In re Stull's Estate
| Decision Date | 03 January 1898 |
| Docket Number | 124 |
| Citation | 39 A. 16,183 Pa. 625 |
| Parties | Estate of Richard H. Stull. Appeal of Ada Morehouse |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 19, 1897
Appeal No. 124, Oct. T., 1897, by Ada Morehouse, from decree of O.C Washington Co., May T., 1897, No. 27, on appeal from register of wills. Affirmed. McCOLLUM, MITCHELL and FELL, JJ dissent.
Appeal from register of wills refusing letters of administration.
McILVAINE, P.J., found the facts to be as follows:
In the year 1885 Richard H. Stull, a citizen and resident of Washington county, married Hannah Margaret Lewis. They had born to them one child, a son, Samuel A. Stull. On February 7, 1894, Hannah Margaret Stull, nee Lewis, was divorced from Richard H. Stull by the court of common pleas of Washington county on the grounds that he, the said Richard H. Stull, had committed the crime of adultery with one Ada Widdup, the appellant in this case. On the 5th day of April, 1894, Richard H. Stull and the said Ada Widdup were married in Cumberland, Maryland. They left Washington county, Pennsylvania, and went to Cumberland, Maryland, for the sole purpose of being married and to evade, as they thought, offending against the act of assembly of Pennsylvania, approved March 13, 1815, which prohibited their being married. Immediately after the marriage ceremony was performed in Cumberland they boarded a railroad train and returned to their home in this county and lived together as man and wife until the 11th of June, 1895, when Richard H. Stull died. He died testate, making Ada Widdup the principal beneficiary of his will. Stiers Lewis was appointed guardian of Samuel A. Stull, the only child of Richard H. Stull and Hannah Margaret Stull, who, on behalf of his ward, contested the probate of this will. On December 16, 1896, after a trial in the court of common pleas, the will was decided by this court null and void, and Ada Widdup (who is now Mrs. Morehouse), as widow of the said Richard H. Stull, applied for letters of administration. Stiers Lewis, guardian of Samuel A. Stull, the only child of Richard H. Stull, objected to the granting of letters of administration to Ada Widdup (now Morehouse), on the ground, inter alia, that she was not the lawful widow of Richard H. Stull, and suggested that Isaac Overholt be granted letters. The register refused to grant letters to Ada Widdup (now Ada Morehouse) and granted them to Isaac Overholt. From this decree of the register, Ada Widdup (now Morehouse) appealed. Hannah Margaret Stull, nee Lewis, is still living.
The court dismissed the appeal.
Error assigned was decree dismissing appeal.
The decree of the court below is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed at the cost of the appellant.
R. W. Irwin, for appellant. -- The act of March 13, 1815, expressly forbade Richard Stull from marrying Ada Widdup during the lifetime of his divorced wife. Since the passage of that act the question here presented has never been ruled by this court, and it must be determined upon principle and upon authority derived from decisions in sister states. We contend that as much as the marriage was valid, under the laws of the state where it was solemnized, under the law of comity between the states, and upon principles of public policy, it must be treated as valid here: Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L. Cas. 193; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N.Y. 521; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pickering, 433; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; 1 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, sec. 348; Story on Conflict of Laws, sec. 79.
Boyd Crumrine with him E. E. Crumrine, for appellee. -- The marriage set up by the claimant to letters was a fraud upon the laws and jurisprudence of Maryland, violative of the express provisions of the laws of Pennsylvania and, therefore, a valid marriage in neither state: Archer v. Dunn, 2 W. & S. 327; Wood, Bacon & Co. v. Kelso, 27 Pa. 241; Whart. Confl. of L. sec. 401.
Marriage is a contract, but is something more than a mere contract: Story, Confl. of L. sec. 108.
If it be the law of the domicil that when a married person commits adultery, and a divorce is granted therefor, the guilty party and the co-respondent are prohibited from marriage during the lifetime of the complainant, the effect of the decree shall be the same in all other countries: Story, Confl. of L. sec. 41; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Phillips v. Gregg, 10 W. 158; Hill v. Hill, 42 Pa. 198; Parker's App., 44 Pa. 309; Phila. v. Williamson, 10 Phila. 176; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 W. 349; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Love v. Love, 10 Phila. 453; Platt's App., 80 Pa. 501; Ralston's App., 93 Pa. 133; Phila. v. Wetherby, 11 W.N.C. 154; Van Storch v. Griffin, 71 Pa. 240; Smith v. Thornton, 5 W.N. 372; Adams v. Adams, 2 Chest. Co. 560; Le Breton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart. (La.) 60; White v. White, 105 Mass. 325; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Putman v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18; Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun, 238; Ponsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf. C.C. 51; Williams v. Oates, 5 Ired. Law Rep. 535; State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251; Pennegar & Haney v. State, 87 Tenn. 244; Elliott v. Elliott, 38 Md. 358; Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L.C. 193; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85.
Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN and FELL, JJ.
The question at issue in this case arises upon the application of a woman, claiming to have been the lawful wife of the decedent at the time of his death, to have letters of administration upon his estate granted to her. The letters were refused by the register and orphans' court on the ground that the petitioner was not the lawful wife of the decedent and hence was not entitled to them. Briefly the facts were that the decedent Richard H. Stull was married to Hannah M. Lewis who still survives. In February, 1894, the wife obtained a decree of absolute divorce from him on the ground that he had committed adultery with one Ada Widdup. On April 5, 1894, the decedent and the said Ada Widdup, both being citizens and inhabitants of Pennsylvania, went to Cumberland in the state of Maryland, and were there united in marriage. They at once returned to Pennsylvania and there lived and cohabited as man and wife on the farm of the decedent in Washington county, until his death, on June 11, 1895. They had no children, but there was one child, a son, Samuel A. Stull, by the first marriage. It was admitted and found in the court below, and is now conceded on the argument in this Court, that the decedent and Ada Widdup, his paramour, with whom he had committed adultery, went into Maryland to be there married, for the express purpose of evading the law of Pennsylvania which prohibits a marriage with the paramour during the life of the injured wife or husband. It is also conceded that by the law of Maryland there is no such prohibition, and that under that law the marriage was lawful. The question arising is, was the applicant the lawful wife of the decedent at the time of his death? She subsequently married one Morehouse, and now bears his name. Our act of March 13, 1815, Purd. Dig. 688, Pl. 29, sec. 9, provides as follows: "The wife or husband who shall have been guilty of the crime of adultery, shall not marry the person with whom the said crime was committed, during the life of the former wife or husband; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to or affect, or render illegitimate, any of the children born of the body of the wife during coverture." Section 10 disables a guilty wife who after the divorce cohabits with her paramour from alienating any of her lands and tenements, and avoids such conveyances if made.
By the ninth section it will be perceived there is an absolute prohibition of any subsequent marriage between the guilty person and the paramour during the life of the former wife or husband. It forbids the marriage relation to be contracted in the most general terms. The guilty party "shall not marry the person with whom the said crime was committed." A personal incapacity to marry is imposed. The necessary meaning of this language is that they shall not marry at all, in any circumstances, or at any time, or any place, so long as the injured party is living. So far as the purpose and meaning of this statute are concerned it is of no consequence where such subsequent prohibited marriage takes place. The relation itself is absolutely prohibited, and hence is within the operative words of the statute, without any reference as to where the marriage occurs.
It is now necessary to notice the other environments which affect the case. Both the parties to the prohibited marriage were citizens of Pennsylvania, domiciled on her territory, both before and after the marriage, and were only absent long enough to have the ceremony performed. They continued to reside together in Pennsylvania until the death of the husband. The woman resides here still. She never acquired any rights as an inhabitant of the state of Maryland, and can and does, not now claim any right of that character. She is now claiming, not only the protection of our law, but a special privilege and right, accorded only to lawful wives under the intestate law of Pennsylvania, to wit: the right to have administration of the estate of her alleged husband. In this respect the case is different from many of the cases cited in the paper-books, and the difference is against her claim. Here, she, being now and at all times a citizen of Pennsylvania, subject at all times to its laws and its policies, having committed a direct and positive violation of one of those laws which relates to, and immediately...
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Interest analysis in interjurisdictional marriage disputes.
...thereto as upon the inherent right of the rule itself. Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 308 (Tenn. 1888); see also In re Estate of Stull, 183 Pa. 625, 630 (1898) (holding that a bigamous marriage following an unlawful divorce is "contrary to good morals" and not entitled to recognition). For......