In re Steiner

• Decision Date: 02 February 1912
• Citation: 195 F. 299
• Parties: In re STEINER et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

195 F. 299

In re STEINER et al.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 2, 1912

On Reargument, May 8, 1912. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Henry A. Wise, U.S. Atty., and J. Neville Boyle, Asst. U.S. Atty for prosecution.

Abram J. Rose, for respondents.

LACOMBE Circuit Judge (after stating the e (after stating the facts as above).

Motion is made to dismiss the proceedings upon several grounds:

1. That the alleged contempt was committed, if at all, in the Circuit Court, and these proceedings were begun in that court prior to December 31, 1911. It is contended that punishment therefor cannot be imposed by the District Court. Reliance is had upon authorities, such as Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364 19 L.Ed. 214, which hold that only the court whose authority is contemned has the right to punish for the offense.

When the judiciary act of March 3, 1911, abolished the Circuit Courts, it carefully undertook to preserve all acts, rights, suits, and proceedings, and also to provide for the prosecution of all offenses and for all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred prior to the taking effect of the new act. Sections 299, 300. The relevant phrase of the latter section is:

'All offenses committed * * * may be prosecuted and punished * * * in the District Courts, in the same manner and with the same effect as if this act had not been passed.'

If the 'act had not been passed,' the Circuit Court would still be sitting in this district with power to punish for a contempt committed in such court. The plain meaning of the act is that for the purposes enumerated the District Court acts as if it were the Circuit Court, merely with its name changed. Touching all pending matters the court is continuous; it is one court only from the beginning of the proceeding to its conclusion. The situation is not such as we find in removed causes where a case is transferred from one court to another; the original court still continuing in existence as a court independent of the other. The proceeding and the court both pass over. Any construction such as that here contended for would lead to the absurd result that all the orders and decrees, injunctive or mandatory, of the old Circuit Court, were practically abrogated on January 1, 1912, because, if such an order or decree cannot be enforced, it becomes mere waste paper. Congress certainly did not contemplate such an absurd result, and there is nothing in the language of the sections which would require its acceptance.

2. It is contended that the proceedings should be dismissed because the defendants ultimately prevailed in the suits in which it is alleged that contempt was committed. This suggestion is not found persuasive. While an order stands, it should be obeyed, and the court which makes it should not be contemned. Appeal, not disobedience, is the remedy if a party thinks his adversary is not entitled to the order. This is not a proceeding on the civil side, but an independent proceeding on the criminal side, of the court.

3. That defendants have concededly complied with the order directing the impounding of the cameras.

Nothing of the sort is conceded. Some cameras were turned over to counsel, but this proceeding is concerned with a certain other camera which was never turned over, which it is alleged was an infringing machine, and about which it is alleged false statements were incorporated in the affidavits.

4. Because the court was without power to make an order pendente lite impounding the cameras.

The converse is well-settled law in this circuit (Underwood Typewriter Company v. Elliott Fisher Company (C.C.) 156 F. 588), and no authority is cited to support defendant's proposition.

5. Because the proceedings should have been begun by rule to show cause, and not by warrant of attachment. It is manifest upon examination of the authorities cited by both sides that it is a matter of discretion with the court which method it will follow in proceedings of this sort.

6. Because the principal charge is that perjury was committed and it is contended that perjury cannot constitute a contempt. Upon the argument it was suggested that the same act could not be punished twice. This suggestion is not found in the brief; it is not persuasive. If by the same act two distinct offenses are committed, it is difficult to see why the penalty for each offense should not be imposed. If a person should commit an assault in the courtroom upon the marshal with a deadly weapon in order to effect the release of...