In re Sugar Notch Borough

Decision Date19 July 1899
Docket Number210
Citation43 A. 985,192 Pa. 349
PartiesSugar Notch Borough. Appeal of Warrior Run School District
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued April 11, 1899

Appeal, No. 210, Jan. T., 1898, by school district of the borough of Warrior Run, from decree of Superior Court, Jan T., 1898, No. 13, affirming order of Q.S. Luzerne Co., Jan T., 1894, No. 283. Reversed.

Appeal from Superior Court. See 7 Pa.Super. 4.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court of quarter sessions, BENNETT, J., as follows:

Pursuant to previous proceedings had for that purpose, under and in accordance with the provisions of the act entitled, "An act to provide for the division of boroughs and the erection of new boroughs," approved May 29, 1889, P.L. 393, a decree of this court was entered on January 25, 1895, dividing the borough of Sugar Notch, and setting off and erecting, according to the boundaries therein given, the village of Warrior Run (formerly included within the borough of Sugar Notch), into a new borough, under the style and title of "the borough of Warrior Run."

On the day last aforesaid, to wit: January 25, 1895, the auditor, whose report is here excepted to, was appointed under the provisions of the Act of June 1, 1887, P.L. 285. The title and 1st section of this act, being the legislation which is particularly important here, are as follows:

"A further supplement to an act, approved the 11th day of June, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine, entitled 'A supplement to an act for the regulation of boroughs,' approved the 3d day of April, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, providing for the adjustment of indebtedness and government of the boroughs, townships and school districts, affected by changes of limits of any borough in the commonwealth.

"Section 1. That, whenever proceedings shall have been or shall hereafter be commenced in any court of this commonwealth for the purpose of changing the limits of any borough by annexing thereto any adjacent tracts of land, or detaching therefrom any territory included therein, and the same shall have been approved by the grand jury to which the application shall have been submitted, it shall be the duty of the court, before entering the decree confirming the same, to appoint an auditor, who shall ascertain the existing liabilities of the several boroughs, townships and school districts, which may be affected by the said change of limits, the amount and value of the property owned by each, and the amount and value of the property, passing to or from each borough, township or school district, and the assessed valuation of all property liable to taxation for borough, township or school purposes, as shown by the last annual assessment in each of said boroughs, townships and school districts, and within the limits of the part annexed to or detached from said borough, and shall report the same to the said court, with the form of decree adjusting the liabilities for all indebtedness, and the value of property held or acquired by each justly and equitably upon said borough, township and school district, respectively; and said court shall be authorized to direct the amounts that shall be paid one to the other, and the time and mode of payment, and, if necessary to a proper and just adjustment of the same, may order and direct a special tax to be levied upon the property so annexed to or detached from said borough, for the payment of so much of the indebtedness, as may be awarded against it and direct how the same shall be assessed and collected."

The auditor appointed as aforesaid has filed a report in pursuance of the provisions of the foregoing act. So far as concerns the school district of Sugar Notch borough and the school district of Warrior Run borough which was carved out of the territory of the former and came into existence with the new borough of Warrior Run, this report shows that there was no indebtedness of the school district of Sugar Notch borough at the time of the division; that, considering the value of the school property of the latter at that time and estimating the rights thereto of the two school districts on the basis of the relative assessed valuations of taxable property in each, there remains in the school district of Sugar Notch borough, school property to the value of $6,169.74 more than its proportionate share thereof; and the report recommends a decree that the latter district pay said sum to the school district of Warrior Run borough and that the money for the payment thereof be raised by a special tax in the school district of Sugar Notch borough. The latter borough is the exceptant here. It attacks that portion of the auditor's report above referred to, and by three of its exceptions complains that the act of 1887 is unconstitutional: (1) Because the subject of valuing school property and charging one district to compensate another on that account is not expressed in the title and violates article 3, section 3, providing that "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title;" (2) because it attempts to regulate the affairs of certain school districts to the exclusion of others and violates article 3, section 7, prohibiting the passage of "any local or special law . . . regulating the affairs of . . . school districts;" (3) because it attempts to grant certain school districts to the exclusion of others, special and exclusive provisions, and is special legislation and contrary to article 3, section 7, forbidding the passage of "any local or special law . . . granting to any corporation, association or individual, any special or exclusive privilege or immunity. . . ."

We hold that the act of 1887, in so far as it provides for the valuation and distribution of property owned by school districts affected by changes of borough limits, the creation of indebtedness on that account in favor of and against such school districts, and the enforcement of payment of such indebtedness by the levy and collection of special taxes, is unconstitutional and void, because the subject thereof is not clearly expressed in its title, and it attempts to regulate the affairs of certain school districts in the commonwealth to the exclusion of others, and, therefore, violates section 3 of article 3 of the constitution, providing that "No bill . . . shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title," and is also contrary to that part of section 7 of the same article, prohibiting the passage of "any local or special law . . . regulating the affairs of . . . school districts."

The first and second exceptions, as numbered in this opinion, to the auditor's report, are sustained and the report is set aside in so far as it relates to the school district of the borough of Sugar Notch and the school district of the borough of Warrior Run.

Error assigned was the decree of the Superior Court affirming the decree of the court of quarter sessions.

Judgment reversed and procedendo in accordance with this opinion awarded.

S. J. Strauss, with him B. R. Jones, for appellant.

William S. M'Lean, with him James H. Shea and George R. M'Lean, for appellee.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, MITCHELL, DEAN and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL:

1. The title of the Act of April 3, 1851, P.L. 320, is "An act regulating boroughs." Nothing more general and comprehensive on that subject could have been devised. It included the entire range of borough affairs so far as they were within legislative control. When, therefore, the Act of June 11, 1879, P.L. 150, was entitled "A supplement to an act for the regulation of boroughs," it was so far as the title was concerned as broad as the original act. It comprehended everything relating to boroughs that was or could be the subject of legislative action. The Act of June 1, 1887, P.L. 285, is entitled, "A further supplement to an act, approved June 11, 1879, entitled 'A supplement to an act for the regulation of boroughs,'" etc. If the title had stopped here it would have been beyond question for it would have been as broad as that of the original act and the first supplement. It would have included the whole subject of boroughs, and nothing germane to any aspect of that subject, would have been beyond the limits of the title. But the title of the act of 1887 did not stop at that point, it proceeded to specify the particular branches of the general subject which it intended to deal with, by the words "providing for the adjustment of indebtedness and government of the boroughs, townships and school districts affected by changes of limits of any borough in the commonwealth." If we look beyond the title to the body of the act of 1879 we find that it deals with changes of borough limits and therefore the subject of the act of 1887 is not only within the limits of the title of the act of 1879, but entirely germane to its enactments. The only question left therefore in regard to the title of the act of 18...

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