In re Stoneroad

Citation155 Cal.Rptr.3d 639,215 Cal.App.4th 596
Decision Date18 April 2013
Docket NumberA132591
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesIN REJames Charles STONEROAD, on Habeas Corpus.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Petition granted.

Haerle, J., filed dissenting opinion.

See 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 812.

Trial Court: Humboldt County Superior Court Trial Judge: Hon. Marilyn B. Miles

Attorney for Petitioner: Susan L. Jordan, By Court Appointment Under the First District Appellate Project.

Attorneys for Respondent: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill, Acting Sr. Asst. Atty, Gen., Anya M. Binsacca, Supervising Deputy A.G., Amber N. Wipfler, Deputy Attorney General.

Kline, P.J.

James Charles Stoneroad, a life-term inmate of state prison convicted of second degree murder, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus from the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) denying him parole. Petitioner argues that the decision denying parole is arbitrary and unsupported by some evidence of his current dangerousness. He additionally urges that the gravity of his commitment offense can no longer be used to find him unsuitable for parole because he has already served more prison time than the maximum base term prescribed by the Board's regulations for that offense.1

We reject the latter argument but accept the former. As we explain, the Board's decision does not reflect due consideration of numerous statutory and regulatory factors bearing upon suitability for parole and the evidence the Board relied upon does not rationally indicate petitioner is currently dangerous. Because the decision violates due process, we shall grant the petition and remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings pursuant to In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291, 234 P.3d 541 ( Prather ).

In 2006, the Board conducted a subsequent parole suitability hearing and denied petitioner parole. In 2010, the Board again denied petitioner parole and scheduled his next parole hearing to occur in three years. The Board's 2010 rulings are the subject of this petition.

Petitioner's Background

Prior to his imprisonment, petitioner had a long-standing problem with alcohol that is inseparable from any account of his life and the commitment offenses. According to a 1987 probation department report, petitioner began drinking when he was 12 or 13 years old, and was drinking regularly by the time he was 16. Petitioner was a “binge drinker,” consuming alcohol until he was extremely intoxicated and sometimes experiencing “blackouts.” As we will discuss, petitioner murdered Kane and attempted to murder Irwin after consuming large amounts of vodka, and has stated through the years since that he has very limited or no memories of these crimes.

Petitioner, a Native American, was born in Pawnee, Oklahoma, in 1946, the seventh of 10 children. He drank in part to relieve a lot of “inner pain” from the emotional and physical abuse he endured as a child. His mother abandoned him when he was a baby and his great-grandmother raised him until he was five, when his mother and father took him back. After this he was “spoiled” and his favored treatment caused resentment among his siblings, particularly his older brother, who repeatedly beat petitioner, and threw him down and choked him until petitioner passed out.

Petitioner dropped out of high school after his sophomore year and left home after a particularly severe altercation with his brother, John. He completed some college courses despite his lack of a high school degree. The probation officer reported that petitioner had falsely claimed in the past to have a Bachelor's and a Master's degree (as well as to be a veteran of the Vietnam War). Petitioner acknowledged to the Board that he had not yet obtained his GED, and the Board noted that he scored a grade placement level of 7.6 on a TABE test, although he had tested higher in the past.

Petitioner was married and divorced twice before the commitment offenses, the marriages resulting in the birth of four children. Both divorces were at least in part due to his continued drinking problems, even though he completed a treatment program during his second marriage. He told the probation officer that his second wife claimed he was abusive towards her, but that he knocked her down only once, when he was sober. A 2001 evaluation reported that petitioner was married a third time in 1991, while he was in prison, but a subsequent evaluation stated that he stopped having contact with this wife in 1996. Petitioner told the Board that he had a “significant other” at the time of the hearing.

Petitioner has no juvenile record and no significant adult criminal record. In 1964, he was convicted of public intoxication and fined $14, and in 1966 he was convicted of being drunk in public and disorderly conduct, for which he was fined $15. In 1972, he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, but the charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Petitioner told the Board he was sober at the time of the assault incident, which he contended was an act of self-defense against a brother-in-law who had been drinking.

In 1973, petitioner was charged with first degree murder, but found not guilty by reason of self-defense. This incident occurred when he and a group of American Indian Movement members had been drinking and he began to argue with one of the men. The man shot at petitioner and, as he threatened to shoot again, petitioner fired a shot to scare him but accidentally hit him, causing his death.

Irwin met petitioner in 1983 at a residential alcohol treatment program for Native Americans in Oakland. Petitioner was a program resident who later helped establish and operate a youth group for the program. He was employed for about six months in 1984 as the executive director of the Intertribal Friendship House in Oakland. Petitioner had also worked as a marine machinist, a long haul truck driver, and a technical writer, and had done surveying and ranch work.

According to Irwin, she and petitioner began living together in October 1984. Petitioner continued to binge drink during their relationship. He became “mean” when he drank and normally stayed away from home. She said he twice acted violently towards her, both times while under the influence, hitting her the first time and swinging at her the second. The probation officer reported that petitioner left his position at the Intertribal Friendship House to attend an alcohol treatment program “after hitting victim Irwin during an alcoholic blackout.” He completed the program, but soon returned to binge drinking.

Irwin said she and petitioner moved to Hoopa in February 1985 so she could work in a high stakes bingo operation. Petitioner found people in Hoopa “very clannish and stand-offish,” so he “became more and more isolated and started drinking more.”

For some months in 1985, petitioner was also employed at a high stakes bingo operation in Hoopa, but he lost this job when he resumed drinking and ceased working, which left him without income. Petitioner told the Board he was terminated because he left the area to participate in a treatment program; he returned to Hoopa “determined to make a go of it ... but then after I got back up there, everybody more or less turned away from me again. And I was without employment, in a strange place, isolated, and I started drinking again.” A psychiatric evaluator reported at petitioner's 1987 sentencing hearing that, because petitioner was unemployed and financially reliant on Irwin, he became very depressed and began hearing voices taunting and berating him, which caused him to feel angry and fearful.

Irwin told the probation officer that in early 1986 she told petitioner she did not want to “live that way” anymore. Petitioner made plans to move to Montana, where he could find employment. He was packed and ready to leave when Irwin's mother suffered a stroke. Petitioner stayed and he, Irwin, and Kane moved into the mother's home so Irwin could care for her mother. Irwin and petitioner did not address their issues again, and Irwin spent most of her energy dealing with her mother.

The Commitment Offenses

According to accounts in the record, on April 7, 1986, Irwin went to work while petitioner stayed home and drank two and a half pints of vodka between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Kane came home around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. and eventually went to bed. Irwin returned home at about midnight and found petitioner in a storage room, where he had said he would sleep that night.

About 3:00 a.m., petitioner asked Irwin to come out of her mother's bedroom, but Irwin said she was busy with her mother. Petitioner left and went into a bedroom occupied by Kane. Irwin heard Kane say, “What's the matter with you, no,” and she went to investigate. She saw that petitioner was holding a knife and Kane had been stabbed in the chest. The three struggled over the knife, and Irwin's hand was cut badly. Petitioner told Kane, “Your mother is next.”

Irwin and Kane broke away from petitioner and ran down the hall. Irwin went to call the police while Kane lay on the floor. Before Irwin could call, petitioner took a rifle out of a cabinet and began loading it. Irwin fought with petitioner over the gun, but petitioner hit her in the head with it; she ran out the back door as petitioner fired a shot at her that missed. Petitioner loaded another rifle and shot Kane, who bled to death.

The police found petitioner sleeping in a storage room. He made no attempt to evade arrest and appeared unable to understand why he was being arrested. Petitioner told police he had no memory of the incident because he was extremely intoxicated. A blood sample taken from him at 8:55 a.m. that morning showed a blood-alcohol content of .15. In taped statements to police, petitioner said he could not remember stabbing Kane or shooting at anyone, but that “I must have shot him,” that he got...

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