In re Taasera Licensing, Patent Litig.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:22-MD-03042-JRG |
| Parties | IN RE TAASERA LICENSING LLC, PATENT LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO CIVIL ACTION NO. 222-CV-00468-JRG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
MEMORADUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”) (Case No. 2:22-md-3042, Dkt. No. 89; Case No. 2:22-cv-468, Dkt. No. 26) filed by Defendants CrowdStrike, Inc. and CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “CrowdStrike”). On February 21 2023, the Court held a hearing in the abovecaptioned case regarding the Motion, along with several other consolidated cases and related motions. (Case No. 2:22-cv-468, Dkt. No 43). Having considered the Motion, the subsequent briefing the oral arguments, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
On October 21, 2022, Taasera Licensing LLC (“Taasera”) filed suit against CrowdStrike asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,673,137 (the “'137 Patent”); 8,327,441 (the “'441 Patent”); 8,850,517 (the “'517 Patent”); 8,955,038 (the “'038 Patent”); 8,990,948 (the “'948 Patent”); 9,092,616 (the “'616 Patent”); 9,608,997 (the “'997 Patent”); and 9,923,918 (the “'918 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 13-21). Beginning on August 3, 2022, and for tag-along cases filed thereafter, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) centralized the above-captioned litigation in the EDTX and transferred the following cases to the same (categorized by their original jurisdictions) for consolidated pretrial proceedings:
• Eastern District of Texas:
• Northern District of Texas:
o Trend Micro, Inc. v. Taasera Licensing LLC, Case No. 2:22-CV-00303-JRG
• Western District of Texas:
o Taasera Licensing LLC v. CrowdStrike, Inc., CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc., Case No. 2:22-CV-00468-JRG
(Case No. 2:22-md-3042, Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 3; Case No. 2:22-cv-468, Dkt. No. 12). On January 6, 2023, CrowdStrike filed the instant Motion, requesting that the Court dismiss Taasera's (1) “direct infringement claims for the six identified method-claim patents, (2) indirect infringement claims for all Asserted Patents, and (3) claim for permanent injunctive relief. (Case No. 2:22-cv-468, Dkt. No. 26 at 7).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2). A Court can dismiss a complaint that fails to meet this standard. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6). “to survive dismissal at the pleading stage, a complaint must state ‘enough facts such that the claim to relief is plausible on its face.'” Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads enough facts to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court accepts well-pleaded facts as true and views all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the Court is not required to accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Id.
In the Fifth Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009); Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). In determining a motion to dismiss, “[t]he court may consider ‘the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.'” Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F.Supp.3d 928, 935 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting Lone Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)).
In the context of patent infringement, a complaint must place the alleged infringer on notice of what activity is being accused of infringement. Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, the plaintiff is not required to prove its case at the pleading stage. Id. Assessing the sufficiency of pleadings is a context specific task; simpler technologies may require less detailed pleadings whereas more complex technologies may demand more. Disk Disease Solutions Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
CrowdStrike argues that Taasera fails to state a claim for direct infringement, indirect infringement, and injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 26 at 7). The Court considers each issue in turn.
As an initial matter, CrowdStrike argues that this Court is bound by precedent from the Western District of Texas because cases transferred to transferee courts for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 must apply the substantive law of the transferor court. (Id. at 16 (citing In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liab. Lit., 215 F.Supp.2d 795, 804 (E.D. Tex. 2002)). CrowdStrike misapplies In re Norplant because the transferee court is required to apply the substantive law of the state from which it was transferred. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (). In fact, “[f]ederal law (unlike state law) is supposed to be unitary.” Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2nd Cir. 1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407). Therefore, this Court will apply the legal precedent of the Fifth Circuit, the Federal Circuit, and the Eastern District of Texas. Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his court cannot and does not apply the law of another circuit simply because the case was transferred from the other circuit.”); Menowitz, 991 F.3d at 40 (“[A] transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law, not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit.”); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ().
CrowdStrike argues that Taasera fails to plausibly allege direct infringement for six of the Asserted Patents since Taasera fails to identify that either CrowdStrike defendant actually performs each and every element of the claimed methods. (Dkt. No. 26 at 9-10). CrowdStrike contends, for example, that Taasera alleges that the accused products “practice a method for implementing security for a computing device ....” (Id. at 10 (citing Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 38)). CrowdStrike further contends that Taasera improperly ties such allegations solely to the accused products, arguing that said accused products cannot practice a method by themselves. (Id. at 11 (citing Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Sys., Inc., 965 F.3d 1299, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). It therefore argues that to properly allege direct infringement of the asserted method claims, Taasera would have to identify a person or entity that performed each step of the asserted methods. (Id.). CrowdStrike states that if Taasera's direct infringement theory relies on a combination of multiple entities performing different steps of the claimed methods, Taasera must plausibly allege divided infringement. (Id.).
CrowdStrike also argues Taasera wrongly conflates the CrowdStrike entities as direct infringers of the Asserted Patents, arguing that Taasera should be required to identify which CrowdStrike entity performs the steps of the asserted method claims. (Id. at 12, 13). In CrowdStrike's view, “[c]ourts have dismissed complaints that improperly conflate defendants' actions.” (Id. at 12-13 (collecting cases)). Although Taasera may argue that CrowdStrike directly infringes based on use or testing the identified accused products, CrowdStrike asserts, such allegations are mere boilerplate recitations. (Id. at 13).
Taasera responds that its Complaint defines “CrowdStrike” to include both CrowdStrike, Inc. and CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc. as directly infringing the Asserted Patents. (Dkt. No. 30 at 9).
Taasera argues that, as to each Asserted Patent, it alleges facts to show how CrowdStrike's accused products satisfy each element of one or more claims of the Asserted Patents. (Id. at 10). The Complaint makes clear, Taasera asserts, “that once the device is working, the product performs the asserted method.” (Id. at 11). In fact, according to Taasera, “The CrowdStrike products causing the product to automatically perform a step of the method is similar to the theory approved in SiRF Tech Inc., where the accused infringer designed, made, and sold GPS chips in products with software that automatically performed a step of the claimed method.” (Id. (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. ITC, 601 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Taasera further argues that it does not improperly conflate the CrowdStrike entities and alleges that they both retain Accused Products that perform all steps of the asserted...
To continue reading
Request your trial