraw an admission, this court is not limited to a review of the denial of the motion itself and "may consider the record of the plea proceedings, including the plea colloquy and plea affidavit or statement." Id. at ¶ 12.
¶ 15 Turning now to K.M.'s arguments on appeal, K.M. argues generally that her admission was not knowing and voluntary. Specifically, she argues that she was not informed of her right to testify at trial and did not waive that right at the admission hearing. K.M. also argues that she did not admit to facts sufficient to support an admission of child abuse homicide because she never admitted that...
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