In re T.W.

• Docket Number: 995-2022
• Decision Date: 21 June 2023
• Parties: IN RE: T.W.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

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IN RE: T.W.

No. 995-2022

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland^[**]

June 21, 2023

Circuit Court for Charles County Case No.: C-08-JV-22-000016

Shaw Tang, Kenney, James A., III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

Shaw J.

The State filed a delinquency petition in the Circuit Court for Charles County, alleging that T.W., a juvenile, was involved in a second-degree burglary and attempted theft of a motorcycle from a store in White Plains, Maryland. Following a bench trial, Appellant was found to be involved in the crimes of second-degree burglary and possession of burglar's tools and was placed on supervised probation. In this timely appeal, Appellant asks:

Did the juvenile court err by denying T.W.'s motion to dismiss for excessive delay in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy adjudication?

For the following reasons, we affirm, in part and vacate in part, the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Appellant's sole issue on appeal alleges violations of the time deadlines associated with his juvenile case, therefore, a detailed recitation of the underlying facts of the case is not necessary. See Thomas v. State, 454 Md. 495, 498-99 (2017). In order to provide context, we include a summary of the facts adduced at the adjudication hearing.

On December 25, 2021, Charles County Sheriff's Office Police Officer Justin Burbank responded to Atlantic Cycle &Power, a motorcycle dealership located on Crain Highway in White Plains, Maryland. The store's alarm had been activated and police were alerted that someone was in the front vestibule area of the business after hours. Upon entering, Officer Burbank saw Appellant inside the area between the first and second set of doors to the dealership. Both sets of doors had been pried open, and a security rolldown door had also been cut. The officer ordered Appellant to come out with his hands raised. Appellant was then taken into custody, searched incident to arrest, and agreed to speak to the police. The police recovered tools, including bolt cutters and a pry bar, gloves, and a face mask at the scene.

The following is a chronology of the dates at issue:

December 25, 2021: Arrested and Charged with attempted breaking into the Atlantic Cycle &Power store, located in White Plains, Charles County, Maryland. Released to grandmother after processing.

February 16, 2022: Charges forwarded from police to Department of Juvenile Services ("DJS") intake officer. ^[1]

March 1, 2022: Charges forwarded from DJS to State's Attorney.

March 30, 2022: Juvenile Petition filed by State's Attorney.

April 4, 2022: Juvenile Petition served.

April 13, 2022: Preliminary Hearing

April 14, 2022: Entry of Appearance of Counsel.

May 11, 2022: Status Hearing May 25, 2022: Adjudication Hearing (scheduled, but postponed). State's request for postponement granted. Adjudication rescheduled to June 29, 2022.

June 14, 2022: Motion to Dismiss for Excessive Delay filed.

June 29, 2022: Adjudication Hearing (held). Appellant's Motion to Dismiss for Excessive Delay heard and denied.

July 27, 2022: Disposition Hearing.

Pertinent to our discussion is the first scheduled Adjudication Hearing on May 25, 2022. On that day, the State requested a postponement because it learned that morning at 8:15 AM, that the responding officer, Justin Burbank, "called out sick and is unavailable to testify." The State informed the court that the 60^th day from the day the petition was served was May 31, 2022^[2]. See Md. Rule 11-421 (b) (discussed infra).

The court granted the State's motion, stating:

All right, Madam Clerk, let's do this. Let's grant the State's request to continue the case. Let's set the case for June 22nd, at 8 a.m. Excuse me, 9 a.m. The -- my -- my feeling on this is in age of the pandemic people calling in sick, you know, I have to sort of treat it a little bit differently, you know. So June 22nd, at 9 a.m. we'll do adjudication.

Appellant's counsel objected, asserting that she was ready to proceed, and the proposed new hearing date conflicted with her schedule. The court responded, "All right. I don't know if I said it, which is probably good cause to go outside the time. But do you want the 22nd or the 29th?" Maintaining the objection, Appellant's counsel stated, "[b]etween those two dates we would choose the 29^th." Adjudication was reset for June 29, 2022.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a written Motion to Dismiss for Excessive Delay in Violation of Respondent's Statutory and Constitutional Rights to a Speedy Trial. That motion was heard by the juvenile court prior to adjudication. As will be examined in more detail in the following discussion, Appellant argued there were two delays at issue: 1) the delay in forwarding the complaint by the police to DJS; and 2) the delay in subsequently scheduling adjudication. Of these, the parties and the court spent most of the hearing on the latter issue.^[3]

Appellant argued that the adjudication hearing needed to be held within 60 days of service of the delinquency petition or counsel's appearance, whichever is earlier and "extraordinary cause" is required to extend this deadline. Md. Rule 11-421 (b) (2); Md. Rule 11-421 (b) (6). Appellant argued there was not extraordinary cause to postpone the original adjudication, scheduled for May 25, 2022, and stated:

Based on that, this case was set for adjudication on May 25th, and we showed up ready for adjudication on May 25th.

That morning after telling Counsel that they would be ready for adjudication, the State asked for a continuance saying that one of the officers called in sick.

We objected to that continuance. We were given no explanation of what kind of sick we're talking about, was it a broken ankle, was it COVID symptoms? That would obviously affect whether or not there is good cause to continue a case based on the officer calling in sick.

But even if the Court were to find that that was a valid reason to continue the case, there's no explanation, there's no, there's really no good reason to continue the case outside of 60 days (inaudible).

I don't know why the officer called in sick. I did -- we didn't get any more information about that, but the Court wasn't closed because of COVID, we -- you know, the truth is in that timeline I had some, had to stay out of Court because of COVID and had since returned and been able to handle quite a few cases.^[4]

The Court's been open this entire month, there's been no day that it was closed because of COVID.

And instead of -- and, you know, even if there was a concern about that specific day, May 25th, the Court could have and should have re-set this case to the following day, find out more from the officer the following week so that the officer would have time to recover.

These days I think COVID quarantine time is either five, 10 days, depending on what the situation is. There was no reason to, for this case to be set out as far as it was set.

And when re-setting this case, the Court did not find extraordinary cause within the 60-day time limit; instead, what the Court found was good cause.

And, you know, I, I don't know that I agree that there was good cause to go outside of the 60 days, but either way, we're not at the extraordinary cause standard.

Appellant also asserted that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Addressing the required factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), counsel stated:

In this case we've gone outside of the Court's (inaudible) rules, but we've also violated [T.W.'s] Constitutional rights to a speedy trial, implicating his Constitutional right to a speedy trial and violating that right because of the length of delay, because of the reason for the delay, because he asserted his right to a speedy trial, because of the prejudice that he has suffered as a result of this.

[T.W.] and his grandmother came to Court on May 25th ready for trial. I don't think we found out that this case was getting continued until close to noon on that date, after they had been sitting around for a few hours.

Then he came to Court again today ready for trial, ready for an adjudication; and he sat here from 10:00 until after noon, I think it was about 12:15 when his case was first called, only to find out his case was getting pushed to the afternoon.

He came back in the afternoon and we had to wait for some other cases to be dealt with and now here we are at 2:40 on the second day that was set for adjudication, well outside of the 60-day time.

This has weighed on [T.W.] This has weighed on his family. His father's at work today and couldn't be here with him, which is why his grandmother is the one who is here with him, and it's been frustrating to them.

It also affects our ability to assist in his Defense because of the issues that I discussed before, when it comes to memory, when it comes to his recollection of the events and really when it comes to whatever services the Court were to offer if he were found involved and connecting them back to the allegations for which we are before the Court.^[5]

The State responded:

[STATE]: I did make [T.W.'s COUNSEL] aware of that early in the morning when I became aware, became aware of the officer's (inaudible) delay.

As stated, that morning when we were in Court when this matter was called, called, I told her initially that we were prepared to move forward and that Email I believe was around 7:48 that morning.

Subsequently I sent an Email to [T.W.'s COUNSEL] later, a few moments later which, if I'm not mistaken, I don't have the exact time stamp, but it was before Court started and I told her unfortunately the State will be requesting to have this matter continued due to the

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