In Re Stephen J. Williams, No. 06-BG-682.
| Docket Nº | No. 06-BG-682. |
| Citation | 3 A.3d 1179 |
| Case Date | September 09, 2010 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
3 A.3d 1179
In re Stephen J. WILLIAMS, Respondent.
A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 422088).
No. 06-BG-682.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Feb. 17, 2010.
Decided Sept. 9, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Stephen J. Williams, pro se.
William R. Ross, Assistant Bar Counsel, with whom Wallace E. Shipp, Jr., Bar Counsel, and Judith Hetherton, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel, were on the brief, for Office of Bar Counsel.
Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and KRAMER and FISHER, Associate Judges.
KRAMER, Associate Judge:
This matter comes before this court as a result of discipline imposed upon Stephen J. Williams by the Connecticut Superior Court. The Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) recommends that we impose the non-identical reciprocal discipline of a six-month suspension with a fitness requirement. We agree with its recommendation of a six-month suspension but we conclude that Mr. Williams's conduct warrants the imposition of a requirement that he complete an ethics and practice course before he is reinstated, rather than that he make the full reinstatement showing.
Williams was admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on January 3, 1990, on motion. At the time, he had also been admitted to practice law in Connecticut and New York. In 2006, Williams was suspended from the practice of law in Connecticut for six months for violations of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct (“Connecticut Rules”) in connection with his pro se representation in a traffic matter. 1 The Connecticut court concluded that Williams's conduct “constitute[d] a danger to the administration of justice and to the citizens of Connecticut who might unwittingly engage his ponderous services.” Finding clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated Connecticut Rules 1.1, 3.5(3), 4.4, and 8.4(4), 2 the court suspended Williams's license to
practice law for six months on July 18, 2005, and conditioned his reinstatement upon completion of an approved “course of instruction on legal ethics and Connecticut Practice and Procedure.” Williams has failed to comply with these conditions and remains suspended in Connecticut.
New York subsequently imposed a six-month suspension as reciprocal discipline. District of Columbia Bar Counsel filed a certified copy of the Decision and Order of the Connecticut Court with this court on June 12, 2006, and a copy of the New York court's order on September 11, 2006. 3 On March 6, 2007, we suspended Williams on an interim basis pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(d) (1991), 4 and directed the Board to either (1) recommend whether identical, greater or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline, or (2) determine whether the Board should proceed de novo.
In response, Williams filed several motions with the Board, including a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, a motion to strike parts of Bar Counsel's brief, and a motion to compel discovery. The Board denied all of Williams's motions in a May 8, 2007, order. Williams moved to vacate this order, but the Board denied the motion and prohibited Williams from filing additional motions without prior leave from the Board, citing Williams's history of “filing repetitive motions.” Williams also petitioned this court for an en banc rehearing of his interim suspension. We denied that petition on July 12, 2009. 5
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(2) embodies a rebuttable presumption in favor of the imposition of identical reciprocal discipline unless the respondent demonstrates, or the court finds on the face of the record by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the five exceptions set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) applies. “A determination that one or more of the exceptions ... applies is a question of law or ultimate fact. Accordingly, the court's review is de novo.” 6 If none of the exceptions apply, “a final determination by a disciplining court outside the District of Columbia ... that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct shall conclusively establish the misconduct for the purpose of a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding in this Court.”
III. Legal Analysis
As a threshold matter, we must respond to Williams's challenge that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to impose reciprocal discipline. The District of Columbia Home Rule Act vests our court with the authority to impose reciprocal discipline on attorneys. 7 Section 431 of the Act provides that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over “any other matters granted to the District of Columbia courts by other provisions of law.” 8 D.C.Code § 11-2502 9 is the “other provision of law” which, together with the legal principle of collateral estoppel, establishes that the disciplinary power vested in our court includes the power to impose reciprocal discipline in addition to original discipline. 10
Williams next contends that two of the exceptions to the imposition of reciprocal discipline enumerated by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c), specifically a denial of due process and an infirmity of proof, have been established by clear and convincing evidence. 11 He further argues that he was denied the assistance of counsel in Connecticut, that his privilege against self-incrimination was infringed, and that the proceedings against him were unfair and biased. In addressing Williams's arguments, D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h) requires us to “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record....”
A. Exceptions to Reciprocal Discipline Pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(1) provides that reciprocal discipline shall be imposed unless the attorney demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]he procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process....” Williams alleges that the Connecticut proceedings denied him due process because he was not provided proper notice and he was denied his right to confront witnesses and use the compulsory process. 12 We disagree. The Board found Williams had proper notice because he “participated extensively in the Connecticut disciplinary process, filed numerous motions, many of which are analogous to the motions he filed before our Court in the District of Columbia,” and was “granted continuances ... and repeatedly urged to seek the advice of counsel.” The Connecticut court
also cited the disciplinary rules Williams allegedly violated, providing Williams fair notice of the charges against him, and the possible sanctions attached thereto. 13 Thus, Williams has failed to provide any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that he lacked proper notice.
Substantial evidence also supports the Board's findings on the issue of Williams's right to confront witnesses and to compulsory process. 14 The record shows that Williams subpoenaed three witnesses to appear at his 2005 Connecticut disciplinary hearing: the Assistant State's Attorney, the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court, and the presiding Superior Court Judge. All three were present in the courtroom during his hearing. Williams, however, failed to make an adequate proffer as to the testimony he planned to elicit from them. Thus, the Board correctly concluded that Williams had an “opportunity to confront his accusers and to elicit their testimony,” but failed to do so.
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(2) provides that reciprocal discipline shall be imposed unless the attorney demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that “there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject ....” As noted by the Board, the Connecticut Court found “clear and convincing evidence” that Williams engaged in the charged misconduct. We decline to engage in a de novo review, for to do so would be inconsistent with the principles of collateral estoppel. 15 “[O]ur responsibility in reciprocal matters is not to sit in...
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Lowery v. United States, No. 06-CM-1195.
...that the record consequently does not conclusively show he could have done so. The appellant in Plummer never made such a claim either, 3 A.3d 1179and the record on appeal in that case was similarly silent. That did not stop us from granting a remand in that case. Prior to Plummer, no one f......
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In re Williams, Case No. 3:05–GP–18(RNC).
...[978 F.Supp.2d 135]The court conditioned his reinstatement on successful completion of an approved legal ethics course. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179 (D.C.2010), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1010, 181 L.Ed.2d 736 (2012). Respondent remains suspended in both of those jurisdictions, as......
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In re Salo, No. 11–BG–1433.
...that one or more of the exceptions ... applies is a question of law or ultimate fact,” this court's review is de novo. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179, 1182 (D.C.2010) (citation omitted). In this case, Bar Counsel urges us to impose a reciprocal discipline of one year with reinstatement conditi......
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In re Scott, No. 08–BG–191.
...evidence of record,” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1), but we conduct a de novo review of the Board's legal conclusions. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179, 1183 (D.C.2010); In re Fair, 780 A.2d 1106, 1110–11 (D.C.2001). D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) establishes a presumption that, in a reciprocal matter, this......
-
Lowery v. United States, No. 06-CM-1195.
...that the record consequently does not conclusively show he could have done so. The appellant in Plummer never made such a claim either, 3 A.3d 1179and the record on appeal in that case was similarly silent. That did not stop us from granting a remand in that case. Prior to Plummer, no one f......
-
In re Williams, Case No. 3:05–GP–18(RNC).
...[978 F.Supp.2d 135]The court conditioned his reinstatement on successful completion of an approved legal ethics course. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179 (D.C.2010), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1010, 181 L.Ed.2d 736 (2012). Respondent remains suspended in both of those jurisdictions, as......
-
In re Salo, No. 11–BG–1433.
...that one or more of the exceptions ... applies is a question of law or ultimate fact,” this court's review is de novo. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179, 1182 (D.C.2010) (citation omitted). In this case, Bar Counsel urges us to impose a reciprocal discipline of one year with reinstatement conditi......
-
In re Scott, No. 08–BG–191.
...evidence of record,” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1), but we conduct a de novo review of the Board's legal conclusions. In re Williams, 3 A.3d 1179, 1183 (D.C.2010); In re Fair, 780 A.2d 1106, 1110–11 (D.C.2001). D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) establishes a presumption that, in a reciprocal matter, this......