In re Stephenson

• Decision Date: 09 October 2015
• Docket Number: 109,121.
• Citation: 302 Kan. 851,358 P.3d 86
• Parties: In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Jeri D. STEPHENSON, Appellee, and Gregory J. PAPINEAU, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

302 Kan. 851

358 P.3d 86

In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Jeri D. STEPHENSON, Appellee

and

Gregory J. PAPINEAU, Appellant.

109,121.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 9, 2015.

John W. Fresh, of Larry R. Mears, Chartered, of Atchison, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

J. David Farris, of J. David Farris Law Offices, of Atchison, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether a child-support obligor, who became disabled and applied for social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits for himself and his dependents, may be reimbursed or receive a credit for past child-support payments. The obligor in this case argues his children received duplicative payments, both of which satisfied his child-support obligations for the period between his application for and the approval of the SSDI derivative benefits: One payment came directly from the obligor as the child support became due and the second occurred when the Social Security Administration (SSA) paid the SSDI derivative benefits that had accumulated while his application was being processed. Both the district court and a divided Court of Appeals determined the disabled obligor was not entitled to a credit, a reimbursement, or an offset. in rE marriage oF stephenson & papineau, 49 kaN.app.2d 457, 308 P.3d 1270 (2013).

On review of the Court of Appeals decision, we reverse, holding that a district court may—but does not necessarily have to—grant a credit to a child-support obligor who is current on child support when a lump-sum payment of accumulated SSDI derivative benefits duplicates the obligor's support payment. A credit, if granted, may be used to offset other support obligations imposed by the court on the obligor. Alternatively, the district court might adjust an obligor's support obligations, require reimbursement of the duplicative payments from funds that are discrete from SSDI benefits, or fashion some other equitable remedy permitted under applicable federal statutes and regulations. Because the district court in this case did not recognize the extent of its discretionary powers, we remand this case for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural Background

The district court resolved the issue in this appeal based on the following stipulated facts. Gregory J. Papineau and Jeri D. Stephenson divorced in 2006. Through the divorce decree, the district court granted Stephenson primary residential custody of their minor children and ordered Papineau to pay monthly child support. At the time relevant to this appeal, Papineau's monthly obligation was $782, and he did not owe an arrearage. The stipulated facts provided no additional information about the financial obligations of either party.

In 2010, Papineau became disabled. He began receiving long-term disability benefits through a policy with Standard Insurance Company, which allowed him to timely pay his monthly $782 child-support obligation. During this time Papineau also applied for SSDI benefits, but the SSA did not approve his application and begin providing those benefits until March 2012. These benefits included ongoing derivative payments of $802 per month to Stephenson as the “representative payee” of Papineau's dependent children. The SSA also made a $5,600 lump-sum payment to Stephenson for the children's benefit; this payment retroactively covered derivative benefits that had accrued during the time between Papineau's SSDI application and its approval.

Subsequently, Papineau filed a motion to modify his child-support obligation. He first asked the district court to relieve him of his personal obligation to make child-support payments, noting the monthly SSDI derivative payment to his dependent children fully and contemporaneously satisfied—and, in fact, exceeded—his monthly obligation. Second, he asked for an order requiring Stephenson to reimburse him for child support he had already paid in an amount equal to the lump-sum payment of accumulated SSDI derivative benefits. Papineau also asked the district court to consider the parties' stipulated fact that Standard Insurance Company was claiming “subrogation to all benefits received by [Papineau] and the minor children, to include the amount of the retroactive payment received by [Stephenson] on behalf of the minor children.”

The district court granted Papineau's first request, recognizing that in Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, Syl. ¶ 4, 538 P.2d 649 (1975), this court held a child-support obligor may receive credit for SSDI payments made for the benefit of the obligor's minor children “to the extent of, but not exceeding” the obligor's monthly child-support obligation that is contemporaneous with the monthly SSDI payment. But the district court denied Papineau's second request for reimbursement of the child support he had paid during the pendency of his SSDI application. Citing In re Marriage of Hohmann, 47 Kan.App.2d 117, 274 P.3d 27 (2012), rev. denied 297 Kan. 1245 (2013), the district court concluded Papineau's payments must be considered a gift that inures to the benefit of the children and may not be recovered.

Papineau appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed. Stephenson & Papineau, 49 Kan.App.2d 457, 308 P.3d 1270. Judge Gordon Atcheson dissented, concluding that Papineau should be allowed an “accommodation” in the form of a “payment or payments from Stephenson to Papineau, a credit against other obligations Papineau has under the divorce decree benefiting his sons, a combination of payments and credits, or something else satisfactory to the parties and the district court.” 49 Kan.App.2d at 490, 308 P.3d 1270 (Atcheson, J., dissenting).

Papineau filed a petition seeking review of the Court of Appeals decision, which we granted.

Analysis

We begin our review in the same position as the district court and Court of Appeals—that is, we exercise unlimited review, without deference to the district court or the Court of Appeals, because the issue was determined based on stipulated facts and the law that applied to those facts. See Rucker v. DeLay, 295 Kan. 826, 830, 289 P.3d 1166 (2012). Papineau's appeal presents an issue of first impression, and we believe the best approach in this case is to follow the analytical path taken by the district court and Court of Appeals. Thus, we will analyze our decision in Andler, the Court of Appeals' decision in Hohmann and other cases, decisions from other jurisdictions, and statutes and regulations governing SSDI benefits.

As we do so, we will compare and contrast the Court of Appeals majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case. While valid arguments can be made for both sides of the issue and are well-stated in the Court of Appeals' split decision, upon our independent review of the authorities we conclude the dissenting opinion presents the more persuasive analysis and, with some modification, the appropriate outcome.

We begin our review with this court's decision in Andler.

1. Andler

In Andler, the parties divorced just months after an automobile accident resulted in a father's permanent disability. The district court ordered the father to pay child support to his former spouse, who was granted custody of the minor children. The court order did not mention the potential effect of SSDI benefits on the father's obligation. Yet, just 1 month after the decree was filed, the children began receiving SSDI benefits as their father's dependents; the SSDI payments exceeded the father's court-ordered obligation. After the monthly dependent benefits began, the father made four child-support payments from his own funds. He then stopped making personal payments, which led the mother to file a motion to have the father held in contempt for violation of the court's order. The mother argued, in part, that the father should not receive credit for the SSDI payments because the benefit came from an act of Congress, not the father.

The Andler court rejected the mother's argument. First, the court noted that SSDI benefits are not government gratuities. The Andler court reasoned: (1) SSDI benefits represent contributions a worker has made throughout the course of employment and the worker has a vested right in the payments, including derivative payments to dependent children, and (2) the underlying intent behind SSDI payments to a dependent child is to provide support that the disabled parent is unable to provide. Thus, in this sense, the benefits represent earnings in much the same way as would benefits paid by a private insurance company. Andler, 217 Kan. at 542–43, 538 P.2d 649 ; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.330 (2015) (indicating insured persons who suffer from a physical or mental disability

and are no longer able to work are entitled to benefits from the SSA insurance program in the form of SSDI payments to themselves and their minor children); see also 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (SSA benefit is directly related to the amount the insured has paid into the program).

Ultimately, the Andler court held that monthly SSDI benefits that derive from a child-support obligor's SSA benefits and are paid to the obligor's children satisfy ongoing child-support obligations because the source and purpose of the payments are the same—both child-support payments and SSDI benefits come from the income or assets of the obligor and provide for the needs of the minor children. 217 Kan. at 542–43, 538 P.2d 649 ; Kansas Child Support Guidelines § II.A. (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 127) (Guidelines) ( “The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of the child.”); see In re Marriage of Henry, 156 Ill.2d 541, 550–51, 190 Ill.Dec. 773, 622 N.E.2d 803 (1993) (“[T]he source and the purpose of social security dependent benefits are identical to the source and purpose of child support—both come from a noncustodial parent's wages or assets and both provide for the needs of the dependent child.”).

Andler's...