In re Steele
Decision Date | 08 June 1908 |
Citation | 161 F. 886 |
Parties | In re STEELE. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
See 156 F. 853.
The act of Congress (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, Sec. 2, 30 Stat. 545 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3420)) creating courts of bankruptcy provides for one court only within the territory prescribed.
Courts of bankruptcy have no jurisdiction outside of their territorial limits as prescribed by the act of Congress creating them.
A United States district judge, even though a judge of the Northern and Middle districts of Alabama, has no jurisdiction, while holding court in the Middle district thereof, to make an order appointing a referee in bankruptcy for the Northern district of Alabama.
A United States district judge, even though a judge of the Northern and Middle districts of Alabama and residing in the Middle district, has no jurisdiction or authority to go into the Northern district, while the judge of the said Northern district is holding court therein, and make an order appointing a referee in bankruptcy and prescribing a rule for the reference of proceedings in bankruptcy to said referee so appointed by him, without the concurrence of the judge of the said Northern district.
Such action by a district judge, even though a judge of both districts, being made without the concurrence of the judge of the Northern district, is coram non judice and void, in so far as the same applies to the Northern district; and the judge of the said Northern district has the right and authority to set aside any order or orders so made.
Sterling A. Wood, for petitioner.
The matter here presented is upon a sworn petition filed by Nenian L. Steele, a referee in bankruptcy heretofore appointed by this court, calling attention to the fact that the clerk of this court is proceeding, or is about to proceed, to refer one-half of the cases in bankruptcy filed in this court to Alex C. Birch, under and by virtue of what purports to be an order of this court appointing said Birch a referee in bankruptcy, and directing the clerk to make such reference to said Birch. Such appointment and order is averred to be absolutely void, and this court is asked to set the same aside as having been improvidently made. The facts stated in the petition, upon which relief is prayed, are as follows:
Copies of the orders referred to in the petition are made exhibits thereto.
The fact that such purported order or orders, as above set forth, were made by a United States district judge claiming to be a judge of this court, necessarily surrounds the questions presented with some embarrassment not generally arising in courts of justice, when called upon to modify, revise, or reverse the decisions of other judges or courts. More especially is this the case when the matter has reference to an officer of the court, for whose conduct the judge is at least morally responsible. However this may be, the Constitution and laws of the United States necessarily place the responsibility to act upon all judges to whom parties feeling aggrieved have the right by law to apply. I cannot under my oath of office decline to assume the responsibility which the law places upon me. I cannot delegate my jurisdiction to any other judge. I cannot divide my jurisdiction with any other judge. I cannot, with due respect to the office I hold, decline to act when it is my duty to act; nor can I yield this duty to others, however eminent they may be. I cannot silently permit another to assume the jurisdiction in my court which the law places upon me. The law defines my jurisdiction, the law defines my right and authority, and the law alone shall be the beacon to guide my footsteps in seeking rightfully to determine this matter.
As shown by the facts stated in the petition, an effort is made by the learned judge to create another referee in bankruptcy in this court, without the knowledge or concurrence of the court itself. This is sought to be done, first, by an order purporting to have been made while that learned judge was holding court in another district; and, second, by filing that order, thus purporting to have been made, in this district on Sunday night, May 31, 1908; and then, finally, by entering an order about 8 o'clock Monday morning, June 1 1908, ratifying the making of the previous order in another district. These various efforts at effecting the appointment of a referee and designating the manner in which the business of this court shall be referred to him were all made, or attempted to be made, at a time when the judge of this court was engaged in holding...
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