In re Stetson's Estate

• Decision Date: 27 June 1931
• Docket Number: 36
• Citation: 305 Pa. 62,155 A. 856
• Parties: Stetson's Estate
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

155 A. 856

305 Pa. 62

Stetson's Estate

No. 36

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 27, 1931

Argued May 13, 1931

Appeal, No. 36, Jan. T., 1932, by Real Estate-Land Title &amp Trust Co., guardian of estates of Thomasina Stetson and Jane B. Stetson, minors, from decree of O.C. Montgomery Co., dated March 4, 1931, granting petition for review, in estate of John B. Stetson, deceased. Reversed.

Petition for review. Before HOLLAND, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Review allowed. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., guardian appealed.

Error assigned was decree, quoting it.

The decree of the court below is reversed, and the petition of appellees praying the opening and reviewing of the accounts and adjudications therein referred to, is dismissed at their cost.

W. W. Montgomery, Jr., with him Henry M. Brownback, for appellant. -- The right of review is barred by the statute of limitations: Milliken's App., 227 Pa. 502; Nixon's Est., 239 Pa. 270; Priestley's App., 127 Pa. 420; Barr's Est., 43 Pa.Super. 540; George's App., 12 Pa. 260; Bagg's App., 43 Pa. 512; Jones's App., 99 Pa. 124; Given's Est., 292 Pa. 483; Weiting v. Nissley, 6 Pa. 141; Groff's App., 45 Pa. 379; Johnson's App., 114 Pa. 132; Rice v. Braden, 243 Pa. 141.

The granting of the petition was not a proper exercise of discretion: Jones v. Integrity T. Co., 292 Pa. 149; Moss's App., 83 Pa. 264; Biddle's App., 99 Pa. 278; Eisner's Est., 175 Pa. 143; Veech's Est., 74 Pa.Super. 373; Sherwood's Est., 206 Pa. 465; Bailey's Est., 291 Pa. 421; Littleton's App., 93 Pa. 177; Kachline's Est., 7 Pa.Super. 163; Michener's Est., 225 Pa. 66.

John Hampton Barnes, of Barnes, Biddle & Myers, and Maurice Bower Saul, of Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, for appellee. -- The five-year limitation of the Acts of 1840 and 1917, does not bar relief: Emery's Est., 1 Camp. 485; Sloan's Est., 254 Pa. 346; Willing's Est., 288 Pa. 337; Huff's Est., 300 Pa. 64; Audenried's Est., 31 Pa. C.C. 198; Patterson's Est., 77 Pitts. L.J. 193; Linnard's Est., 299 Pa. 32.

The decree granting the review was a proper exercise of discretion: Macpherson's Est., 260 Pa. 492; Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. Simpson, 293 Pa. 577; Kelly's Est., 37 Pa.Super. 320; Maris's Est., 301 Pa. 20.

Before FRAZER, C.J., WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER and MAXEY, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

When testator died, the principal of his estate consisted in large part of common and preferred stock of the John B. Stetson Company, which, on the adjudication of the executors' first account, was awarded to the trustees named in his will. On three several occasions thereafter, that company gave to each of its shareholders rights to subscribe to a portion of a new issue of stock. These were sold by the executors and trustees, when and as received, and the moneys thereby respectively realized were accounted for in the next three accounts, which were audited and adjudicated in due course, and were confirmed absolutely on March 31, 1908; April 2, 1910, and June 1, 1912. The last of these adjudications stated that "The surviving widow and the two sons of the testator [who were the only persons having any possible interest in the estate] have united in declaring to the court that they have examined the account and approve, ratify and confirm the same." The sums received from the sale of those rights were awarded by the court, in the several adjudications, to the testamentary trustees, upon the trusts contained in testator's will. In five later accounts (three of which were filed subsequent to 1917, and were audited, adjudicated and confirmed absolutely more than five years prior to the filing of the petition for review now under consideration), the testamentary trustees charged themselves, in each of the principal accounts, with the net balance shown by the adjudication of their immediately preceding account, which, in each case, included all three of the sums received from the sale of those rights; and in the adjudications of these five accounts, the last of which was confirmed absolutely on June 23, 1924, the principal, made up as stated, was again awarded to the testamentary trustees, upon the trusts contained in testator's will.

With the record in this shape, the life tenants, -- claiming that those three sums were income and not principal, and hence should have been awarded to them absolutely and not to the testamentary trustees -- on April 30, 1930, filed a petition to reopen and review all of those accounts and adjudications. The court below decreed the relief prayed for on the theory that, since those sums were still in the hands of the testamentary trustees, the accounts and adjudications could be opened and reviewed after any lapse of time, no matter how great. Appellants assert that this was an erroneous conclusion, and contend that, under section 1 of the Act of October 13, 1840, P.L. 1841, page 1, and section 48 of the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447, 514, the right to a review of each of those eight accounts was lost after the expiration of five years from its absolute confirmation. The court below seems to concede that this would have been so but for the fact that we have repeatedly said, after as well as before the passage of those statutes, that the orphans' court has an inherent right to review and correct its errors. We have so said, and now repeat it; but we have never said (where no fraud was alleged, as here there was not) that the limitation of time expressed in those statutes did not apply, if the relief sought was of a matter expressly declared to be within their scope and purpose. To have so decided would have been to convict the legislature of giving to a petitioning litigant the right to decide for himself whether he would proceed under or aside from the statute, telling him that if he took the former course he would limit himself as to the time he might apply for relief, and if he took the latter he would be free from all such limitations; in other words, the practical effect of so deciding would be to make the statute a piece of useless legislation. Such a conclusion should never be reached, unless no other is reasonably possible, which is not the situation here.

Moreover, section 13 of the Act of March 28, 1806, P.L. 558, 569, 4 Sm. L. 326, 332, is an express prohibition to our so deciding. It is there said: "In all cases where a remedy is provided or duty enjoined, or anything directed to be done by any act or acts of Assembly of this Commonwealth, the directions of the said acts, shall be strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be inflicted or anything done agreeably to the provisions of the common law, in such cases, further than shall be necessary for carrying such act or acts into effect." At one time the two clauses of this section were construed together, and it was applied only to penal actions and indictable offenses: Rees v. Emerick, 6 S. & R. 286, 289. We have long since abandoned that construction, however (Wike v. Lightner, 1 R. 289; Hare v. Commonwealth, 92 Pa. 141; Borough of Beltzhoover v. Gollings, 101 Pa. 293), and it is now held that where a statute provides a remedy its directions must be strictly pursued, and the prior method of procedure to obtain relief, whether at common law or in equity, will be treated as still in force only to the extent necessary for carrying the statute into effect: Heller v. Fishman, 278 Pa. 328, 331. Since, then, the Act of 1840 formerly provided, and now that of 1917 provides a remedy by bills of review in the cases specified in them, each must be strictly followed and the prior procedure can no longer be sustained.

This brings us to the question as to how far, if at all, those statutes are applicable here. The Act of 1840 probably is inapplicable since it relates only to the accounts of an "executor, administrator or guardian," whereas those sought to be reviewed in this proceeding are accounts of testamentary trustees. The commission which drafted the various statutes to "codify and revise the law of decedents' estates," says in their Report (page 219), that "the word 'fiduciary' is substituted for 'executor, administrator or guardian' [as appearing in the Act of 1840, thus] making the act include testamentary trustees." It is not necessary to consider at this time whether or not there was any exception to this interpretation of the Act of 1840. It was repealed by the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 (at page 539), and for it was substituted section 48 of the latter statute which provides as follows (P.L. 514): "Within five years after the final decree confirming the original or supplementary account of any fiduciary, which has been or may be hereafter passed upon, [a] petition of review being presented . . . by any person interested therein, alleging errors in such account, or in any adjudication of the orphans' court, or any report of an auditor of such account, which errors shall be specifically set forth in said petition of review, said petition and errors being verified by oath or affirmation, the orphans' court shall grant a rehearing of so much of said account, adjudication, or auditor's report as is alleged to be error in said petition of review, and give such relief as equity and justice may require, by reference to auditors, or otherwise, with like right of appeal to the proper appellate court as in other cases: Provided, That this act shall not extend to any cause when the balance found due shall have been actually paid and discharged by any fiduciary."

Under the Act of 1806, supra, this section of the Act of 1917 must be construed to mean that the party "alleging errors in such account, or in any adjudication of the orphans' court, or any report of an auditor on such account," can only effectually do so "within five...